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Summary
SUMMARY
The thesis is focused on the transformation o f Kazan -  the capital city of the Republic 
o f Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The research uses two case studies, namely the 
Resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) and the 
Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan 
Historic Centre (2000-2005) to analyse the emerging nature and character of urban 
governance in Kazan. The research is based on the analysis o f policy documents, 
statistical data and interviews with policy-makers in the city of Kazan in Russia.
The analysis of urban transformation helps to understand the underlying political, 
economic and social processes that Russia has experienced since the late 1980s. The 
research has critically evaluated the theories of globalisation, post-socialist transition 
and governance and demonstrated that many o f these theories are western-centric and 
have been developed and evolved with little engagement with Russian urban 
experience.
The research also reveals the limitations o f western urban theory in explaining the 
urban transformation o f Kazan where the elites pay homage to globalisation and neo­
liberalism in principle, but in practice use old-fashioned methods of administrative 
coercion and political bargaining to attract development funding from the state- 
controlled industries and the federal government. The research has revealed the 
importance of pre-existing institutions, practices and cultures that form “hybrid” 
institutional arrangements that diverge from the entrepreneurial governance model.
vi
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Chapter 1 Introduction
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The significance of the topic
This study is inspired by observations of the transformation of the city of Kazan, the 
capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia. This transformation has been connected to 
the implementation of large govemment-led urban redevelopment projects, including the 
construction of one of the largest in Europe Kul-Sharif Mosque (1995-2005) and the 
Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of Kazan Historic 
Centre (2000-2005). Large urban development projects are interesting not only because 
they transform the image of the city and its habitual environment, but also because they 
represent changing patterns of political and economic power and display societal 
processes and identities (Swyngedouw and Moulaert 2003c; Lefebvre 2003/1977). The 
analysis of urban development projects in Kazan will contribute to our understanding of 
the post-socialist city, post-socialist transition, urban governance and its political, 
economic and social context.
The post-socialist transition has been a subject of academic debates since the early 
1990s. The initial idealism of such concepts as the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989) and 
the “third wave o f democratisation” (Huntington 1991) has been gradually replaced by 
more sceptical views of the ability of many post-socialist countries to make a complete 
transition to democracy and a market economy as the actual path of transition has been 
complicated by various political, institutional and social “legacies” (Lowenhardt 1995; 
McFaul 2001). The two decades of a patchy and protracted democratic consolidation 
have led to questions about the usefulness and explanatory power of the post-socialist 
paradigm itself (Carothers 2002; Young 2007).
The historical disjuncture between the West and non-West theoretical debates 
hinders the development of theoretical alternatives to the dominant post-socialist 
transition theory. This disjuncture stems from the reinforced during the Cold War 
division between the East and West which still shapes the western perception of the post­
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socialist region and inhibits the effective implementation of cross-cultural and trans­
national perspective and channels of exchange (Flynn and Oldfield 2006, p. 5). The 
historical conceptual division between the developed and less developed countries also 
fails to incorporate the peculiarities of Russia’s situation and makes it difficult to 
“pigeonhole Russia” (Oldfield 2001, p. 102). As a result the development of post­
communist Russia is very rarely mentioned in the mainstream globalisation literature 
(McCann 2004a, p. 1). The studies of Russian cities represent a very modest section of 
western literature as compared to voluminous studies of cities in China and Central and 
Eastern Europe. The need for international collaboration and expanding the geographical 
horizons of western debates has been realised in the West as well. For instance, there 
have been recent calls to develop more comparative research aimed at testing western 
concepts of state rescaling in diverse global regions (see, Brenner 2009, pp. 133-34).
Another problem of the dominant transition theory is that it focuses primarily at 
the macro level and tends to overlook geographical contingencies and regional variations 
within the country. In a country like Russia such an approach proves to be inadequate 
because globalisation is in practice tempered by more local processes which makes the 
impact of globalisation fragmented and often contradictory (Sakwa 2004, p. 211).
This research attempts to address these problems by analysing urban 
transformation and urban governance in post-socialist Russia. The significance of cities 
for the post-socialist transition has long been acknowledged (Andrusz et al 1996). 
According to Wu (2003) transitional cities are becoming such an important subject of 
inquiry because they are located at the frontier of globalisation and becoming the gateway 
linking the global economy and transitional economies (p. 1337). Nevertheless, research 
on urban governance in Eastern Europe still remains under-theorised (Feldman 2000, p. 
829). To date, there has been little systematic work done to apply Western concepts and 
debates to Russian cities (exceptions include Golubchikov 2010; Badyina and 
Golubchikov 2005). It remains unclear how urban transformation in post-socialist 
countries relates to wider theoretical debates of globalisation, competitiveness, neo­
liberalism and governance.
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
The analysis of large urban development projects will also contribute to our 
understanding of the connections between the social and the spatial by looking at how 
political, social and economic transition unfolds in the context of a regional capital in 
Russia. The spatial aspect of urban governance has gained prominence in the light of the 
recent critical geographical debates on the spatial dimension of state power, geography of 
power and rescaling of state (see, Allen 2003; Brenner 1998; 2003; 2004; Jessop 2008). 
The organisational, spatial and cultural aspect of urban governance embodied in large 
urban development projects have been rarely discussed in the Russian context which 
makes it an interesting area of analysis.
1.2 Post-socialist urban governance in Russia
In a centrally planned system the lines of command pierced through administrative tiers 
from the centre down to the socialist enterprise level. According to Lappo (1992) socialist 
cities were first of all sites of industrial production, hence urban development served the 
aim of increasing industrial output (p. 530). There was no clear division between the roles 
of local authorities and industrial ministries in executing urban development tasks. It was 
a common practice when local and regional authorities negotiated with powerful all- 
Union ministries the location choices for new industrial developments trying to secure the 
inflow of central government investment in their regions. The major benefits o f having a 
new industrial development were not only new jobs, the enhanced tax base and improved 
infrastructure but also new housing, hospitals, schools and other urban services required 
to create good living conditions for workers (Osborn 1970). Governance as a system of 
flexible multi-level institutional arrangements and managerial practices was not alien to 
the Soviet system and, in fact, was essential for urban development (see, Hough 1969; 
Taubman 1973).
Since the beginning of the economic and political reforms in the early 1990s 
Russian cities have undergone a dramatic transformation in their economic base, urban 
development, planning and governance. In 1990 the system of local government in 
Russia was “reinvented” with the first democratic (i.e. multi-party) local, regional and
3
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republican elections (Campbell 1996, p. 142). In 1992 the centralised planning system 
collapsed and the city authorities “picked up” some powers that used to belong to the 
Communist party, the central government and industrial ministers. Subsequently, the 
control of economic production and exchange has started shifting to the regional and 
local levels (Stoner-Weiss 1997, p. 88; Shleifer and Treisman 2000, p. 30).
However, assuming control over economic issues came at a price. According to 
Shvetsov (2002) cities were immediately affected by the restructuring that worsened the 
pre-existing problems and caused avalanche-like growth of new urban problems (p. 7). In 
this situation city authorities in Russia lacked sufficient institutional capacity to govern 
(Friedgut 1994), suffered from poor inter-government coordination (Young 1994) and 
experienced growing pressure on municipal budgets from fulfilling central mandates not 
always supported by budget funding (Mitchneck 1997). Russian cities faced 
unprecedented situation when the number of urgent tasks was rapidly growing while the 
amount of available financial and material recourses not simply remained the same, but 
much more often contracted (Shvetsov 2002, p. 10). The problems of early years of 
transition persisted into the present. With municipal budgets being under the strain, city 
authorities in Russia lack own resources to cover the unfunded mandates of the central 
government and run urban services and therefore remain highly dependent on “hand­
outs” from regional and federal level budgets (Evans 2000, p. 125; Slider 2004, p. 155; 
Young 2004, p. 137).
Russian cities remain restrained in terms of both economic and political resources 
available for providing adequate support of local services and the implementation of 
development plans. While local governments are dealing with the increasing number of 
more complex issues, they undergo the process of reform and modernisation. The 
processes of privatisation and commercialisation of land, infrastructure and social 
services have moved the issues of social justice and equality to the fore of political 
agenda. This leads to a series of questions about the policy choices available to the post­
socialist city under the conditions of economic restructuring, growing competition and 
budgetary instability. The Western theories suggest that economic restructuring leads to 
the transformation of the traditional government and proliferation of governance,
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competitiveness, urban entrepreneurialism and public-private partnerships, where both 
sectors work together in order to achieve socially significant results (see, Harvey 1989; 
Stone 1989). Under the conditions of growing economic complexity and uncertainty 
governments borrow approaches that have been developed in the business sector and are 
aimed at enhancing efficiency and effectiveness public sector administration.
The research addresses the question whether the post-socialist city is likely to 
adopt entrepreneurial and marketing strategies aimed at the enhancing its competitiveness 
on open markets, or alternatively, is the post-socialist city more likely to use traditional 
and well-proven during the socialist period strategies to secure development funding 
based on such methods as political bargaining and administrative coercion. This research 
attempts to approach these questions by looking at the design and implementation of 
large urban development projects.
Recent studies on Moscow show that the city government has been successfully 
using its administrative power and the availability of private capital to commercialise 
urban space and mobilise financial resources needed for the implementation of large 
urban development projects (Pagonis and Thomley 2000; Valletta 2005). Although there 
is evidence of the convergence of urban planning and governance in Russian cities with 
western examples (see, Shove and Anderson 1997; Trutnev et al 2004), other studies 
suggest that traditional institutional arrangements, cultures and practices still play a 
decisive role in shaping the contemporary Russian urban governance (see, Campbell 
2006; Hahn 2004). Taking into account significant economic disparities between Russia’s 
regions it is plausible to expect that only few Russian cities would be able to adopt a neo­
liberal urban governance model similar to one set up by Moscow government. Less 
prosperous cities may rely on the traditional methods of mobilising resources for urban 
development, as detailed in Evans (2000, p. 115) and Mitchneck (1994, p. 93). That 
makes the analysis of the socialist ‘legacies’ important for the understanding of 
contemporary Russian urban transition.
All these issues provoke numerous questions about the nature of urban 
governance in Russia’s cities and the role of large urban development projects in working 
out the new governance model. Urban transformation in post-socialist Russia raises
5
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questions about the mechanisms that lie behind these urban development projects and to 
what extent they can be explained with reference to Western concepts of urban 
governance and development. An analysis of the interaction between the actors and 
governing mechanisms involved in the urban transformation can help to understand wider 
social dynamics in post-socialist countries.
1.3 Urban redevelopment projects in the post-socialist city
The socialist system implied standardisation of building technology across the country 
and led to “urban uniformity” (Fisher 1967, pp. 1080-1082). The post-socialist transition 
has brought about the great diversity of new types of urban development projects as well 
as the actors involved in their planning and implementation. The post-socialist city has 
witnessed the proliferation of commercial urban development projects. Strong efforts 
have also been made to replace the grim imagery of the socialist industrial past with more 
“marketable” images capable of attracting external investment (Young and Kaczmarek
1999). The post-socialist transition has affected buildings and urban spaces as bearers of 
“collective memory” and “symbolic ownership” (Colomb 2007). Some legacies 
associated with former repressive regimes have become unacceptable and had to be 
“erased” (Leach 2002), other legacies have become highly desirable and hence had to be 
recreated (Graney 2007).
In the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) capital cities have undergone 
transformation aimed at representing newly revived statehood and national identity. For 
example, in Turkmenistan architecture and monumental art have been used to consolidate 
the rule of the President by creating myths about the decisive role he played in the history 
of the country (Sir 2008, p. 215). In a similar way Anacker (2004, pp. 530-531) shows 
that the new capital city of Kazakhstan, Astana is being constructed with the purpose of 
representing both the external and the internal legitimacy of the current political regime. 
Adams (2008, p. 287) describes the centuries-old Russian tradition of the ruling elites 
using monumentality in urban design to shape the society, strengthen the nation’s unity 
and legitimise the political rule. The existing literature on urban development typically
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presents urban development as a ‘snapshot’ of political, economic, social and cultural 
transformations in the society that reflects societal changes in the most visible and lasting 
form but does not systematically connect these aspects.
The resurrection of old and the construction of new places of worship have 
become one of the symbols of post-socialist urban transformation. Some projects, such as 
the resurrection of the Cathedral o f Christ the Saviour in Moscow in 2000, have been 
given a national significance (Sidorov 2000). Andrusz (2006) describes the same project 
as linking tourism and religion - “a place to which visitors come either to search for their 
spiritual selves or to consume religion as spectacle” (p. 87). Hoffman (2007) gives an 
account of the same project from a completely different perspective. He argues that the 
multi-million dollar project of the Cathedral resurrection actively supported by the Mayor 
of Moscow Luzhkov, has become the testing site for the new political and economic 
mechanisms that eventually formed a new urban governance model for Moscow. 
According to Hoffman, in order to establish a good relationship with the Moscow 
government, businesses donated money to the construction of the Cathedral, which was 
patronised personally by the Mayor of Moscow. The Mayor Luzhkov
has rebuilt not merely the destroyed by Stalin temple and created not only a 
shiny symbol of Russia’s post-socialist renaissance. The temple has become 
the materialisation of the new model of capitalism, which Luzhkov was 
introducing in Russia in the 1990s, the model that combined money and 
power... with a singe central figure, Luzhkov himself, at the steering wheel 
(Hoffman 2007, p. 272).
More recently urban development projects have taken a new direction, suggesting 
that new influences and priorities such as nationalism and nostalgia for the Soviet past are 
being brought to bear on urban development in Russia. Since 2000, the new era of Putin’s 
rule has been associated with the growing use of patriotic rhetoric in political discourses, 
identity debates and subsequently in architecture and urban design. Largely, these 
discourses have been based on the glorification of the Soviet past and the achievements 
of the socialist system. Baker and Glasser (2005), for example, observe that
7
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Moscow developers of the 1990s had built great towers of glass, hoisted 
dizzying neon signs along once-grey avenues, and invested millions of 
dollars in shimmering new buildings whose main architectural style was 
best described as late Las Vegas. Anything Soviet was out, and anything 
that smacked of Western-style modernism, no matter how tacky, was in.
But in Putin’s Moscow, political slogan of stability and restoration of 
Soviet-era symbols were mirrored in the changing landscape. Architects 
called the design concept of the moment neo-Stalinism, in homage to the 
style decreed by Stalin (Baker and Glasser 2005, pp. 148-149).
At the regional level, after the Soviet Union collapsed and the subsequent 
reconfiguration of Russia’s federal system gave more powers to its provinces, regional 
authorities especially those in ethnic provinces made efforts to revive regional cultures 
with the aim to achieve greater political and economic autonomy from Moscow. Large 
urban development projects became an important element of newly constructed regional 
identities. The expectation of political and symbolic significance of new urban 
development has had an impact on the type and visual characteristics of the projects as 
explained by Demchuk (2002):
The ruling regional elites invested a substantial part of their energy and 
efforts into a struggle for political ‘dissociation’ from Moscow, rather than 
into economic policies. This led to a paradoxal situation: real economic 
needs of regions were taken into account less than positive image o f the 
region and its international relations. Instead of refurbishing schools, 
kindergartens and hospitals, local budgets allocated enormous funds for 
restoration o f historical monuments and famous architectural sites, or 
facades of the houses on the main streets of regional capitals. In cities of 
the Volga region, for instance, local leaders were concerned about the 
view of the cities from the river, presuming that travellers would make 
their judgements about the well-being of the region and about the 
independence of the regional authorities y appearance of the buildings.
Due to lack of finance, regional elites used all their opportunities to 
accumulate symbolic and administrative resources hoping to ‘convert’ 
them into material ones one day (p. 112).
These examples demonstrate that the boundaries between the commercial, 
symbolic and political motivations for urban projects are rather blurred. A religious 
project plays a central role in constructing power and capital accumulation schemes; a 
commercial project has little economic rationality and has a mainly symbolic role. Both 
economic and political “rationality” seems to be losing their traditional meanings in the
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process of forming a new cultural landscape and a political economy of urban space. In 
that sense traditional interpretations of urban projects and urban images as ‘products’ of 
political and economic processes lack certain dynamism, as they tend not to pay 
sufficient attention to such important aspects of urban development as the contingencies 
of the process, the role of the actors involved and the necessary relationships between the 
actors.
The mainstream literature on post-socialist transition assumes that under 
conditions of globalisation there must some uniformity in the ways cities are planned and 
governed. At the same time, many studies show that the real situation is much more 
complex and involves political and cultural contingencies. In that sense traditional 
interpretations of urban transition as a ‘response’ to challenges fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the local contingencies of the process, the role of the actors involved and the 
necessary relationships between the actors. The discussion leaves many unanswered 
questions about political processes, governance practices and institutional conditions 
which lie behind the implementation of large urban development projects in the post­
socialist city.
1.4 Problems in the existing literature on post-socialist urban transition
The post-socialist transition and its impact on cities and the way cities are planned and 
governed has been well documented in the literature (Andrusz et al 1996; Hamilton et al 
2005; Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). Nevertheless the existing literature on urban 
transition has some theoretical limitations and weaknesses which present a challenge of 
conducting research on urban governance in post-socialist cities. In addition to the 
disjuncture between the West and non-West debates and limitations of theoretical 
transfer, there are other theoretical problems.
First, the dominant concept of post-socialist transition implies a passage from one 
set of political and economic rules to another and a subsequent ‘pre-written’ reshaping of 
the regulatory environment and government institutions inherited from socialism into 
some ‘normal’ market configuration. This approach has been criticised as “naive” and
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unable to take into account the “power of the past” (Hamilton et al 2005, p. 11). The 
concept of ‘legacy’ seems to overshadow more fundamental question about alternatives 
to neo-liberalism, its local variations and the role of pre-existing factors that may 
substantially alter its development. In policy terms the uncritical use of theories and 
discourses creates a danger of mechanical translation of certain governing practices 
across national borders assuming that what worked in the West would work in the East. 
In practice the actual ‘transition’ is never as neat and straightforward as the theory might 
imply (Herrschel 2007). Too much seems to be taken for granted in adopting neo- 
liberalist restructuring as the only way of solving economic problems.
Second, despite the fact that post-socialist transition has led to the dramatic 
political and economic restructuring and the proliferation of western concepts of urban 
competitiveness, entrepreneurialism and urban governance in political discourses, urban 
management practice and urban planning, theoretical reflection on these processes may 
still lag behind. The urban transformation of the post-socialist city has been partly 
explained by various concepts including economic restructuring, local government 
reform (Campbell 2006), place promotion (Ren 2008), place identity (Leach 2002), 
landscape (Colomb 2007) but little efforts have been made to attempt to theorise the 
change outside the dominant concept of post-socialist transition. Little is known how 
political, economic and cultural values and discourses interact at the urban development 
level. Disciplinary barriers seem to complicate the understanding of complex and 
dynamic transformation of urban space in Russian cities and indicate the need to ground 
research in a wider theoretical context and use the existing theories more critically.
Third, despite the significance of cities for defining the actual configuration of 
post-socialism in socio-spatial and economic terms, few attempts have been made to 
analyse the mechanism and driving forces o f transition at the city level. According to 
Musil (1993) a reliable theory to explain post-socialist urban transition was non-existent 
(p. 899). Since then there has been a significant growth in research on post-socialist 
cities, but still, according to Feldman (2000):
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research on urban development and governance in Eastern Europe is 
chiefly empirical. Post-socialist transformations are not conceptualised in 
the light of the theoretical frameworks commonly employed to explain 
regeneration and governance (in ‘the West’) and, conversely, these 
frameworks do not incorporate evidence from Eastern Europe (p. 829).
While attempts to theorise urban transition remain rare, researchers focuse on 
more localised tasks. According to Axenov et al (2006) if searching for a “comprehensive 
explanation” is an impossible task, “individual phenomena that characterise the 
transformation” should be studied (p. 19)'. In Russia, scholars demonstrate low interest in 
studying urban politics and dedicate more efforts to municipal law and management 
studies (Gel’man 2002, pp. 19-20). While most of the literature remains descriptive and 
focuses on spatial and institutional transformations in post-socialist cities, the studies on 
the emerging model o f urban governance and the implications of neoliberal transition in 
the post-socialist context remain rare (see Badyina and Golubchikov 2005).
Fourth, the existing urban literature seems to describe urban transformation within 
a dualistic model of the “driving force” and the “reaction” (see, Tsenkova and Nedovic- 
Budic 2006). This approach conceptually separates the urban space and the social process 
by portraying the former as a ‘receiver’ of influences generated elsewhere. That approach 
locks the debate within the disciplinary boundaries of economics and political science on 
one side, and urban studies on other. As a result, the narratives of institutional, spatial, 
political development appear somewhat separated. This separation limits the 
opportunities to conceptually link economic aspects with physical, social and mental 
aspects of space as proposed by Lefebvre (2003/1977, p. 88).
Finally, the collapse of the communist system and the following transformation of 
political and governing mechanisms gave rise to several interesting studies of the 
emerging patterns of urban governance in Russian cities (see Ruble 1995), but overall,
1 A xenov  et al (20 0 6 ) continues, “at the m om ent, it is im possib le to provide a com prehensive explanation  
o f  the interconnections and relationships betw een the various social processes that are currently taking 
place throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It is how ever, realistic and possib le to undertake an 
assessm ent o f  individual phenom ena that characterise the transformation phase and the current state o f  
urban developm ent in the post-socialist countries” (A xen ov  et al 2006, p. 19).
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the area receives modest research attention. The analysis of post-socialist urban 
governance occupies a marginal section in urban literature. While there is growing 
literature on urban transformation of capital cities in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Stanilov 2007), in the case of Russia the debate focuses mainly on the country’s two 
largest and most globalised cities: Moscow and St. Petersburg (Evans 2000, p. 115). With 
few exceptions (Stenning 1999; Alexandrova et al 2004; Graney 2007; 2009) Russia’s 
regional capitals have received practically little research attention.
1.5 Developing a framework for analysis
The discussion demonstrates that post-socialist urban transformation is a complex 
phenomenon that needs further analysis. To overcome the limitations of the existing 
theory that considers post-socialism as ‘eastern wing’ of the global process of neo-liberal 
restructuring, the research will critically review the modem western theoretical debates. 
The contemporary debates on neo-liberalism, the socio-spatial organisation of state, 
transformation of state power examine a contested, heterogeneous and restless process 
which gives a rise to new governing models and constellations of power (Swyngedouw
2000). Cities and regions occupy central position those processes as the sites where new 
relationships of power are formed (Brenner 2004).
Large urban development projects play a central role in shaping new social 
practices and work as testing sites of new governing models (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; 
Brenner 2004). Cities and their spatial form are inter-related with the economic, social, 
cultural, and political structures of the society within which they exist (Marcuse and van 
Kempen 2000, p. 5). Urban space is seen in a dialectical connection with social, 
economic and political processes, and within the context of urban governance, economic 
and political restructuring and state realignment (see Amin and Thrift 2006; Soja 2000). 
The role of large urban development projects in constructing new economic, political and 
social relations in the city receives growing research attention in various geographical 
contexts. The role of the visual in the planning and implementation of large urban 
development projects becomes increasingly significant as the image of new development
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reflect the patterns of domination and power in society (Broudehoux 2004; Lovering 
2007). The visual component of urban projects reflects a combination of societal forces 
including political, economic and cultural influences. Cities and urban spaces are thought 
to be fundamentally important for reproduction and restructuring of the relationship of 
economic, political and social power. Therefore, specific urban projects have to be 
understood and interpreted as a result and a testing site of the particular historical form of 
urban governance that is built into the system of social, economic and political relations 
in the society.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the complex nature of urban 
transformation using large urban development projects as case studies. This approach will 
help to understand the mechanisms of urban development and the role of a wider set 
factors influencing development including the post-socialist economic restructuring, the 
emerging patterns of governance, the construction of new political and ethnic identities, 
the new ‘geometry’ of centre-periphery relationship in Russia and the prime role of the 
visual component in shaping development strategies. This shows the need for deeper and 
more dialectical interpretation of the relationship between them.
1.6 Research questions
This research aims to overcome the limitation of the existing literature and contribute to 
our understanding of urban transformation in the post-socialist city. The complexity of 
urban transformation in Russia and related processes of political and economic 
restructuring requires a critical use of the existing theories. The research attempts to 
avoid the interpretation of urban change within narrow disciplinary boundaries of 
transition theory by looking at a wider spectrum of western debates that so far have not 
been widely used to analyse Russian urban transition.
The central question of this research is to what extent Western theories of 
globalisation, neo-liberalism and competitiveness can explain urban transformation of the 
post-socialist city, or the transformation is more local in its nature and is shaped mainly 
by the local actors, legacies and pre-existing institutions. This is an interesting question as
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it can help not only to shed light on urban governance in Kazan, but critically evaluate 
western debates by expanding the geographical horizons to the region that has not been 
sufficiently studied yet. The broadening of geographical horizons will help to test the 
applicability of western debates in a new research context and evaluate the scope of 
generalisation the debates can provide.
The current study has started as an enquiry into large urban development projects 
that were implemented in Kazan and made a strong impact on the image for the city. 
Urban development projects do not exist independently from the political and socio­
economic realities, moreover, they are seen as laboratories whereby new forms of urban 
governance are worked out and new social relationships are constructed. The urban 
project is used as a lens to understand the process and structure of urban governance in its 
concrete historical form.
The aim of the current study is to analyse large urban development projects in the 
context of Russia’s regional capital and more specifically the current study seeks to 
answer the following questions:
1) What are the underlying mechanisms of urban re-development projects in post­
socialist cities, specifically regional capitals such as Kazan?
2) To what extent are these projects aimed at creating new urban images to re-invent 
the city for external audience?
3) Who is responsible for delivering these projects and what forms of urban 
governance are being formed?
4) What is the relative importance in these projects of enhanced urban and regional 
competitiveness (for economic success and external investment and development) 
and more internally orientated political motivation?
1.7 The case studies
Both case studies are based in Kazan - the capital city of Tatarstan Republic located in 
the European part o f Russia. Similar to other post-socialist capital cities, over the last two
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decades the city of Kazan has undergone a remarkable urban transformation including the 
resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) and the 
implementation of the Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the 
Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005). These two case studies have been selected because 
different levels government including federal, regional and local, as well as the non­
government sector have been involved in their design and implementation. The selected 
projects have also made a profound impact on the city landscape and the image which 
distinguishes them from other urban development projects implemented in Kazan during 
the same period.
The city of Kazan is a good case study because its urban development strategies 
have been played out within a complex institutional environment formed by processes of 
state restructuring, neo-liberalisation and establishing new patterns of power. In Kazan 
the interests of the federal, regional and local ruling elites collide; the old scores between 
the colonised and the colonisers were settled; here was staged the project of Tatarstani 
sovereignty; and implemented one of the most radical urban renewal and image remaking 
programmes in Russia’s regional capitals. All these make Kazan an interesting case study 
where question of urban development and governance can be explored.
1.8 The structure of this thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 will discuss the theoretical 
sources of research with the purpose of identifying the gap in knowledge and constructing 
a framework for analysis. Chapter 3 will discuss the research design and methodology. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the political, economic and social context of the research at three 
structural levels: national, regional and city and will specific governance and 
development challenges in the city of Kazan. The empirical work is done in Chapters 5 
and 6. Chapter 7 discusses the findings and the final Chapter 8 summarises the research.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
To analyse urban transformation in the post-socialist city it is necessary to bring together 
several strands of research. The mainstream debates on post-socialist cities cover the 
areas of social, political, economic, institutional and spatial change but at the same time 
seem not to be well connected with the contemporary western literature on urban 
governance, neo-liberal urbanisation and competitiveness. To date, little systematic work 
has been done to apply these concepts to cities in Russia. Therefore, broadening the 
western debates into new regions and exploring links with the literature on post-socialist 
transition represents an interesting research task. The literature review chapter has the 
following aims: 1) to discuss relevant literature sources, 2) to identify the gap in 
knowledge, and 3) to produce a framework for analysis. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2.1 reviews the literature on post-socialist transition and its implications 
for cities. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on neo-liberal shift and its implications for 
cities. Sections 2.3 compares the debates and discusses the relevance of western literature 
for post-socialist cases. Urban governance is discussed in Section 2.4, and finally, the 
theoretical framework for the study is outlined in Section 2.5.
2.1 Post-socialist transition and cities
Many studies (see Campbell 1995; 1996; 2006; Evans 2000; Evans and Gel’man 2004; 
French 1995; Gel’man 2002b; 2004b; Ruble 1995) have shown that pre-existing 
institutional arrangements, practices and cultural norms still influence politics and urban 
governance in post-socialist Russia. Therefore, an overview of the socialist urban 
planning system is important for understanding the contemporary stage of urban 
transition in Russia. Are ‘legacies’ elements of the previous institutional order that play 
residual role before they disappear completely once the post-socialist transition is 
finished, or are they essential elements of the system of urban governance?
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2.1.1 The socialist planning system and cities
The government system of the USSR comprised the Communist party, government 
authorities (ministries and agencies) and soviets inserted into four administrative tiers 
including i) the all-union level, ii) union-republic, iii) province and iv) local levels. The 
lines of command operated across the administrative tiers from all-union ministries and 
planning authorities down to local production units (Nove 1986, p. 9). The central 
planning committee (Gosplan) ordered various plans from a sophisticated system of 
national economic planning, to the plans and programmes of industrial complexes large 
and small (Alden et al. 1998, p. 362).
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) according to the Soviet 
Constitution (1977) was the “guiding force of the society” (Konstitutsia 1977/1990) and 
in fact was the core of the political system of the Soviet Union. Party organs formed a 
separate hierarchy of power that acted at all administrative levels, functional and 
geographic (Reiner and Wilson 1979, p. 58). Although the Party did not have formal 
powers its political control was pervasive because
the Party and government personnel interlocked at all levels -  from the 
top, where the prime minister and other top state officials were members 
of the Party Politburo or Central Committee, down to the cities, where the 
Mayor usually sit in the Party committee’s bureau (Taubman 1973, p. 14).
Whilst the Party played the leading role in decision making the soviets were fulfilling 
“the myth of participatory democracy by serving as an intermediary between constituent, 
politicians, and bureaucrats” (Frolic 1970, p. 688). Amalrik (1970) explained the 
weakness of soviets as elected government bodies by Russian historical traditions and the 
fact that “the idea o f self government, of equality before the law and of personal freedom 
-  and the responsibility that goes with these -  are almost completely incomprehensible to 
the Russian people” (p. 31).
Although the socialist centralised planning system is often perceived as that based 
on clearly defined areas of responsibility, detailed plans and rational administrative logic, 
numerous studies pointed out to the opposite: the actual implementation of plans 
depended on institutional contingencies and bargaining between actors which often
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involved personal connections and informal relations (Frolic 1971; Artobolevsky 1997). 
The centralised planning system had to deal with institutional deficiencies and lack of 
enforcement capabilities (Bater 1977), suffered from uncertainties about the availability 
of funding, lack of clarity in administrative responsibilities (Nove 1986, p. 50) and the 
lack of decision making power at the local level (Osborn 1970, p. 224). According to 
Vorozheikina (1994) the inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy required 
“necessary lubrication” in the form of patrol-client relationship, personal ties and 
corruption in order to allow the system function (p. 109).
Hough (1969) argues that those deviations from the principles of classical 
bureaucracy were not small ‘fixes’ that help the system to run. To the contrary, the 
“rampant particularism and irrationality” were, in fact, essential for the performance of 
the administrative-planning system as they allowed for flexibility and discretion needed 
for the system to function in a non-routine situation and under conditions of insufficient 
information (pp. 3-7). According to Hough (1969) if in the administrative-planning 
system all duties were taken literally and rules were obeyed rigidly the production units 
would not be able to operate effectively (p. 213). The Communist Party organs were 
institutions that exercised discretion “by compelling administrators to break the law or to 
violate some directive or plan indicator” that could slow the performance down. Other 
managerial responsibilities of the Party regional and local organs, according to Hough, 
included identifying priorities, coordinating the performance of the production units 
while acting across organisational boundaries, resolving interdepartmental conflicts, 
using administrative power to allocate resources and discretionary powers in cases of 
ambiguity in order to ensure the fulfilment of a common goal (pp. 253-255). Other 
responsibilities included the mobilisation of popular support for government initiatives 
such as increased industrial production (p. 126), the selection and appointment of 
personnel (p. 149) and of no small importance, the support of political values, the 
cultivation of the sense of loyalty and dedication (p. 297). Hough’s study demonstrates 
that the Soviet system was not as rigid and monolithic as it is often thought to have been 
but actually needed a lot of discretion exercised by the Party authorities, which stood
18
Chapter 2 Literature review
above the government and industrial management and could intervene at any level when 
it was needed.
Several other studies reveal the complex political nature of decision-making in the 
socialist system. For example, in his study of bureaucratic politics in urban development 
in the USSR Taubman (1973) argues that Soviet government was permeated with politics 
because “the Soviet political system is a huge bureaucratic arena in which bureaus 
compete, bargain and negotiate to such a degree that although all are officially 
subordinate to one central leadership that are virtually no sphere of administration 
immune from bureaucratic politics” (pp. 5-6). Artobolevsky (1997) argues that regional 
policies in the USSR were not the pure result of centralised planning as regions and cities 
were competing for resources of the centre and the actual decision upon the location of 
development projects depended on subjective factors such as personal connections, 
effective lobbying and the status of a territory in the USSR political hierarchy1.
The proliferation of administrative bargaining between USSR republics and the 
centre suggests that the level of centralisation in the USSR government was not as high 
as it is often portrayed. Valentey (2008) argues that in the Soviet system the actual 
decision-making powers belonged to local groups that were formed of representatives 
from the Party, state bureaucracy and industrial management (p. 102). Local groups 
actively participated in formulating the economic development policy:
Development of republics and regions of USSR depended on the resources 
which ministries (whose industrial enterprises were located in the republic 
and regions) were able to receive from the state in a struggle with other 
ministries. The result of this bargaining was predictable. Gradually 
republics and regions formed their own integrated state-economic and 
party-bureaucratic structures, which had a monopoly on accurate 
information as well as economic and political power, which made them 
responsible for real decision making at the subnational level (Valentey and 
Glichich-Zolotoreva 2008, p. 52).
1 In Azerbaijan in the 1990s, for exam ple, a number o f  industrial enterprises were created because o f  the 
strong position o f  the leader o f  the republic’s Com m unist party, A liev , in M oscow  (Artobolevsky 1997, p. 
136).
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While regional governments and industrial management played an important role 
in organising regional and local industrial production and economic development, the city 
level authorities had less leverage to manage economic activities or even to plan urban 
development. While the official view claimed that “only in socialist countries urban 
development is done according to a plan, regulated effectively and managed according to 
the interests of the whole society” (Vol'skiy et al 1987, p. 5), in contrast to the official 
rhetoric, the socialist city was described as completely dominated by the tasks of 
industrial production (Lappo 1992, p. 530). The balance of power between the central 
planning authorities and industrial ministries on the one hand and the local authorities on 
the other, was not in favour of the latter. Large industries and the ministries “determined 
not only the amount and type of housing, but also the level of services and the fate of 
urban planning and zoning, the level of cultural life” (Osborn 1970, p. 222). As Andrusz 
(1984) explained, “many enterprises and organisations of union and republican 
subordination did not present the city planning committees with their draft development 
plans and other data which would be crucial for devising a co-ordinated city-wide plan” 
(p. 155). When development plans were prepared, the task was often performed in design 
institutes located in large cities and “no attempts were made to gather local support for 
them because it was neither appropriate nor necessary. Planning was done fo r  the city 
rather than with the city” (Shove and Anderson 1997, p. 214).
The actual development outcome in Soviet cities was a result of a complicated 
bargaining process between territorial authorities and industrial ministries. For example, 
Taubman (1973) pointed out that development of a socialist city was a result of a 
conflictual political process of urban governance in which power groups represented by 
the party apparatchiks, soviet bureaucrats and socialist enterprise directors tried to gain 
control over scarce resources in order to achieve their goals. Using Leningrad as a case 
study, Ruble (1990) shows how the interaction between the local, regional and central 
authorities with regional level leader playing a role of political brokers between the 
centre and the periphery shaped the city. These studies show that a competitive and 
pluralist urban governance model is not a new phenomenon for Russia’s cities and that 
urban development has been a contested process run by various powerful groups.
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These legacies of the Soviet state as the source of investment, the organiser of 
economic development, the owner of means of production and controller of property 
rights is particularly important for understanding political and economic regimes in the 
contemporary Russian city. This topic will be explored further in the empirical part of the 
research. The significance of pre-existing institutional arrangements at the regional level 
for understanding modem urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the 
Research Context chapter using the Tatarstan and the city of Kazan as examples.
2.1.2 Post-socialist transition debates
This section will discuss the theoretical aspects of the post-Socialist transition including 
political, economic, social, spatial and cultural. The timeframe of the Russian reforms 
and other aspects of the policy process will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Political aspects
The early literature on post-Socialist transition saw the events in Eastern Europe and 
Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a part of the chain of events marking the “end 
of history” era predicted by Fukuyama (1989). The events were seen as a part of the 
“Third wave” of democratisation that started in countries of Southern Europe and spread 
across countries of Latin America in the late twentieth century (Huntington 1991). For 
example, Schmitter and Karl (1994) claimed that events in “in Eastern Europe or the 
former Soviet Union should be considered... analogous to events or processes happening 
elsewhere” (p. 178). It was assumed that in a universal historical process of 
“democratisation, liberalisation and privatisation” the collapse of authoritarian regimes 
was seen as natural and inevitable (Kaminski 1996, p. 3). Other scholars took more 
critical approach and argued that while a comparative analysis the democratisation 
process in the USSR and political change previously manifested in other parts of the 
world could be useful, the was little certainty about the outcomes of the process of post­
socialist transition (Bova 1991, p. 137).
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The doctrine of democratic transition has informed a number of comparative 
studies focused on the analysis of similarities and differences between Russia and the rest 
of the western world with the aim to identify the “abnormalities” that impede transition to 
democracy and market. According to Lowenhardt (1995) those abnormalities include 
various mental and institutional “legacies” of the Communist rule, the structure of the 
Soviet economy, multiethnic national composition, the instability of borders and the 
great-power status (pp. 48-52). McFaul (2001) sees Russia’s transition to liberal 
democracy as a complicated path “littered with impediments” (p. 369), which included 
both structural elements and actor-related aspects. According to McFaul (2001)
Russia’s new leaders could not... bulldoze old institutions and erect new 
ones. The use of force was considered, but Russia’s revolutionaries 
wisely refrained from using violence to achieve their goal of political, 
economic and state transformation. This strategic decision allowed many 
Soviet institutions as well as the organisations created and privileged by 
these institutions to linger in the post-Soviet era. Historical legacies 
influence all revolutions, but the shadow of the past was especially long 
(and dark) in this transition because the strategy of co-option rather than 
confrontation allowed institutions and individuals from the ancient 
regime to persist (p. 125).
Both authors have assumed that while the political processes in Russia of the early 1990s 
represented transition from authoritarian rule to a ‘normal’ liberal democracy, these 
processes were severely impeded by legacies of the previous regime. Such legacies 
included the weakness of the party system, the concentration of power within the 
executive branch, a lack of respect to the rule of law, a weak press, and the absence of 
civil society -  all o f which demonstrated strong resilience under transitional political 
regime (McFaul 2001, pp. 310-337). The important questions of institutional continuity 
and adaptation in the new conditions and the role of old institutions in forming the 
“actually existing” neo-liberalism have almost completely escaped the researchers’ 
attention.
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Economic aspects
To understand why the reforms took a particular direction it has to be taken into account 
that in the early 1990s the state of the Russian economy was the main concern and urgent 
measures were sought to restore economic life severely affected by the stagnation and 
subsequent disintegration of the centralised planning system. The successful examples of 
economic restructuring policies implemented in the 1980s in the UK and the US looked 
very pertinent to the Russian leadership and a similar approach to tackling crisis was 
adopted (Nesvetailova 2005, p 239). In Eastern Europe, Anglo-American policy product 
with a liberal brand name quickly established “a virtual monopoly on policy advice in 
most target states in the region” (Gowan 1999, p. 187). Eventually, Yeltsin’s cabinet fully 
embraced the vision of a liberal economy integrated into the global system and invited 
foreign advisors to engineer the reforms (Aslund 2007).
In policy terms, the post-socialist transition was aimed at fixing the abnormalities 
and market distortions inherited from the socialist system. According to one of the 
western advisors to the Yeltsin’s cabinet, the core reforms included six elements: 1) open 
international trade; 2) currency convertibility; 3) private ownership as the main engine of 
economic growth; 4) corporate ownership as the main dominant organizational form for 
large enterprises; 5) openness to foreign investment; and 6) membership in key 
international economic institutions (Sacks 1995, p. 51). ‘Capitalism by design’ was to be 
built through trade liberalisation reform, macroeconomic stabilisation, internal 
liberalisation (the abandonment of price control) and extensive privatisation all of which 
were deemed to constitute the reform package necessary for ‘institutional harmonisation’ 
with the advanced market economies (Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 57; Sachs 1992). Those 
economic transition policies fit under the umbrella of the Washington consensus, which 
refers to a set of supposedly uncontroversial theoretical and political assumptions about 
the composition and sequence of market-oriented reforms for economic growth 
(Herrschel 2007, p. 64). The analysis of Russia’s economic transformation also became 
dominated by neo-liberal ‘transition’ theories (McCann 2004a, p. 1).
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Social aspects
The post-socialist transition was seen as mainly a political and economic process with 
little attention paid to understanding as to how the reforms could be internalised socially. 
The social organisation, traditional institutions and culture were not seen as significant 
aspect as compared to economic rationality. While the main emphasis was made on 
reforming socialist economies according to the principles of neoclassical economics, a 
wider societal context of reforms was ignored both theoretically and practically (McCann 
and Schwartz 2007, p. 1340). The dominant economic view of transition neglected 
history and had a perception of reforms that
begins at the end-point, an idealised market, phrasing everything in those 
terms, ignoring the crucial question of how reforms engage existing 
society. The project of the economist is to grasp the tabula rasa and design 
a new system, to match events against the yardstick of that design, and to 
diagnose as failure any deviation from design (Murrell 1995, p. 177).
The transition doctrines prioritised economic rationality, while socio-political systems 
were perceived as unimportant, “getting in the way of sensible economics” (Murrell 
1995, p. 164). The current research attempts to explore the wider arena of policy process 
that involves not only economic rationality but other politically, socially and culturally 
embedded factors that are all important for understanding the policy outcome.
The universalist approach has been criticised for using historically and 
geographically specific societal and political conditions and Western values based on 
Protestant ethics to model reforms in post-socialist countries. When mechanically 
transferred to the Russian context, these doctrines and policies have produced unexpected 
results. For instance, according to Artobolevsky (1997) the Western advisors and Russian 
decision makers simply assumed that “what worked in the West would also work in the 
East” (p. 130) which often happened without taking into account the national specificity 
(Mushtuk 2007, p. 41). The ‘unwarranted faith’ in the inevitability of a transformation to 
a capitalist society has been criticised for its simplified linear approach, according to 
which “if the correct procedure is followed, the desired outcome can be assumed” 
(Bridger and Pine 1998, p. 3). According to Nesvetailova (2004) the architects of the 
reforms did not take into account the fact that
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Economic systems are products of long-term historical developments.
They reflect the nation’s traditions and beliefs, the evolution of property 
relations and the mechanisms of distribution: in short -  the structure of 
political power. In this instance, it is important to remember that, 
throughout history, the ruler in Russia was above any legal norms and 
laws (p. 50).
Despite the enormous cost the reforms have inflicted on society, they were continued 
which led to dramatic decline in economic well-being, social fragmentation, growing 
social and geographical disparities.
Spatial aspects
The dominant approach to theorising transition focuses overtly on the macroeconomic, 
country-wide level and pays little attention to the regional variations of transition. 
Neoliberal reforms were designed and introduced for the national scale and were 
considered as a process informingly affecting all spatial scales and levels from national to 
local. Seen through the prism of economic rationality, economic restructuring 
programmes did not take into account pre-existing spatial conditions. The recently 
published volume Global geographies o f post-socialist transition by Herrschel (2007) 
catalogues the variations of transition across countries in different regions of the world. 
Most of the contributions ignore the geographical aspects of transition within a country, 
conceptualising transition as a national-level phenomenon with very little attention paid 
to regional differences and the role of cities. Young (2007) argues that it is naive to 
assume that transition leads to one version of capitalism, as “what emerged in CEE was a 
complex mix of hybrid economic arrangements that synthesised in a complex way the 
new influences of the emergent globalised flexible capitalism with the legacies of the 
communist system” (p. 86).
As discussed in more detail in the research context chapter, Russia’s regions vary 
dramatically in the level of economic development, industrial and natural resource base, 
population size, ethnic characteristics and constitutional status and political influence vis- 
a-vis the federal centre. Therefore, regions are likely to adapt different strategies to 
economic and political reform. According to Smith (1995):
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there is the issue of at what level - the central, the local state or the macro- 
regional - politicians can most effectively secure for the localities the 
successful transition to the market. For its part, the centre has provided 
little in the way of effective economic policies for the regions, including 
policies that minimise disruption in the supply and demand for 
commodities between the regions... The chaos of this transition to market 
exchange has meant that the centre has been singled out by the ethno- 
republics and regions for failing to provide effective leadership in order to 
minimise the scale of economic disruption (p. 29).
The investigation into the reasons behind large differences in regional growth 
performance for the period from 1991 to 1998 has demonstrated that the economic 
performance of Russian regions depends much more on the pre-existing factors rather 
than on the progress of reforms or regulatory environment2. Ahrend (2005) claims that
First, neither differences in the depth of economic reform nor politico- 
institutional variables explain much of the variation in regional 
performance. Second, we find that the initial structure and competitiveness 
of a region's industry or a region's human capital and natural resource 
endowments, are an important determinant of a region's economic 
performance (p. 290). The initial situation in which region found itself at 
the start of transition seems to explain its relative economic success of 
failure much better (p. 311).
This analysis challenges the fundamental assumptions of transitional theory about the 
significance of market oriented regulatory environment for improving economic 
performance of countries in transition. As Ahrend’s research claims, the economic 
performance o f Russia’s regions depends more on the initial economic conditions.
Cultural aspects
The departure from the totalitarian rule has liberated society from a dogmatic ideology 
and introduced political freedom, pluralism and created opportunities for growing ethnic 
and religious awareness and national self-determination (Peterson 2001). National
2 The dependent variable is econom ic growth rate; the independent variables are placed in three groups: 1) 
politico-institutional features (governors' political orientation, m easures o f  institutional efficiency and risk 
o f  violent conflict); 2) indicators o f  econom ic reform s (degree o f  privatisation, price liberalisation and level 
o f  subsidies); 3) initial conditions (econom ic, geographical and structural features) (Ahrend 2005).
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identity projects have sprung up in post-socialist countries as a reaction to the 
“ideological vacuum” left after the break-up of the USSR (Beyme 1996; Lynn and 
Bogorov 1997) and as a reaction to colonial rule (Johnson 2005, p. 22). The growth of 
national awareness has had serious implications for the political development of many 
post socialist countries. Some former federalist states (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and USSR) have disintegrated and gone though painful process of the readjustment 
national borders and restructuring of national identities. In many post-socialist countries 
construction of a new national identity has required dealing with the “unwanted past” 
would that be the Communist, Russian or Nazi past (Leach 2002).
The sources of identity construction include ethnicity (Smith 1991) and religion 
(Johnson 2005; Matsuzato 2006). The analysis of identity construction by Castells (2004) 
is based on an approach relating to power and domination, which implies that national 
identities are socially and politically constructed to serve interests of certain groups 
(Castells 2004, p. 7). Even if identities are formed, transformed and adopted as 
instruments of social mobilisation and struggle, they cannot be constructed from ‘scratch’ 
as they are based on powerful ideas of nation, ethnicity and language. Heritage plays an 
important role in the construction of a national identity. Graham et al (2000) 
conceptualise heritage as contemporary use of the past. The meaning of the past for the 
present contemporary politics seems to be crucial for understanding heritage. Heritage 
and identity are mutually reinforcing concepts both playing an active role in 
contemporary politics. Unpacking the concept of heritage requires an analysis of political 
forces and interests because they would need particular histories, identities and heritages 
to justify political claims over territory, resources and power.
In Russia, transition sparked decentralisation tendencies among the provinces. 
Regional elites used identities strengthen claims of larger autonomy. Constructed 
identities are being used by political elites to help them to achieve their rational goals. 
Emergence and development of political identity is a result of "performance of political 
actors, who want to use those phenomena in their interests" (Gelman and Popova 2004, p. 
254). Kolossov (1999) refers to the practice of "identity manipulation" permeating the 
following areas: language policy, creation of national information space, the intention of
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national myths and stereotypes shaping territorial identities (Kolossov 1999, p. 75). 
National identity was a crucial component in making separatist threats to Moscow. 
According to Castells and Kiselyova (2000) national identity may be used “as a rallying 
banner to claim autonomy and threaten with separatism in order to obtain special status 
and additional resources from Moscow. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in 
the context and empirical chapters using the construction of national identity in Tatarstan 
and its use in federalism politics as an example.
Criticism o f the dominant approach to post-socialist transition
The actual course the post-socialist transition has led to a realisation that transition does 
not necessarily comply with idealised models. A somewhat simplified understanding of 
transition as a passage from one point to another has significant limitations as it 
overlooks the complex and contradictory nature of the process (Young 2007). The 
following issues have been discussed in the literature.
The understanding of transition as ‘a predetermined route from state socialism to 
capitalism’ has serious limitations (Lane 1995). In the West, the collapse of socialism 
was seen as a natural victory of a superior system over inferior non-westem-style state- 
societal regimes, which then had to adopt the western paradigm of state-social 
organisation, summarised in democratic market economy (Herrschel 2007, p. 46). This 
approach to transition has been also described as a “transition as imitation” by Stark and 
Bruszt (1998), meaning that post-socialist countries were expected to imitate the political 
and economic models already present in the West:
approaches the postsocialist economies from the standpoint of a future that 
has already been designated. As the science of the not yet, designer 
capitalism studies postsocialism in terms of what it will or must become, not 
simply gazing into the crystal ball of the future but also examining the 
present through that distorting lens (Stark and Bruszt 1998, p. 5).
Evaluations of democracies in transition often use the ‘yardstick’ based on an 
idealised view of the established democracies to measure the progress of ‘transitional’ 
countries towards democratic institutionalisation. Those cases that have not “arrived” at
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full institutionalisation or that do not seem to be moving in this direction, are seen as 
stunted, frozen, protractedly unconsolidated. The fact that some of those cases have been 
in a state of “protracted unconsolidation” for some 20 years suggests that there is 
something extremely odd about this way of thinking (O’Donnell 1996, p. 38). To some 
extent this stems from a somewhat simplified understanding of the role of democratic 
institutions that maintains that once the institutions are in place they will “naturally 
impose a deepening of democracy over time” (Gazibo 2005, p. 170).
In contrast to the idealised models, Russia’s transition has been more complex 
than previously experienced transitions in other countries, because in addition to 
marketisation and democratisation it has involved the transformation of state borders and 
national identities (Kuzio 2001, p. 169). In the modem literature on transition, the initial 
idealism has been replaced by growing scepticism as demonstrated by McFaul et al
(2004) who claim that “transition from autocracy can lead to democracy as well as to new 
forms of autocracy” (p. 12). Herrschel (2007) argues that “democratisation and transition 
have occurred in many different shades of grey” (p. 6). Several studies have described 
various forms of semi-democratic regimes including “competitive authoritarianism” 
(Levitsky and Way 2002), “partial democracy” (Robinson 2003), “Potemkin democracy” 
(Clark 2004) and other forms of compromised or hybrid democracies. The actual 
outcome of transition is no longer taken as ‘natural’ and a successful transition is 
believed to require a decisive power advantage in hands of hegemonic democrats 
(McFaul 2002, p. 214). Other argue that that it is precisely the democratic deficits that 
has allowed Russian democracy to sustain as under certain conditions a compromised 
democracy can be more durable (Bunce 2003, pp. 187-88). This demonstrates the 
ambiguity of the democratic transition paradigm and deficiency of a simplistic approach 
to transition.
In the 1990s it was believed that the liberalisation would automatically, through 
‘the invisible hand of the market’ transform Russia’s economy (Rutkevich 1996, p. 86). 
Later more scepticism developed in transition debates, and some even have claimed that 
the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness because it does not account for 
important underlying conditions, such as “the economic level, political history,
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institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions or other “structural” 
features” (Carothers 2002, p. 8).
The programmes and policies adopted by the Russian government to proceed with 
transition to a market economy were influenced by a group of academics associated with 
Harvard or MIT, which led to “an emphasis on top-down reforms designed by 
economists, using similar policies across countries, since market systems are pretty much 
the same everywhere whether in Russia in 1913 or the OECD of 1994” (Murrell 1995, p. 
173). Not only were the reforms based on very specific assumptions about the 
functioning of markets and the role of the state, the policies that were introduced were 
inappropriate for the case of Eastern Europe because
the policies of the Washington consensus were tailored to the problems of 
economic instability and associated indebtedness in developing countries, 
particularly Latin America. They were thus aimed at economies that were, 
more or less, following market principles... The Consensus was aimed at 
distorted market economies, and not those with a completely different 
approach to, and operation of, resource allocation (Herrschel 2007 pp. 64).
McCann and Schwartz (2007) argue that reforms based on the neoclassical paradigm pay 
little or no attention to the vital question of the embeddedness of the economy within 
much broader societal structures. To the contrast, new institutionalism emphasises “the 
complexity of pressures on organizations and how these are not reducible solely to 
following market signals” (p. 1340). A new wave of literature has emerged that started 
explaining the failure of transition. Interestingly, some of the experts who were involved 
in the initial reforms became their critics. According to Aslund (2007) liberalisation has 
transformed Russia’s economy but in a particular way: while the market reforms have 
succeeded, the democratic transition has failed (p. 296). The former chief economist from 
the World Bank has acknowledged that “seldom has the gap between expectations and 
reality been greater than in the case of the transition from communism to the market” 
(Stiglitz 2002, p. 151).
30
Chapter 2 Literature review
Beyond transitology?
The review of the debates on post-socialist transition has revealed the complex and 
contradictory nature of the process as well as the ambiguity of the post-socialist transition 
theory. The unproblematic vision of inefficient command-administrative system being 
‘naturally’ replaced by a more efficient market economy is seen as simplified (Burawoy 
2001; Marcuse 1996). Transitology should overcome the universalism and ‘teleologicaf 
bias that characterise the dominant concept of transition. According to McCann (2004a) 
countries may “possess different forms of local dynamics and processes which refuse to 
meld into a globalized homogeneity of forms” (p. 3).
To solve this problem, more attention should be paid to understanding the role of 
pre-existing institutions. According to Young (2007) the Washington Consensus and 
related approaches to post-communist change underestimated the legacies of state 
socialism and their impact on economic and political processes:
Rather than just being swept away at the ‘end of history’ to leave a tabula 
rasa upon which Western models of democracy and capitalism could be 
instantly established, the networks and socio-economic relations of state 
socialism have continued to impact on post-communist change in the 
region (p. 76)
Legacies not only ‘continued to impact’ on post-communist change, “partial 
ruins” of communism provide “institutional building blocks for political, economic and 
social reconstruction” (Stark and Bruszt 1998, pp. 5-6). The elements of the old system 
may “remain in place, albeit suitably modified to incorporate elements of liberal market 
economy, operating within a framework defined by many checks and balances in order to 
protect society from the unbridled impact of a wholesale systemic change (Herrschel 
2007, pp. 57-58). As discussed in subsequent chapters, Tatarstan has adopted a soft 
strategy of introducing market that distinguishes the region from other Russia’s provinces 
that used a wholesale approach towards marketisation. Taking into account variations in 
transition, processes in post-socialist countries should be analysed not in terms of the 
compliance with transition blueprints but by studying ongoing social conflicts and 
alliances that are shaping the multiple possible futures (Stark and Bruszt 1998).
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To understand the complexity of ‘transition’, the complex interactions between 
social groups, ‘old elites’ and ‘new elites’, state institutions, economic production and 
distribution modes have to be taken into account. Burawoy (2001) argues that the main 
reason for the particular outcome of Russia’s transition is the emerging structure of class 
power, which has produced disastrous societal effects. The decline of production 
mechanisms and their replacement with the mechanisms of exchange disempowered 
labour and empowered the new business class:
With the disintegration of the administrative economy and the transition 
from a nomenklatura to a merchant financial bourgeoisie, centred on 
banks, trading, mafia, and exploitation of natural resources, industry 
collapsed and the working class became mere residue of the past”. Under 
these conditions, “the liberal creed of the New Russians... became a thin 
veil of justification and legitimating for pursuing narrow economic 
interests (Burawoy 2001, p. 286).
Burawoy (2001) analyses the dynamic interaction of interrelated social, economic 
and political conditions and blames the structure of Russia’s economy which is less 
unsuitable for the market (too centralised and monopolistic) and the strategy of the 
reform’s implementation (too rapid compared, for example, to Chinese reforms) for the 
involution. Burawoy draws his analysis of Russia’s transformation on Polanyi’s 
framework and argues that Russia has missed all three elements of the “great 
transformation”, namely, transformation of production, of society and of the state and has 
undergone “transition without transformation”3. This discussion raises further questions 
about the capacity of transitional theory to describe, explain and processes in post­
socialist countries. The role of institutionalism in explaining the process will be discussed 
in Section 2.3.
3 The econom y undergoes neither a neoliberal revolution nor an institutional evolution but rather an 
econom ic involution, a market that sucks resources out o f  production, sending it into a spiralling  
contraction. Instead o f  a vibrant synergy betw een civ il society  and the state, w e find their mutual repulsion  
in which society turn in on itse lf -  societal involution -  and the federal state turns outwards to the global 
econom y, unable to contain the tendency toward regional autonom y -  political involution (Burawoy 2001 , 
p. 276).
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2.1.3 Post-socialist urban transition debates
This section seeks to introduce the urban transition debate and connect it with wider post­
socialist transition debate reviewed in the previous sections. It has been acknowledged 
that cities are important for the very process of transition (Andruzs et al 1996; 
Kostinskiy 2001), that “cities have been the main arenas of change, showing the newly 
emerging socio-economic differences in detail, and acting as the main foci of economic 
transaction between the country and the outside world” (Herrschel 2007, p. 133) and that 
cities function as gateways to the global economy (Wu 2003, p. 1337).
Despite the significance of urban areas for understanding transition, many studies 
on post-socialist cities remain quite descriptive in nature. The transition literature sees 
cities at the receiving end of changes occurring at the societal level. Little research has 
been done so far to explore what role large urban development projects play in creating 
new governance regime and practices and what are possible connections between large 
urban development projects and wider socio-economic transformations in post-socialist 
countries. This section seeks to critically review the current debate on urban post-socialist 
transition in order to explain large urban development projects in the post-socialist city. 
The mainstream literature on post-socialist urban transition can be characterised as 
follows.
First, the literature on post-socialist urban transition has been informed by the 
dominant concept of transition as a linear, pre-defmed passage from a totalitarian 
communist state to democracy and a market economy built in compliance with western 
standards. As discussed previously, this dogmatic approach to transition has been 
influenced by a teleological (predefined path of transition) and policy biases (“making the 
institutions “right”). It has also used somewhat simplified reading of institutional theory 
that emphasises the significance of design of formal institutional. The reality of the 
political transition seems to be more complex and contradictory.
For example, in post-reform China there has been no intention to democratise the 
political system (Ma 2002). The political discourses and governance practices related to 
the remodelling of Beijing, the political, economic and cultural elements intertwine in a
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rather unexpected way. In the 1990s the Chinese state faced a serious legitimacy crisis 
and needed to construct a new national identity to sustain its rule: "the state sought to 
regain public support and hold the country together during this turbulent period by 
nurturing a nationalist revival, thereby substituting patriotism for Marxism” (Broudehoux 
2004, p. 10). Although the Chinese modernization is still measured against the yardstick 
of international achievements,
in its efforts to forge a modem identity 'with Chinese characteristics' China 
thus remains divided between its desire to set itself apart by developing its 
own brand of modernity - one that distinctly differs from that of the liberal 
capitalist democracies of the West - and the pressure to conform to 
international ideas about modernity (Broudehoux 2004, p. 15).
Apart from an economic logic, urban image construction and city marketing also 
serve ideological purposes. Urban image construction has long fulfilled political ends, 
serving as a tool of social control, as a means of popular pacification, and as an 
instrument of state legitimatisation. Decision-makers use the built environment to 
manipulate consciousness, and disguise this manipulation in order to reproduce their 
political ideology and naturalize their power. Urban images must therefore be read as 
ideological and historical products, as behind those unified appearance lie struggles 
between various organised groups and contestation over use and design (ibid, p. 27).
Second, the literature often portrays the relationship between the state and the 
market in a rather simplistic manner, with the state representing forms of centralised 
control, public interest and coercion and the market representing the private initiative, 
investment and growth. Both are portrayed and mutually antagonistic forces engaged in a 
zero-sum game:
Given the inherent tension between those two rationalities, planning as their 
product either facilitates or restrains market forces as the balance between 
them shifts. Therefore, underlying any planning system is the balance 
established between the role of government and the role of the market in 
urban development (Vujosevic and Nedovic-Budic 2006, p. 277).
This simplistic view overlooks the emerging role of state in putting in place new 
neoliberal regime and does not seem to take into account the growing significance of
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state planning in promoting urban transformation under the conditions of 
entrepreneurial local state, which is becoming common in urban China (detailed in Wu 
2005). According to Ma (2002): “despite the presence of other forces in China’s 
socioeconomic change, such as globalisation with which the state must interact, the 
state remains the leading actor in the unfolding drama of economic transformation’’ (p. 
1549).
The mainstream urban transition literature places a strong emphasis on 
transformation of the regulatory environment as the core of transition process. The 
theorising of post-socialist transition as transformation of institutions is inseparable from 
a strong policy component centred around the following areas: privatisation and 
development of the property rights system (Struyk 1996), development of land markets 
(Bertaud 2006, p. 108), the “harmonisation” of planning legislation with the western 
standards (Golubchikov 2004; Trutnev et al 2004; Iyer 2003), introduction of a housing 
market (Buckley and Tsenkova 2006; Kim 2006).
The post-socialist transition implies a radical departure from the old institutions, 
which have to give way to new, progressive ones. Since pre-existing institutions, 
governing practices, uses of space and socio-spatial constellations cannot be replaced 
overnight with the ‘right’ ones, the ‘inherited’ institutions continue working under the 
new conditions, influencing the outcome of ‘transition’. Pre-existing institutions can be 
seen as “legacies” that slow the progress in the right direction down (French 1995) or as 
integrate components of the emerging actually existing politico-institutional forms of 
Neoliberal urban governance. With few exceptions the literature on the neoliberalisation 
of urban governance remains extremely scarce, which indicates an opportunity for new 
research to be done to address this gap in knowledge.
The economic liberalisation and the “harmonisation” of institutional conditions in 
post-socialist cities have led to a radical reconfiguration of the relationship between the 
state and the market in post-socialist societies, for example, Tosic (2006) notes that
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in the centralised planning system, the public sector determined the urban 
development process from a dominant position, but now its task is to 
regulate the dominating market processes from a subordinate position. It 
clearly has not been easy for the public sector to perform competently in 
this new role, for several reasons: a limited capacity to deal with urban 
issues under market conditions, constrained authority and power relations, 
increased responsibilities, and persisting financial problems (Tosic 2006, 
p. 145).
This reconfiguration of the relations between the state and the market in post-socialist 
countries has been far more than a mere technical change and has led to the development 
of new forms of urban governance (Feldman 2000; Wu 2002; Wu et al 2007), urban and 
regional competitiveness, growing spatial disparities between and within urban regions 
(Wu 2005), proliferation of particular urban and architectural forms that are often 
oriented on international consumption (Ren 2008; Temelova 2007).
Factors, external to cities, such as globalisation, competitiveness and neo­
liberalism, have become a powerful way of conceptualising post-socialist urban transition 
and framing the debate on the emerging post-socialist urban governance. This approach 
conceptualises the urban processes as shaped largely by external “drivers of change” 
include, among other things,
[T]he transitions to democracy (systemic political change), to market 
economies (systemic economic change), and to decentralised systems of 
local governance. These transitions are major drivers of change at the 
city level in four domains: 1) economic change; 2) social change; 3) 
changes in urban governance; and 4) spatial change (transformation of 
production and consumption spaces) (Tsenkova 2006, p. 45)
The external forces make cities adopt new policies and create new governing institutions 
ostensibly more “suitable” to face new challenges. For example, Tasan-Kok (2006) 
shows how under the pressure of international developers on one side and the budget 
constraints on the other local authorities in Hungary and Poland are “impelled to reinvent 
their role” according to the neoliberal conditions:
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As the property market became the major source of income for urban 
governments and they met increasing pressure by private-sector 
investors, the planning regulations were relaxed and the planning regime 
became ad-hoc, opportunity led corrective mechanism. The power to 
coordinate development in cities was eroded through incomplete 
planning regulations and a predominance of informal decision-making.
...the government lost most of its control over urban development and 
planning was considered an old habit of the communist regime (Tasan- 
Kok 2006, p. 68).
These policy measures and institutional adjustments legitimise certain patterns of 
resource allocation and lead to material consequences for urban residents. The emerging 
model of urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
These policy measures and institutional adjustments legitimise certain patterns of 
resource allocation and lead to material consequences for urban residents. The emerging 
model of urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Third, many studies on post-socialist urban transition tend to consider cities as 
rather static politico-geographical units enclosed within the administrative boundaries. 
The current debates shows little attempts to look beyond the fixed spatial organisation 
defined by administrative boundaries and explore the emerging socio-spatial patterns -  
cross border cooperation, growing disparities, competition between regions and spatial 
selectivity in implementation of the federal government development programmes.
The main literature sources show how the political and socio-economic 
‘transition’ has affected cities in terms of their physical form, economic base, urban 
identity and the way cities are planned and governed (see Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 
eds. 2006; Hamilton et al 2005; Andrusz et al 1996). The transformations of urban space 
are presented as theoretically unproblematic, “natural” consequences of transition, 
occurring in different sectors e.g. residential zones (Hirt and Kovachev 2006), urban 
retail (Axenov et al 2006; Garb and Dybicz 2006).
Fourth, the dramatic social transformations that many post-socialist countries have 
gone through have affected the image o f their cities and first of all the capitals. The 
analysis of the image of the post-socialist city occupies a marginal section of the 
literature. The post socialist change has transformed the urban imagery in post-socialist
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countries from “socialist camp to global village” (Shevchenko and Schukin 2004, p. 89) 
and from “the Wall with the Mall” (Andrusz 2006, p. 83). The understanding of the 
cultural transformation undergoing in the post-socialist city needs to be developed 
beyond these rather poetic metaphors. As this section will demonstrate, the image of the 
post-socialist city has been formed as a result of various forces including the search of a 
new national identity, dealing with the “unwanted past” and promoting the place in the 
light of the city competitiveness doctrine.
The analysis of identity construction by Castells (2004) is based on power and 
domination approach. Even if identities are being formed, transformed and adopted as 
instruments of social mobilisation and struggle, they cannot be constructed from 
"scratch" as they are based on powerful ideas of nation, ethnicity and language. The 
symbolic representation literature studies the expressions of the ideas of power, 
domination, ethnic and religious belonging in architectural form, monumental art and 
urban design. There are different ways to reflect the national (and nationalistic) theme in 
architecture. One is object-specific and uses style and decoration. Another can be 
described as the transformation of the political geography of urban space, which includes 
the saturation of urban space with “cult objects” and the use of symbolically important 
sites to locate specific objects.
Post-socialist countries represent a special case of a dramatic change of national 
identities and the perception of culture and history (Beyme 1996; Gelman & Popova
2004). That affects how the identity and culture are translated into urban space (Chibireva 
2002; Sidorov 2000). Examples from Moscow and St. Petersburg show that urban 
development projects have been informed by a dual logic of internationalisation and 
nationalisation where the desire to present the city on the global “marketplace” coincided 
with the need to reconstruct the national identity (Gritsai and Wusten 2000, p. 42). The 
transformations of the image of Kazan pursued the goal of strengthening the Tatar 
national identity and positioning the city on the Russian and global mental map (Graney 
2007). The construction of Kazakhstan’s new capital -  Astana has been aimed on 
constructing a new national identity of the Kazakh people and creating an image of a 
modem city (Anacker 2004).
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To summarise the discussion on post-socialist transition and its implication for 
cities this section will overview the main points made. Table 2.1 “Post-socialist transition 
and urban transformation” connects transition at macro level with transformation in cities 
across several policy areas including political, economic, social, spatial and cultural. The 
table distinguishes between the mainstream transition theory expectation (e.g. “from 
totalitarian to democratic state”) and the critique of the wholesale approach (e.g. “many 
different shades of grey”).
Understanding the functioning of the socialist planned economy and the position 
of the local state within the administrative hierarchy is important for the analysis of 
modem urban governance as governing institutions are characterised by continuity and 
inertia in their development and adaptation. The perception of the transitional route as 
linear and per-defined forms the teleological bias of transitology (O’Donnell 1996). 
Transitology might overestimate the role of institutional design and formal rules (Gazibo 
2005). The policy bias constitutes a serious weakness of transitional theories as it allows 
a lot of universalism and treats the political question as unproblematic and resolved (by 
the act of departing from the authoritarian rule) and focuses on tackling the legacies of 
the previous regime. That is why critical views suggest that the transition theory has too 
much universality and may overlook the political process and diversity of the ‘actually 
existing’ transition. It evades the question as to how institutions develop under concrete 
social, cultural and political conditions. To contextualise the “actually existing transition” 
it is important to understand how the old and new elites share power and how influential 
groups compete for control over economic assets.
The debates on post-socialist urban transition are informed by the dominant 
approach to transition. It has become conventional to conceptualise urban process in post­
socialist cities by separating quite clearly the change at the social level and a spatial 
‘response’ and distinguishing between the “external environment” and the “internal 
environment” of urban transformations (see Tsenkova 2006, p. 23). This approach 
conceptualises the transformation of built environment and urban space is a “product” of 
societal transformations, e.g. the transition from socialism “produces” new urban spaces.
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Table 2.1 Post-socialist transition and urban transformation.
Aspects o f  
transition
Post-socialist transition Urban transformation
Political From totalitarian to democratic 
state.
Democratic, accountable urban 
government.
“Many different shades o f  grey” 
(Herrschel 2007).
Local authoritarianism.
Economic / 
state vs. 
market
From state controlled econom y to 
market econom y. W ashington 
Consensus. The main role o f  the 
state is to create a good business 
climate.
Private property rights. Private return 
oriented investment. Pro-market 
regulatory framework.
Limitations o f  uncritical borrowing 
from the west.
Commercialisation o f  urban space, 
growing disparities,
Social Liberation from political, econom ic 
and cultural suppression.
Liberation o f  the city from the dominance 
o f  its production role, and developm ent o f  
social and cultural role.
Severely underestimated role o f  the 
pre-existing institutions, social 
tradition and norms. Social cost o f  
reforms.
Social segregation.
Spatial Main focus on m acro-economic 
level. Growth o f  regionalism.
Cities and regions are considered as static 
geographical units.
Rescaling o f  state. Econom ic segregation, uneven  
developm ent, gentrification.
Cultural From a totalitarian to a pluralist 
society. Construction o f  new  
national identities.
Construction o f  new  urban and regional 
identities. Expression o f  new values in 
urban form. Internationalisation o f  
architecture.
Ethnic, religious and language 
conflicts. Disputes over borders and 
rights o f  minority groups.
Disputes over heritage, sym bolically  
important urban sites.
Source: compiled by the author.
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While the mainstream literature on post-socialist transition interprets urban 
change as a response to external impact, it pays little attention to the political economy of 
the ‘response’. The mainstream literature also separates changes in the social sphere and 
their spatial implications. This approach can constitute a potential problem while 
analysing urban development projects as it implies quite a rigid analytical framework, 
which may obscure complex patterns of interaction between the urban and the social. 
While focusing on describing changing land use patterns and emerging built forms, they 
pay little attention to conceptualising links between societal transformations and spatial 
developments.
Transformations of the image represent diverse and complex social processes such 
as the search of national identity, the representation of ideas of social power, the 
establishment of ethnic and religious domination. All these ideas and processes have little 
or no place in the current local economic development literature. The latter tend to 
analyse development processes as if they are going on in some kind of abstract space 
operated according to rational essentially economistic logic. While the literature 
describes how powerful ideas dominating social life find their way into the image of the 
city, it fails to pay attention to unpack and critically analyse these ideas. Political, 
economic or military power seems to be a static thing that ‘belongs’ to different groups 
who express it through the means of architecture. The symbolic representation literature 
misses the question of the mechanisms of empowerment, power transfer and contestation.
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2.2 Neo-liberal transition and cities
The previous section has discussed the post-socialist transition and the implications for 
urban areas. So far, the debates on the post-socialist city have been quite disconnected 
from contemporary western debates on neo-liberalism, urban governance and 
competitiveness. It has been claimed that neo- liberalism has become a framework of 
disciplinary political authority acting on a global level (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and 
governance and competitiveness have become new mperatives economic and political 
life (Gordon and Buck 2005, p. 6). The connection between post-socialism and neo­
liberalism remain contentious: while post-socialist reforms have been inspired by western 
neo-liberal doctrines, the political processes leading to the installation of the neo-liberal 
ideology have been different in the West and in the East. Harvey (2005) claims that 
although the outcomes may be similar, it would be misleading to subsume post-socialist 
transition to the Neoliberal shift as the former implies creating a market economy, the 
latter implies restoration of the class power within the existing market economy (Harvey
2005).
2.2.1 The neo liberal shift
The recent transformations of state power in the western countries are often described in 
terms of a neo-liberal shift. Neoliberalism started as an intellectual movement, then in 
the late 1970s was vigorously introduced into government practices in USA and UK and 
now has become a pervasive ideological framework adopted the worldwide (Peck and 
Tickell 2002, p. 380). The advance of Neo-liberalism has been facilitated by powerful 
rhetoric that claims the necessity of economic liberalisation, and de-politicises and 
naturalises the neo liberal doctrines (Munck 2003). The free market is often presented as 
‘natural’ and the only possible way of organising economic life (see Shaikh 2005, p. 41; 
Ohmae 1993, p. 83). Both neo-liberalism and globalism have been associated with a 
mode of exogenized thinking that presents them as a naturalised, external force “linked to 
alleged tendencies towards homogenisation, levelling out, and convergence (Peck and 
Tickell 2002, p. 383). That is why the globalisation and neo-liberalism discourses are
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very closely entwined, since a defining feature of neoliberalism is its 
necessitarian, there-is-no-alternative character and its invocation of a 
‘politics of inevitability’ based on a deference to (global) economic 
forces” ... As an economic discourse, neoliberalism seeks to establish 
market deference as a necessary (pre)condition, attempting to 
renaturalize - and therefore insulate from earthly politics -  those 
economic relations that Keynesian and development economics so 
fatefully politicized. Discursively sequestering these economic relations 
at the global scale and refashioning them as unbending imperatives is, of 
course, one very obvious way of placing the economic beyond political 
reach; economic politics are becoming reconstituted around the need to 
adjust and accommodate to 'out there' market realities (Peck 2004, p.
394).
Post-socialist transition also takes a narrow view of political and economic 
transition as “harmonisation” of institutional settings with the western examples and 
treats the political question as resolved by abolishing authoritarianism. The neo-libera list 
‘policy package’ includes the following elements:
[Deregulation of financial markets, privatisation, weakening of 
institutions of social protection, weakening of labour unions and labour 
market protections, shrinking of government, cutting of top tax rates, 
opening up of international goods and capital markets, and abandonment 
of full employment under the guise of the natural rate. International 
economic policy has been dominated by the ‘Washington consensus’, 
which advocates privatisation, free trade, export-led growth, financial 
capital mobility, deregulated labour markets, and policies of
macroeconomic austerity (Palley 2005, p. 25).
As discussed in Chapter 4 reforms implemented in Russia in the early 1990s were 
based on neo- liberal principles. The reforms are often understood as aimed almost solely 
at dismantling the mechanisms of centralised planning and government intervention 
which created various economic ‘distortions’ and ‘abnormalities’ and suppressed 
entrepreneurial freedom However, this represents only part of the story, namely the 
“roll-back” stage of the neo-liberalist project. The “roll-out” stage implies an active 
construction of the new governing regime designed to secure private property rights, 
competition and to promote entrepreneurial ism.
43
Chapter 2 Literature review
Although the revival of neo-liberalism is associated with the decline of 
Keynesianism and the rejection of active involvement of government in economic life for 
a more pro-market policy, the neo-liberal shift does not imply a weak government model. 
On the contrary, it is characterised by a “dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary 
forms of state intervention” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 352) and “the systemic use 
of state power to impose (financial) market imperatives” (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, 
p. 3), because “‘privatised’ or ‘deregulated’ markets still have to be managed and 
policed... and because, more fundamentally, ‘markets’ themselves are not, never have 
been and cannot be spontaneously occurring and naturally self-regulating” (Peck 2004, p. 
394).
It is argued that neo-liberalism has been first and foremost political project aimed 
at i) re-establishing the conditions of capital accumulation; and ii) the restoration of class 
power (Harvey 2006, 149). According to Harvey, while neo-liberalism has failed to 
secure economic growth, it has succeeded in empowering elites: “it has either restored 
class power to ruling elites (as in the US and Britain) or created conditions for capitalist 
class formation (as in China, India, Russia and elsewhere)” {ibid, p. 152).
Neo-liberalism is far from being monolithic in form and the term is used to label a 
series of political projects associated with a minimalist state (Lamer 2000, p. 5). These 
projects are historically and geographically contingent and “open to institutional frictions 
and resistances of a path-dependant trajectory”, and may vary substantially in 
“conception, specific motivation, means, and consequences” (McGuirk 2005, p. 61). neo- 
liberalist strategies are being superimposed on pre-existing institutional settings to 
produce a unique combination of global and local factors.
The concept of ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’ has been proposed to understand 
neo-liberalism through a prism of local conditions, to analyse local embodiments of the 
broader global or national projects of neo-liberal restructuring, and establish links 
between the ideology and concrete government practices, policies and institutional 
arrangements of the neo-liberalist project. The concept interprets neo-liberalism as 
contextually specific and path-dependant and claims it is a locally constructed 
phenomenon:
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in contrast to neo-liberal ideology, in which market forces are assumed to 
operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are 
“unleashed’’, we emphasise the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal 
restructuring projects insofar they as they have been produced within 
national, regional and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited 
institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and 
political struggles. An understanding of actually existing neoliberalism 
must therefore explore the path-dependent, contextually specific 
interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent 
neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at a broad range of 
geographical scales (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 351).
2.2.2 Implications for cities
Capitalist development unfolds “through a production of historically specific patterns of 
socio-spatial organisation in which particular territories, places and scales are mobilized 
as productive forces” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 354). It has re-positioned them in 
economic and political or power hierarchies; it has produced new relationships of power 
at the local level, and brought into being new forms of governance (entrepreneurial, 
flexible, etc) and new planning approaches and strategies (mega-projects, culture-led 
regeneration, etc). It has also introduced the pursuit of competitiveness as a modern 
imperative.
Literature on the social production of space conceptualises space as an important 
element of economic production and reproduction of social and political relations (Hirst 
2005; Soja 2000). Institutions, social practices, and modes of economic production are 
reproduced in spaces and through spaces (Lefebvre 2003/1978, p. 87). The spatial 
divisions are a product of both market and state forces as the market “produces and 
reproduces these divisions, but the state is deeply involved in their creation and 
perpetuation” (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, p. 4). Contemporary capitalism is thus 
characterised by the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism as a framework of political authority 
that acts across the geographical and political levels (Peck and Tickell 2002).
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Capitalism in order to secure sustained capital accumulation produces different 
socio-spatial forms that are characterised by continuity and transition from one form to 
another. This is described as a ‘spatial fix’ (Jessop 1998). According to Hackworth
(2005)
If the Keynesian managerialist city was characterised by outward 
growth, inner city decline, regulated development, and public investment 
in infrastructure, the neoliberal city is increasingly characterised by a 
curious combination of inner city and exurban private investment, 
disinvestment in the inner suburbs, the relaxation of land use controls, 
and the reduction of public investment that is not likely to lead to an 
immediate profit. If public housing and middle-class suburban housing 
were icons of the Keynesian managerialist city, then gentrified 
neighbourhoods and downtown commercial mega-projects are the icons 
of the neoliberal city (Hackworth 2005, p. 78).
Brenner argues that the contemporary sociospatial transformations of western 
societies are characterised by a complex interaction of different geographical scales with 
the primacy of the national scale:
The contemporary round of globalisation arguably represents a major 
new wave of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in which global 
socioeconomic interdependencies are being significantly extended in 
close conjunction with the established, or restructuring, of relatively 
fixed forms of capitalist socio spatial organisation at diverse, subglobal 
geographical scales. ...the political-economic geographies of this 
dynamics of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are today being 
fundamentally rescaled relative to the nationally configured patterns...
Whereas previous rounds of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation 
occurred largely within the geographical framework of national state 
territoriality, the current round of socio-spatial restructuring has 
significantly decentred the role of the national scale as the primary 
institutional arena for the territorial isation of capital (Brenner 2004, p.
44-45).
The transition from managerial to entrepreneurial urban governance implies that 
the primarily role of the government changes from that of tackling ‘market failures’ to 
creating regimes for capital accumulation (Harvey 1989). Politically, the transition to 
governance is a process of shifting the centre of power away from the public sector to the 
private sector and non-government sector, “governance refers to the development of 
governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have
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become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which 
do not rest on recourse to the authorities and sanctions of government’' (Stoker 1998, p. 
17). The “roll-back” phase is characterised by the dismantling of the artefacts of the 
Keynesian state such as social housing though privatisation and/or demolition 
(Hackworth 2005). The “roll-out” phase is characterised by urban regeneration projects in 
existing city centres, the construction of gated communities at the periphery aid the 
pursuit of proactive policies aimed at the (re)construction of the city image.
It has been recognised that under the conditions of neo-liberalism, large urban 
development projects have become seen “as essential mechanisms for restructuring urban 
areas to meet the new demands for capital; and as important devices in the competition 
between urban centres for scarce central government recourses and globally mobile 
inward investment” (Loftman and Nevin 1995, p. 302).
It is argued that the neo- liberalist project has not been “imposed” on cities, but has 
been actively constructed in cities. As such cities “have become increasingly central to 
the reproduction, mutation, and continual reconstitution of neo-liberalism itself’ and have 
become “incubators for many of the major political and ideological strategies through 
which the dominance of neo-liberalism is being maintained” (Brenner and Theodore 
2002, pp. 375-376). The transition to the neo-liberal city should not therefore be seen as a 
linear process, rather as “a contested, trial and error searching process in which neo­
liberal strategies are being mobilised in place specific forms and combinations” (Brenner 
and Theodore 2002, p. 375).
2.2.3 Competitiveness, entrepreneurial governance and city marketing
It is argued that globalisation and the neo-liberal hegemony have created the imperative 
of urban competitiveness, which then has been adopted into urban and regional governing 
practices (Turok 2004, p. 1070). Despite the fact that competitiveness remains a confused 
concept, it has secured a seemingly hegemonic status in the discourse of urban 
development.
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The competitiveness theory portrays regions and cities as competing similarly to 
commercial firms for the ends such as “mobile investment, population, tourism, public 
funds and hallmark event” through “assembling a skilled and educated labour force, 
efficient modern infrastructure, a responsive system of modern governance, a flexible 
land and property market, high environmental standards and a high quality of life” (Lever 
and Turok 1999, p. 791). On both urban and regional levels of governance policies aimed 
on enhancing competitiveness have gained increasing popularity among policy-making 
elites who see the role of competitiveness as instrumental for achieving economic 
development (Duffy 1995; Turok 2005, 2004; Turok et al 2004).
Neo-liberalism has been crucial for creating the institutional forms and rules of 
interurban competition (Jones and Ward 2002, p. 484). Nevertheless,
this regime of accelerated interurban competition was not simply a 
product of neo-liberalism, nor can it be reduced entirely to its logic, but 
the parallel ascendancy of neo-liberalism has been crucial in reinforcing, 
extending, and normalizing these transurban tendencies towards reflexive 
and entrepreneurial city governance (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 394).
In the UK the institutional framework1 of interurban competition has been the 
result of the central government initiatives aimed at managing the urban crisis. The state 
established parameters and conditions of granting access to regeneration funding based 
on competitive bidding procedures. This “process through which issues/places are 
identified as needing state funds and how this expenditure is then evaluated has been 
realigned through neoliberalisation2. This change in how resources are allocated reflect 
the new logic that underscores the state’s financing of urban development (Jones and 
Ward 2002, p. 485). Swyngedouw et al (2002) point out that competitive bidding for 
nationally and EU-funded urban development projects favours projects that have a sound
1 For exam ple, new  institutions such as urban developm ent corporations (U D C s) and training and enterprise 
councils (TECs) “were created to bypass the perceived bureaucratic m odes o f  intervention associated with 
locally embedded and scale-dependent structure o f  the local governm ent. Through this strategy, the 
assum ptions o f  how and for whom urban policy should be delivered were challenged. Put another way, the 
rules o f  the rationality gam e were rewritten" (Jones and Ward 2002, pp. 482-483).
2 The process includes: 1) the introduction o f  the market into the funding and delivery o f  local services; 2) 
the incorporation into the state apparatus o f  members o f  local business com m unities; 3) the redesign o f  the 
internal structure o f  the state through the formation o f public-private partnerships; 4) and the creation o f  
new institutions, com bining business representatives with state officia ls to oversee and to deliver all forms 
o f  econom ic and social policy (Jones and Ward 2002, p. 485).
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organisational and financial basis which is not available for weaker social groups and 
areas in the city (Swyngedouw et al 2002, p. 565).
There was a criticism of the narrow interpretations of urban competitiveness 
based on a single all-encompassing notion or measure of urban competitiveness and the 
overstating the importance of international trade and explicit competition between city 
authorities (Turok et al 2004, pp. 14-15). According to Bristow (2005) “competitiveness 
is portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated in the era 
of globalisation, such that there can be no principled objection to policies and strategies 
deemed to be competitiveness-enhancing, whatever their indirect consequences” (p. 285). 
The exclusive selection of competitiveness-related variables (such as the share of exports 
in GDP) may limit the understanding of real economic processes.
Radical critics claim that the idea of urban and regional competitiveness is a myth 
that has been legitimised and sold to public by the elite-dominated media which claim 
that territories fail because they are not competitive enough, therefore more neoliberal 
reforms are needed (Harvey 2006, p. 42). Urban competitiveness, according to Peck and 
Tickell (2002)
turns cities into accomplices in their own subordination, a process 
driven -  and legitimised -  by tales of municipal turnaround and urban 
renaissances, by little victories and fleeting accomplishments, and 
ultimately also by the apparent paucity of “realistic” urban alternatives.
Thus, elite partnerships, mega-events, and corporate seduction become, 
in effect, both the only game in town and the basis of urban subjugation.
The public subsidy of zero-sum competition at the interurban scale rests 
on the economic fallacy that every city can win, shored up by the 
political reality that no city can afford principled non-involvement in the 
game (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 393).
2.2.4 Critical reflections on neo-liberal urbanisation debates
The neo-liberal doctrines are based on the ideas of the necessity of on-going capital 
accumulation and economic expansion. This assumption has been scrutinised as in 
practice neo-liberalism often fails to create a stable and equal accumulation of capital. To 
the contrary the geography of neo-liberal urbanisation is characterised by growing 
inequalities and spatial selectivity. According to Harvey (2006b) “the volatility of uneven
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geographical development has accelerated permitting certain territories to advance 
spectacularly (at least for a time) at the expense of others (p. 42). The stability of neo­
liberalism as a political regime remains a highly debated topic. Although neo-liberalism 
has been seen as a remedy to the economic slowdown and recession, it remains “an 
unstable and evolving regime of accumulation rather than a fixed and harmoniously 
functional configuration of political economic power” and “might well not be the answer 
to the capitalists’ prayers” (ibid, p. 29-30).
In institutional terms neo-liberalism remains an elusive concept difficult to “pin 
down” and translate into the language of institutional design and policies. It has been 
claimed that the “actually existing” forms are always a mixture of the globally acting 
forces, policies, ideologies and, on the other side, pre-existing institutions and practices; 
that the “virus” of neo-liberalism can produce an infinite number of locally found 
mutations (Peck and Tickell 2002; 2007). According to Brenner and Theodore (2002) 
“neo-liberal programs of capitalist restructuring are rarely, if ever, imposed in a pure 
form, for they are always introduced within politico-institutional context that have been 
moulded by earlier regulatory arrangements, institutionalised practices and political 
compromises” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 361). One might question the usefulness 
of this concept if it allows such vagueness.
The critique of the neo-liberal city emphasises its growing polarisation, inequality 
and revanchist nature (Hubbard 2004). Swyngedouw et al (2002) refer to large UDPs as 
“elite playing fields” because while they reflect the interests and aspirations of the 
society’s powerful segments, they exclude those less privileged (Swyngedouw et al 2002, 
p. 563). In general, “despite its language of innovation, learning, and openness, 
neoliberalism is associated with an extremely narrow urban-policy repertoire based on 
capital subsidies, place promotion, central-city makeovers, and local boosterism” (Peck 
and Tickell 2002, p. 395).
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2.3 Connecting the debates
Whether and how connections can be made between the debates on post-socialist 
transition and the debates on neo- liberalism remains an open question. The debates lead 
to the question as to whether the process of post-socialist urban transition is part of the 
“mainstream” urban transition or whether instead these processes are qualitatively 
different. This section attempts to establish links between the two debates that to date 
appear to be quite disconnected. This will help to address the question of how relevant 
the debates in the west can be to the transformation ongoing in post-socialist cities.
First, the question of defining the post-socialist transition is connected to the 
globalisation debate and the claims nade about the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989). 
While many adopt globalisation as a base analytical framework for the study of post­
socialist transition in terms of institutional adjustments and ‘catching up’ with the west 
that countries in transition are expected to do, others maintain that the development 
processes in post-socialist countries are much more endogenous in their nature. For 
example, Friedman (2005) claims that urbanisation in China is driven more by the 
evolutionary processes in the Chinese society, than by globalisation and international 
capital (pp. 38-51).
The growing integration of post-socialist countries into the global economy raises 
questions about the impact of “external forces” such as globalisation and the increasing 
imperative of international competitiveness in the processes of urban transformations 
(Hamilton 2005, p. 79). It remains largely unknown whether the submission to the neo­
liberal order represents a new global ‘imperative’ or indicates an uncritical assertion of 
the globalisation and neo-liberalism discourses and leads to certain policy consequences 
across cities in the post-socialist world. It has to be acknowledged that attempts to 
broaden western debates into new regions and find theoretical links between the literature 
on post-socialist transition and western literature remain rare (exceptions include 
Golubchikov 2010).
Second, the role of the state in development is another area where possible 
connections between the debates can be found. A neo-liberal transition needs a strong 
state to remove old regulations, tackle possible resistance and introduce new institutional
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design, financial regulations and managerial techniques. As demonstrated by the
development of a neo-liberal state in Latin America, the neo-liberal shift required 
authoritarian government. This poses a question about the role of ‘residual’ 
authoritarianism in post-socialist states in installing a new neo-liberal order in place. For 
example, Zhang (2000) argues that in China ‘pro-business authoritarianism’ has replaced 
an ‘anti-market totalitarian state’:
China’s economic reform has largely destroyed the economic and
institutional basis of totalitarianism that had once prevailed the country, 
and has transformed significantly the nature of China’s economy, state and 
society: a transformation from a rigidly planned economy into an
increasingly market-oriented one; from an anti-market totalitarian state 
into a largely pro-business authoritarian one: and from a rigid and 
administratively ‘mechanic’ society in a fast-changing, informally 
liberalized and increasingly ‘organic’ society (cited in Wu at al 2007, p. 4)
Although the evaluation of the post-totalitarian transition to pro-business authoritarianism 
is a research task that lies beyond the limits of the current research, the role of 
authoritarian government in countries like China and Russia is very important for the 
theoretical exploration of neo-liberalism and, more specifically, the role of
authoritarianism in putting the neo- liberal order in place.
In Russia, the “first wave” literature on post-socialist transition tended to describe 
authoritarianism as a ‘legacy’ of the socialist past that is yet to be eradicated 
(Loewenhardt 1995). Modem literature tends to describe Russia’s authoritarianism as a 
necessary element of the newly emerging neo-liberal order that is historically conditioned 
by the path of the reforms and the balance of power between different groups. For 
example, Bedirhanoglu (2004) claims that Yeltsin-led shock therapy
has helped the former communist nomeklatura to consolidate around the 
capitalist project, the immediately available alternative in the early 
1990s... It created the most appropriate conditions for the former 
nomenklatura to transform itself into Russia’s new capitalist class (p. 22).
Along the same lines Sakwa (2004) argues that “the failure to take a more cautious 
approach that would have allowed institutions and the rule of law to have developed at 
the same pace as the development of the market allowed a criminalized neo- 
nomenklatura elite to consolidate its power and undermine genuine liberalism and
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democracy” (p. 218). Does that mean that authoritarianism is an organic element of neo­
liberalism as claimed by its radical critics, or does that mean that transitional countries 
represent rather an extreme version of “actually existing neo-liberalism” where a n$w 
economic order has conveniently been juxtaposed onto the pre-existing authoritarian 
legacies?
The question of ‘inherited’ versus ‘emergent’ authoritarianism seems to be 
particularly interesting for the context of the current research. How, in the context of a 
Russian region, can one distinguish between inherited authoritarianism and the 
authoritarian state forms acquired to serve the interest of capital accumulation? Is it a 
legacy of the socialist regime or a form of neo-liberalism that used the fertile soil of 
“post-socialism” to flourish?
A third issue is the institutional dimension. Some students of post-Socialist 
transition agree that Russia has adopted neo-liberalism (Aslund 2007) but the actual 
implementation is still far from completion. For example, Nesvetailova (2005) states that
the central elements of Neoliberalism -  private property, liberalisation and 
a minimalist state -  have been imported into Russia, they did not facilitate 
a comprehensive transition from planned to market economy. Neither did 
they induce Russia’s transformation into a modem ‘competition’ state. Not 
only was the actual implementation of neoliberal restructuring hampered 
by Russia’s structural and political crisis; the perils of building capitalism 
aggravated by institutional failures, power conflicts and global economic 
volatility (p. 248).
This leaves an open question whether Russia’s protracted transition is still to be 
fully implemented or whether Russia may remain in some ‘grey’ transitional area of 
institutional development in which elements of market will continue to coexist with the 
inherited from the socialist past elements of state intervention.
Fourth, Russia’s neo-liberalism faces a similar critique as elsewhere inasmuch as 
it is an internally unstable regime of accumulation that fails to secure long term growth 
and prosperity. According to Burawoy (2001) in post-reform Russia market forces suck 
resources out of production, sending the economy into a downward spiral o f contraction 
(p. 276). It has been suggested that the Chinese city generally complies with the emerging 
model of the neo-liberal city, and should not be seen as “an idiosyncratic and irrelevant
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case” in a broad picture of contemporary urban changes (Wu 2003; 2005). The place of 
Russian cities in relation to global urban processes still remains an open research 
question. The rest of this section will address this issue.
Table 2.2 The comparison of neo-liberal and post-socialist city
Political regime
Neo-liberal city
Established democracy. Crisis of 
traditional democratic 
institutions.
Post-socialist c ity
Democratic transition. Semi-democratic 
government. Limited accountability. 
“Legacies of communism”. 
Authoritarian government.
Role of the 
local state in 
development
State creates conditions for 
investment and capital 
accumulation. Public-private 
partnerships.
Government leads development. State 
and state-control led industries are an 
important source of investment.
Regulatory
environment
Pro-market and pro-investment 
regulations. Zones with special 
planning regime. Speculative 
investment.
Regulation based on western models. 
Land and infrastructures are being 
privatised. Property rights often 
established administratively.
Space/scale City-region Growing inter and intra regional 
disparities.
Urban imagery Globalising city. Image represents 
city on the “global marketplace”.
Cities have opened to 
internationalisation. Urban development 
projects represent national identity and 
position in the “global hierarchy”.
Source: compiled by the author.
Table 2.2 summarises the comparison of the neo-liberal and the post-socialist 
city. The is no universal agreement as to whether post-socialist transition should be 
treated as a part of the global neo-liberal shift with evidence indicating indication to both 
neo-liberal design of the reforms and the post-communist legacies preventing the reforms 
from successful implementation. The role of ‘legacies’ in constructing new governing 
regimes still remains unclear, especially the pre-existing mechanisms of economic 
management and the involvement of state in economic development affairs. If Russia has
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witnessed the conversion of former ‘apparatchiks' into ‘entrepreneurchiks’ exploiting 
their experience and connections for personal gain (Stoner-Weiss 2006), in China, the 
government officials have not directly engaged in business (Herrschel 2007).
The literature on the ‘western’ and the ‘post-socialist’ city also remain quite 
disconnected. The latter pays strong attention to the analysis of the impact of political, 
economic and social transition on urban areas, but overlooks the role of cities in 
constructing new political and economic regimes, reconfiguring the relations between the 
state and the private sector and between the government and society. In that sense, cities 
are seen at the receiving end of societal processes but not as an important part of them. 
This problem can be addressed by trying to engage the debate on post-socialist urban 
transition with the contemporary debates on globalisation, urban entrepreneurialism, 
governance and urban and regional competitiveness.
As discussed in this chapter, globalisation is often presented as an external, 
exterritorial force, that impacts on cities in a single directed, top-down manner. The 
literature on city marketing shows the significance of the visual in place promotion, but 
the question as to why and how urban images are being produced in specific ways under 
the conditions of contemporary capitalism (or transition) remains a new research area. 
Similarly, the linkages between mega-projects and nation-building practices in 
globalising cities remain a new research topic (Ren 2008a, p. 176). Therefore, any 
attempt to join together different stories on urban imagery requires grounding the 
research in the existing debates.
The discussion poses the question as to whether the conventional approaches 
captured by transitional theory can provide a solid foundation for an enquiry into urban 
governance in post-socialist cities, or whether its theses have to be taken more critically 
and possibly reviewed in the light of the modern western debates. The subsequent 
sections will put these questions in a wider context of the current urban governance 
debates.
The literature on symbolic representation and visual transformations of post­
socialist cities deal with highly politicised issues of power, identity and belonging. 
Identities and constructed and deconstructed and are expressed by the means of
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architecture and monumental art. Transformation of the image represent diverse and 
complex social processes such as the search of national identity, the representation of 
ideas of social power, the establishment of ethnic and religious domination. All these 
ideas and processes have little or no place in the current local economic development 
literature. The latter tend to analyse development processes as if they are going on in 
some kind of abstract space operated according to rational and an essentially economistic 
logic.
While the literature describes how powerful ideas dominating social life find their 
way into the image of the city, it fails to pay attention to unpack and critically analyse 
these ideas. Political, economic or military power seems to be a static thing that ‘belongs’ 
to different groups who express it through the means of architecture. The symbolic 
representation literature misses the question of the mechanisms of empowerment, power 
transfer and contestation.
The literature on city marketing shows the significance of the visual in place 
promotion, but the question as to why and how urban images are being produced in 
specific ways under the conditions of contemporary capitalism (or transition) remains a 
new research area. Similarly, the linkages between mega-projects and nation-building 
practices in globalising cities remain a new research topic (Ren, 2008a, 176). Therefore, 
any attempt to join together different stories on urban imagery requires grounding the 
research in the existing debates.
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2.4 Urban governance
This section focuses on urban governance as a framework to analyse urban 
transformation in the post-socialist city and place promotion activities of the local 
state. In western literature, the concept of urban governance is widely used to analyse 
the relationship between state and non-state actors working jointly to achieve socially 
significant results. Tsenkova (2006) has reported the transition to urban governance in 
post-socialist countries, but the novelty and nature of this phenomenon have not yet 
been thoroughly investigated. As Section 2.1 has demonstrated, while the existing 
literature is focused on the aspects of institutional transformation, the political 
economy aspects of urban development in post-socialist cities have received relatively 
modest attention (Feldman 2000; Gel’man 2002). Therefore, the current section aims 
to introduce the concept of urban governance and to identify the elements of urban 
governance related to place promotion and realisation o f large urban development 
projects.
2.4.1 Who Governs?
According to Dahl (1961) while the elites govern, they do so not a straightforward 
political setting: in a pluralist democracy, various social groups influence the decision 
making process. The elites do not merely impose their will onto the masses: in order 
to be legitimate they have to attune policies to the general societal mood: “If the 
leaders lead they are also led” (p. 102). At the same time, democratically controlled 
government is not a handmaiden of its constituency. That is why the main 
characteristic of political power in a pluralist democracy is its ambiguity1. To 
“govern” means to successfully translate the aspirations into policies. Those who are 
able to push decisions through “govern” the city. This is a competitive process 
because different social groups tend to have conflicting goals and may compete for 
the same scarce resources. That is why in order to compete more successfully social 
groups need various resources, such as money, number o f members, organisations, 
knowledge, information and etc.
1 Dahl com pletes the historical analysis o f  e lites evolu tion  as fo llow s: “an elite  no longer rules N ew  
H aven. But in the strict dem ocratic sense, the disappearance o f  the elite  rule has not led to the 
em ergence o f  rule by the people. W ho, then, rules in a pluralist dem ocracy?” (D ahl 1961, p. 86).
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Dahl’s argument can be summarised as follows. First, this is the elites who 
govern. Second, the relations of power are ambiguous and reciprocal: a leader, in 
order to rule legitimately has to look over his shoulder at the sub leaders and the 
constituents to secure their support or tolerance. The idea of pluralism implies that all 
political options are open for discussion and challenge. Third, relations of power are 
competitive: the more resources a group has and the more efficient they are used, the 
more influence on a particular area of decision-making does the group have. 
Resources as the independent variable vary from tangible (e.g. money, number of rank 
and file members) to intangible (e.g. connections, social standing). Political influence 
as the dependent variable is understood the influence upon policies in different areas.
2.4.2 State vs. market
Economic deregulation and globalisation of economic activities led to the emergence 
of a new form of urban governance that perceives the attraction of capital as its main 
task (Harvey 1989). The emergence o f entrepreneurial governance stems from the 
transition of the capitalist state, described as the collapse of the Keynesian state and 
transition from the Fordist to the Post-Fordist mode of production (Jessop 1998). 
Stoker describes the transition to governance as a process of shifting the centre of 
power away from the public sector to the private sector and non-government sector: 
“governance refers to the development o f governing styles in which boundaries 
between and within public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of 
governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the 
authorities and sanctions of government” (Stoker 1998, p. 17).
Urban governance crosses the traditional organisational lines of urban 
government and means much more that urban “government”, because the real power 
lies “within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and 
administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play. The power to 
organise space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilised by diverse social 
agents” (Harvey 1989, p. 6). Harvey (1989) characterises the new urban 
entrepreneurialism using the following three characteristics: i) it uses public-private 
partnerships as the source of employment and development; ii) it is entrepreneurial
58
Chapter 2 Literature review
because it is speculative in execution and design; iii) it focuses on the political 
economy of place rather than territory (Harvey 1989, p. 7).
To follow the discussion in Section 2.2, neo-liberalisation of urban governance 
has made the public sector increasingly dependent on the private sector involvement 
in urban development projects. The institutional arrangements at the local level which 
allow actors to work together under conditions of ‘limited and dispersed authority’ 
and achieve publicly significant results have become known as urban regimes (Stone 
1989, p. 9). A regime is
the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests 
function together in order to make and carry out governing decisions.
There are three elements of this definition: 1) a capacity to do 
something; 2) a set of actors to do it; and 3) a relationship among the 
actors that enables them to work together” {ibid, p. 179).
According to Stone, in the absence of any centralised coordination, it is important to 
achieve consensus and cooperation between the private and public sector, especially 
among “a select few who are strategically placed {ibid, p. 230).
Logan and Molotch (1987) conceptualise the city as a product of interaction of 
two main conflicting values: those of use and those of exchange (Logan and Molotch 
1987, p. 2). Progrowth forces build a coalition that makes a city a “growth machine”, 
which is defined by the authors as “an apparatus o f interlocking progrowth 
associations and governmental units” {ibid, p. 32). The rhetoric used by promoters 
claim that any development is good as it allegedly benefits everybody. The popularity 
o f growth machines stems from the fact that both entrepreneurs and politicians easily 
find an agreement no matter how they split on other issues on the issue of growth 
itself regardless the nature of proposed development, externalities and consequences: 
communities “invite capital to make virtually anything -  whether buttons or bombs, 
toasters or tanks -  in their own backyards” {ibid, p. 33). Disagreements within the 
growth coalitions relate to details, leaving the belief in growth unchallenged {ibid, p. 
65). In comparison, urban regime theories focus on the processes of coalition building 
and deal-making, with less attention paid to the wider context of urban governance 
including the influences of globalisation and new ‘imperatives’ of urban development 
such as entrepreneurialism and competitiveness.
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The theory of ‘bargaining urban governance’ by Savitch and Kantor (2002) 
places urban regimes in the context of the international marketplace. In order to
maximise the potential benefits, cities have to learn how to bargain successfully with
private capital and skilfully use the bargaining advantages that they have:
Our perspective suggests that local governments compete for private 
capital in the international marketplace and that they adopt policy 
strategies to influence the terms of their participation. City 
governments draw upon a variety of bargaining advantages or 
resources in support of these strategies. The more bargaining 
advantages held by the city, the greater its ability to shape urban 
development. Variation in outcomes is a product of four variables -  
market conditions, intergovernmental support, popular control, and 
local culture (Savitch and Kantor 2002, p. 46).
While urban development policies are formulated at the juncture of local and
international forces, “urban choices are not immutable, but capable of expansion,
construction, and modification. ...cities are not mere leaves in the wind of 
internationalisation, but political entities that in many different ways shape economic 
outcomes” (Savitch and Kantor 2002, p. 347).
The application of regime-based frameworks for studying the post-socialist 
city in Shanghai illustrate the difference in the fundamental assumptions upon which 
the system of urban governance acts:
Shanghai's current urban restructuring has been driven by a unique 
pro-growth coalition with Chinese characteristics: implicit, informal, 
and project-based, different from American-style growth machine
politics. The formation of this pro-growth coalition is mainly
attributed to China's asymmetrical reform - while the developmental 
aspects o f the state has changed, the political aspects of the state 
remained intact" (Fu 2002, p. 120).
According to Ma (2002) the development regime in Chinese cities is shaped 
unilaterally by the state: “the state is not only the ultimate policymaker but also the 
controller which evaluates and approves major project applications and oversees their 
implementation” (p. 1549).
The classical regime theory portrays governance as a process of interaction 
between main groups of actors who may or may not have equal power to influence the 
decision making process. Regime theory suggests that the mechanism of interaction 
between the state and market forces is more complex than the post-socialist transition
60
Chapter 2 Literature review
literature often suggests, i.e. the state and market being almost mutually excluding 
forces (as discussed in Section 2.1.3). Therefore, the current research aims to analyse 
the reality of the post-socialist city governance.
2.4.3 Organisation of urban governance
The adjustment to the requirements of the international marketplace, real or perceived, 
stimulates the proliferation of new organisational forms o f governance, including 
flexible urban governance that has “bent and stretched” established planning 
practices, altered exiting organizational arrangements and embraces flexibility of 
collective bargaining, flexibility of workforce, flexibility in organizational design, etc 
(Desfor and Jorgensen 2004, p. 487). According to Swyngedouw et al (2002) the 
‘pluralistic governance’ model implies that in the name o f greater flexibility and 
efficiency in the implementation of large urban development projects, formal 
government structures become subordinated to quasi-private and highly autonomous 
organisations and agencies that “compete with and often supersede local and regional 
authorities as protagonists and managers of urban renewal” (Swyngedouw et al 2002, 
p. 556). These organisational arrangements are created to implement project-focused 
and market-led initiatives and “have replaced statutory planning as the primary means 
o f intervention in the cities” {ibid, p. 562) and have led to “redistribution of policy­
making powers, competences and responsibilities” and ultimately led to the 
“privatisation of urban governance” {ibid, p. 573).
In post-socialist countries, entrepreneurial urban regimes are far from being 
complete, coherent or even functional. A case study from Tallinn by Feldman (2000) 
shows that the success of its waterfront regeneration project has been seriously 
hampered by institutional deficiencies, namely the constantly changing structure of 
land ownership between the public and the private sectors in conjunction with the 
slow progress o f land reform. Laws are frequently modelled on Scandinavian 
examples and are not well adapted to the Estonian context or form a coherent 
framework. All these factors typically “fuel mistrust and communication failure as 
most of the actors participating in the development process are uncertain about their 
roles in the decision-making process” (Feldman 2000, p. 844).
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In the current literature on post socialist transition only limited attention has 
been paid to analysing the role of the local state in urban development, place 
promotion and implementation of large urban development projects. A number of 
case studies demonstrate that Moscow’s ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ does not 
neatly fit into any ‘pure’ model of neoliberal urban governance (Badyina and 
Golubchikov 2005; Pagonis and Thornley 2000). The gentrification of the central 
blocks, which in Soviet times were occupied by factories and working class residents, 
does not represent a vision of gentrification being a result of the government 
withdrawal from or deregulation of the housing market. On the contrary, the case 
study shows that “the role of the Moscow administration has been paramount" 
(Badyina and Golubchikov 2005, p. 126). The government intervention is not an act 
of an abstract government, but an act of a concrete political figure, the Mayor of 
Moscow: "Luzhkov's 'authoritarian neoliberalism' has successfully mobilised the 
property market, delivered large-scale renovation and perked up the look and order of 
his 'city empire'" {ibid, p. 127).
2.4.4 Entrepreneurial urban governance and place promotion
As discussed in Section 2.2 on neo-liberal urbanisation, under the new ‘imperatives’ 
of globalisation and competitiveness, entrepreneurialism has become one o f the main 
rationale of urban governance. Entrepreneurialism is a rather eclectic concept that 
embraces different activities that city authorities become engaged in. These activities 
range from economic development policies, stimulation of local industries to place 
promotion and enhancing the positive image of the city. According to Hall and 
Hubbard (1996):
urban entrepreneurialism has ushered in a whole range of changes in 
the way in which the city operates at all levels, changes that can only 
be comprehended with reference to the changing nature o f social, 
economic and political process which are operating at both the 
global and local level. These changes are being felt at the level of 
experience, as the new urban politics forge a new cultural politics of 
identity at the urban level, changing the ways in which the people of 
the city see themselves and others (Hall and Hubbard 1996, p. 169).
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Wu (2003) argues that the Shanghai entrepreneurial strategy has been a project 
o f the central state looking to restore its legitimacy in response to the globalization 
process:
Whereas the state’s legitimacy embedded in the means of production 
has been eroded through marketisation, the entrepreneurial project 
allows the state to tap the market to restore it role as the promoter of 
economic development. This imperative, both real and perceived, is 
derived from globalization, which is regarded both as a threat and as 
an opportunity for national survival (Wu 2003, p. 1694).
In the era of globalisation and interurban competition, architecture and urban 
design become important elements of the strategies aimed on strengthening 
international competitiveness (Ren 2008; Sklair 2006; Gospodini 2002). The use of 
“city branding” (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005) and local “identity by design” 
(Watson and Bentley 2007) is aimed on forming a positive reputation of a nation 
(region, city) among the wide audience of policy makers, businessmen, visitors and 
creative people (Anholt 2007). Image construction is associated with the attempts 
made by governments to lure mobile global capital to a specific location through 
creating favourable political, institutional and physical conditions -  described as a 
process o f neo-liberalisation of cities (Brenner 1998; Jessop 2002).
Those projects emphasis the “imagery” aspects of entrepreneurial urban 
governance and the use of images in promoting, legitimising and implementing 
development, schemes and policies in place promotion. The western literature on city 
marketing and place promotion presents image as being instrumental to the purposes 
of local economic development (Short et al 1993). At the local level architecture helps 
to advertise urban development projects and promote speculative investment (Crilley 
1993, p. 231). Smyth (1994) considers the preparation of a marketing strategy for a 
building project, development area or the city as isomorphic processes (Smyth 1994,
p. 2).
The construction of new urban imagery is aligned with the postmodernist 
culture that juxtaposes, blends and repeats images and ideas and postmodern society 
“with its eclectic conformity, its fragmented palimpsest of past times and distant 
spaces, its commodified ethnic culture and sanitised classlessness” (Holcomb 1993, p. 
142). The postmodern cultural framework allows the use o f historical references in the
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modem context of selling places, especially through various "culture-led" 
regeneration projects. According to Philo and Kearns (1993) "urban bourgeoisies are 
seeking to mobilise segments of culture, history and locality in the competitive selling 
of their places both to outsides (to attract capital) and to insiders (to legitimise 
redevelopment)" (Philo and Keams 1993, p. 29).
The research draws on the idea that the production of imagery is deeply 
embedded into the socio-economic relations and economic production, investment 
and culture (see Soja 2000; Goodwin 1993; Harvey 1990). Apart from the economic 
logic behind the production and use of a new image of the city described in city 
marketing literature, there is also a strong social logic as place promotion activities 
may be “designed to convince local people, many of whom will be disadvantaged and 
potentially disaffected, that they are important cogs in a successful community and 
that all sorts of ‘good things’ are really being done on their behalf’ (Philo and Keams 
1993, p. 3). Lovering (2007) argues that the ‘performative turn’ in urban governance 
has been a result of the diminishing capacity of urban governance actors to deliver 
qualitative change in economic growth and attempts to “present themselves as if there 
is something that they can actually be seen to achieve” (Lovering 2007, p. 360).
The power o f imagery is defined by its ability to legitimise political choices 
and mobilise people for action. According to Massey (2007) geographical 
imaginations are
powerful elements in the armoury of legitimation of political 
strategies. They are part of the scaffolding from which hang grand 
political visions; they are integral to understanding of such things as 
globalisation and development; they are embedded too in the 
assumptions that underpin the most apparently mundane of 
government documents, or the research reports of private hired 
consultants (Massey 2007, p. 23).
Entrepreneurialism implies economic innovation as an imperative for economic 
development, whereas economic development in post-socialist cities can be achieved 
through different channels e.g. natural resource or government rent, etc. Competition 
may be within the political sphere and regulated by a different system of incentives. 
Competitiveness assumes too much universality in the conditions of competition and 
implies quite a narrow and rigid route to development success, which may not be the 
case in the post-socialist conditions.
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2.4.5 Spatial dimension urban governance
In cities the adoption of the neo-liberal governance model has led to the growing 
attention to the central areas as sites of urban regeneration and various sorts of iconic 
and flagship urban development projects. Urban competitiveness thinking has affected 
urban and regional development strategies and practices across the world. In western 
cities competitiveness thinking has led to the proliferation of various ‘culture-led’ 
regeneration projects which aim to commercialise the elements of history, heritage 
and place identity attempting to create an attractive image for visitors and business 
partners. According to Keating and Frantz (2004)
by making external circumstances such as globalisation pressures, 
urban competition, or institutional restraints by state authorities 
responsible for their failure, they [the city authorities] can justify their 
claims for urban autonomy and thus increase their own power base. 
Therefore we should rather see the theme of urban competition, and 
the associated neomercantilist vision of cities vying for limited 
opportunities, as constructed by political and economic elites in order 
to mobilise support behind particular policy stances (Keating and 
Frantz 2004, p. 188).
The intertwining of both nationalistic and competitiveness rhetoric in urban 
development projects is not a uniquely post-socialist phenomenon2. The question is 
important not only in the countries undergoing “transition”, hence understanding of 
urban transformation should take into account cultural aspects too. According to Ren 
(2008a):
The generic and noncontexual global architecture has a wide appeal 
among the territorial elites eager to construct a globally oriented image 
for their nations and cities. In Europe, it might be the uncertainty and 
anxiety about economic globalisation felt by political elites that 
account for the construction of monumental architectural projects.
While in China, it is the rising nationalism, along with global 
consumerist ideology, that drives the production of architectural mega 
projects (Ren 2008a, p. 187).
The literature on the spatiality of post-socialist urban governance remains 
modest and fragmented however. The transition to a market oriented urban 
governance is characterised by the following processes: marketisation of urban 
development and growing inequalities (Wu 2005, p. 102), commercialisation and
2 See  for exam ple, the cases o f  B ilbao (K eating and Frantz 2004; M cN eil 2 0 0 0 ) and C ardiff (M cN eil  
and T ew dw r-Jones 2003).
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privatisation of urban space, the introduction o f new regimes of policing, and the 
redirection of public investment from social programmes to commercially oriented 
projects. There are other interesting areas where debates on post-socialist transition 
and neo-liberal urbanisation interface, for example, the rationale, organisational and 
political support behind large urban development projects.
Table 2.3 Urban governance from post-socialist transition and neo-liberal 
perspective.
Post-socialist urban governance Neo-liberal urban governance
Organisational
structure
Legacy of a centralised and 
vertically integrated 
administrative structure. Weak 
municipal self-govemance. 
Emergence of public-private 
partnerships.
Public-private partnerships. Quick 
adaptation to the changing economic 
conjuncture. Avoids public 
accountability through “special 
regimes” and “special development 
zones”.
Policies Privatisation of state property. 
Monetisation of services.
Promotion of economic development 
by creating good economic climate 
and through direct support.
Rationale Competitiveness.
Entrepreneurialism.
Competitiveness. Entrepreneurialism.
Spatial
dimension
Locked up within the existing 
administrative boundaries. 
Spatial inequalities. 
Gentrification.
Transforms and bends the pre-existing 
administrative boundaries. Selective 
in spatial choices.
Development
projects
Government funded. “Proto” 
real estate market.
External funding. Speculative 
investment. Government support 
through various PPP forms.
Visual
representation
The need to erase the memories 
of the “unwanted past”. New 
imagery contributes to the 
construction of new national 
identities, promotes market 
values.
Imagery relates to the positioning of 
the city on the “global map”. Employs 
international “starchitects” to do 
design work according to 
international standards.
Source: compiled by the author.
Table 2.3 “Urban governance from post-socialist transition and neo-liberal 
perspective” compares post-socialist and neo-liberal urban governance. It is argued 
that the focus on the visual and the nature o f urban development projects being
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implemented in western cities can help drawing some conclusions about the emerging 
politico-economic regime of the neo-liberal city. The following section will discuss 
urban governance in post-socialist context and the implications for urban space and 
the image of the city.
2.5 Framework for analysis
The concluding section of the literature review chapter attempts to summarise the 
discussion, and to integrate its different themes to establish the framework for 
analysis. As discussed in the previous sections, the transitional urban literature often 
sees cities at the receiving end of societal processes and economic transformations i.e. 
as somewhat passive recipients of change. This approach can potentially impede the 
opportunities to analyse urban change in post-socialist cities and the complexity of 
interaction between the urban and social, and the role of key actors and agents of 
governance. Moreover, the dogmatic views of both the post-socialist and neo-liberal 
transformation of urban governance suggest that there is a ‘pre-written’ script that 
cities have to follow. However, there are grounds for questioning this. This study 
attempts to address the question by studying urban development projects as 
‘laboratories’ of emerging forms of urban governance and hence re-connect the 
project level with transformation on higher level.
2.5.1 Urban development projects as a research lens
This section aims to discuss the role of large government-led urban development 
projects in the creating new urban governance. This research does not analyse how 
architectural monuments convey their meaning through visual characteristics and 
architectural detail (questions that theory of architecture deals with). Instead of 
focusing on architectural morphology and the language of architecture, this research 
analyses the emergence of urban development projects in the context of political, 
economic, social conditions and the interaction o f powerful actors.
Architecture has always reflected the structure of power in society and cannot 
be analysed independently from social and political factors affecting its production 
and use (Vale 2008, p. viii). The “carved in stone” societal processes make cities, 
public places and buildings essential for understanding history and political, economic
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and social changes. Grand projects and monumental art have always played an 
important role in constructing and legitimising important political and social ideas 
(Sudjic 2006). Buildings, as “the visible embodiment of the invisible” manifest and 
represent certain values and identities (Leach 2002).
During the socialist period, architecture and urban design were used for the 
purpose of socialist propaganda. Stalin used architecture and urban design for political 
purposes as analysed by Papemy (1996) and Ikonnikov (2006)3. Khmelnitskiy (2007) 
acknowledges that “the construction of the Palace of Soviets would become the main 
USSR propaganda campaign and the main policy of ideological consolidation of the 
population around new Stalin’s leadership” (p. 85) and also suggests that Stalin used 
design contests for the Palace as a laboratory of new socialist architecture: “he [Stalin 
-  N.K.] was looking not for a concrete design, but for the direction and aesthetic 
system which would be used and developed further” (ibid, p. 122). The aim was to 
test the mechanisms of power upon the architectural and planning community in order 
to attune them for using on the political opponents and the wider social audience (ibid, 
p. 124-125).
The dramatic political, economic and social transformations in post-socialist 
countries have created demand for new types of buildings and urban spaces and 
introduced new organisational and economic mechanisms of urban development. The 
current literature identifies several tendencies in post-socialist urban development 
including the emergence of commercial spaces, new spaces of worship, new symbolic 
meanings conveyed by urban space, the transformation of place identity and the 
emergence o f new governing mechanisms that facilitate the production o f new 
architecture and urban design.
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of large commercial urban development 
projects in post-Socialist cities (Temelova 2007; Sailer-Fliege 1999; Sykora 1999). 
New commercial urban development projects often enjoyed direct political and
3 The 1930s w ere the tim e o f  an acute housing crisis both in M o sco w  and in all other U SSR  c it ie s .. .  It 
w as im possib le to rationally justify  the construction o f  a g igantic prestige build ing-m onum ent that 
w ould  detract m uch needed resources from satisfy ing the socia l needs. N evertheless, the very  
possib ility  o f  the im plem entation o f  such a project had to instill into m inds b e lie f  in strength o f  the 
societa l order and the build ing itse lf  had to represent in reality the idea o f  bright future, w hich could  
ju stify  any hardship and exertion today. In other words, the Palace o f  Soviets w as conceived  as 
im plem ented utopia, the m aterialisation o f  S ta lin ’s m yth, w hich w as active ly  instilled into the m ass 
co n sc iou sn ess by the propaganda apparatus (Ikonnikov 2 0 0 6 , p. 328).
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financial government support, but at the same time lacked a coherent economic 
rationale:
in the absence o f economic development, social and profitability 
arguments, what remains as the justification behind public 
involvement in Manezh4 is the political motive... The argument 
presented here is that it was a political act drawing on the image of 
the 'market'. However the employment of this term did not result in 
greater effectiveness and efficiency in operational management or 
reconfiguration of interests groups involved in decision-making. In a 
paradoxical manner the 'market' was used for its symbolic 
importance but was excluded from the way the project was carried 
out. Planning procedures were bypassed, opposing views were 
ignored and important laws were violated to promote an unprofitable 
investment that 'the market' would never have made (Pagonis and 
Thomley 2000, pp. 755-757).
Swyngedouw (2003a; 2003c) suggests that urban development projects play a 
more important role than a mere instrumental one in attracting investment, and has 
conceptualised urban development projects as a laboratory and testing site o f urban 
governance. There is a growing literature that examines the role of urban development 
projects in the formation of urban governance models (see: Moulaert et al 2003; 
MacLeod 2002; Smith 1996). According to Swyngedouw et al (2003c) large-scale 
urban development projects (UDPs) have become
a sort of new urban policy that actively produces, enacts, embodies, 
and shapes the new political and economic regimes that are operative 
at the local, regional, national and global scales. They are the 
material expression of a developmental logic that views mega­
projects and place marketing as major leverages for generating future 
growth and for waging a competitive struggle to attract investment 
capital. Urban projects of this kind are, therefore, neither mere result 
or response, nor the consequence o f political and economic change 
enacted elsewhere. On the contrary, we argue that such UDPs are the 
very catalysts of urban and political change; UDPs incorporate 
processes that are felt locally, but regionally, nationally, and 
internationally as well (pp. 2-3).
Here urban development projects are analysed in the light of globalisation 
process and specifically within the interaction of the global and the local (“glocal”). 
Urban development projects play an important role in the processes of social, 
economic and political restructuring are used as “the lens through which we can begin
4 Underground shopping mall near the Red Square in M oscow .
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to excavate the myriad processes o f socio-spatial change that have reshaped... the co­
ordinates of everyday life” (Swyngedouw et al 2003a, p.l 1). Thus, urban development 
projects are not only the final result or product of governance, they are the process 
through which governance is performed and patterns of power are constructed. The 
actors involved in urban development projects exercise governing power through 
these projects.
2.5.2 Framework for analysis
The discussion in Section 2.1 has suggested that, the orthodox view of the post 
socialist transition implies the use of a ‘pre-written script’ o f urban transformation. As 
the real ‘transition’ often deviates from the expected route, doubts arise concerning 
the validity o f the transitional theory assumptions. The attempt o f transitional theory 
to analyse the present on the basis of the “future that has already happened” indicates 
a major ontological problem of transitional frameworks, namely its attempt to analyse 
transforming social phenomena within a rigid theoretical framework. The rest o f the 
section is dedicated to designing a framework for analysis that may better meet the 
challenge of analysing the post-socialist urban transformation.
Organisational structure and funding
The actual transition always occurs in a ‘hybrid form’ where the ‘partial ruins’ of the 
past become engaged with new political and economic arrangements (Herrschel 
2007). For example, in recent projects o f gentrification of the city centre blocks 
Moscow city Government has played not just regulatory role but led the whole 
process (Badyina and Golubchikov 2005). It has become a normal practice in Moscow 
that the local state instead of relying exclusively on the mechanisms of formal 
taxation makes individual deals with developers, which specify the obligation of the 
developer to transfer a share of the residential or commercial stock to the city in 
exchange of getting guaranteed access to municipal infrastructure and trouble-free 
review of the planning application (Valletta 2005).
These case studies show that urban governance in Moscow does not neatly fit 
into a ‘pure’ model, either authoritarian or neo-liberal but rather represents a ‘hybrid’ 
form very similar to those described by Ma (2002) and Wu et al (2007) in which the
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authoritarian executive authority of the local state is used to create a regulatory 
environment for the market, intervene in the market and give the local authorities 
power to act as an initiator and business partner in discretionally selected urban 
development projects.
Even if the design of the formal institutions is done in compliance with the 
requirements of an advanced market economy, the actual performance of the actors 
may be conditioned by other factors, such as habits and cultural norms. While formal 
institutions have been adjusted to western norms, a lack of trust and cooperation 
between actors has seriously hampered the success of urban redevelopment projects in 
Tallinn (Feldman 2000, p. 844). Since the zoning system was introduced in 1998 in 
Kazan the functional designation and development parameters have been constantly 
changed to adjust to the demands o f the private and state developers that required 
higher development density (Personal conversation in Kazan Planning Department 
2009).
This discussion illustrates the difficulties of using the analysis of formal 
institutions as the actual processes and actors may ‘bypass’ them. The ‘hybrid’ forms 
of governance do not fit into any ‘pure’ model form. The emergent in post-socialist 
cities urban governance is not about deregulation, greater efficiency, advanced capital 
accumulation and seem to combine elements of neo-liberal regime with traditional 
developmental state. The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” can be 
potentially useful instrument to analyse the dissemination of neo-liberal regimes over 
localities. However, it is unclear how to connect the ‘model’ form and the ‘actually 
existing form’ or a ‘marginal’ form of neo-liberalism, as many claims made in the 
debates on neo-liberal urbanisation are too broad and speculative and hence difficult 
to apply to a practical research situation. To what extent have post-socialist cities 
become “entrepreneurial”? How entrepreneurialism is progressing in relation to the 
post-socialist transition?
Rationale o f  urban governance
The current literature discusses various links between globalisation and urban 
governance and cities spatial structure. These debates are fundamentally important for 
understanding urban governance in post-socialist countries since they became open to
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global influences. However the degree to which the “global” affects the “local” 
remains unclear. Under conditions of globalisation and weakening of the national 
state the local state has to become more “entrepreneurial” and business oriented, its 
main role has shifted from providing local services to creating a good business 
environment for business and investing (Harvey 1989). In the new globalising 
regulatory environment cities achieve different degree of success: some manage to 
secure places in the top league of the global hierarchy, other become marginalised as 
‘losers’ of the global competition. Much depends on the ability of the city authorities 
to use the assets and secure deals with the private sector (Savitch and Kantor 2002). 
The discourse of urban and regional competitiveness implies certain universality in 
the nature of the challenge that cities across the world face which requires a standard 
“response” in terms of government strategies, institutional design and action aimed at 
strengthening local competitiveness.
The degree and the scope of the universality remains an open question. 
Competitiveness assumes too much universality in the conditions of competition (i.e. 
economic competition according to rational rules), which may not be the case in post­
socialist conditions. As the discussion in previous chapters has demonstrated, there 
are limits to the competitiveness thesis in terms of the geographical scale, as not all 
cases of interurban competition are global, and limits in other conditions as 
competition can be observed in the political sphere where it is regulated by a different 
system of incentives. The conditions of competition also vary as while some cities 
compete on the global market, other opt to compete on national and regional markets. 
Different conditions of competition require different strategies. While the global 
competition implies meeting economic, institutional and cultural standards set up at 
the global level, competition at other scales may occur according to different rules.
As the literature review has demonstrated architecture and urban design have 
been an important component of local and regional competitiveness strategies. Global 
ambitions require meeting international design standards, selection of specific 
architectural ‘brands’ that are globally recognised and meeting the level of ‘iconic 
architecture’ (Sklair 2006; Ren 2008a). In the post-socialist world architecture and 
urban design have face more urgent tasks related to expressing the ideas of newly 
established or regained national identity (Graney 2007). This does not mean that there 
is a clear-cut division in the task assigned to the imagery urban projects. Urban
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development projects in post-socialist countries often serve both goals, contributing to 
the construction of the national identity and searching for enhancing local 
competitiveness on the national or global scale (Anacker 2004; Broudehoux 2004). 
Project is western countries are not exclusively focused on perusing a position in the 
global hierarch either. Regions with strong ethnic characteristics may use architecture 
and urban design for promoting their identity similar to post-socialist states (Keating 
and Frantz 2004).
Imagery projects are addressing two outcomes: i) reconstructing the identity, 
and ii) promoting economic growth. How do these components mix and what are the 
mechanisms that bring them to being? Can the literature on identity construction and 
symbolic representation in post-socialist countries offer a plausible explanation of the 
emerging city imagery? Is the competitiveness theory capable of explaining the 
mechanisms of the city image production? In that sense, neither pure economic logic 
not the logic of symbolic representation can provide a full explanation.
Spatial dimension
As the literature review has demonstrated, the geographical dimension plays an 
important role in urban governance debates. Debates on neo-liberal urban governance 
and competitiveness are closely connected with globalisation and imply a large degree 
of uniformity in the establishment of global regulatory orders. The literature on global 
cities indicates towards the interconnectedness of places through the globalisation 
processes (Massey 2007). The post-socialist transition debate is described as “the east 
wing” of globalisation debate dealing specifically with the issue of adaptation of the 
post-socialist countries to the regulatory regimes adopted in the west. In this respect 
the literature remains country-specific and analyses transition as a process of the 
national level paying little attention to regional variations and differences.
At the national level, the processes o f state rescaling lead to the emergence of 
new governing practices and urban spaces (Brenner 2004). For example, Russian 
government has become more selective in terms of choosing geographic locations for 
investment projects. Although, these policies have not been formulated in a coherent 
form, there are signs that indicate that the resources of the central government in 
future will be focused on particular geographic locations, including regions, cities or
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cross-boundary geographical entities selected according to criteria of economic 
rationality and efficiency.
At the city level the new state role and governing regimes have led to various 
consequences. While the state of the old neighbourhoods continued to decline the new 
islands of prosperity have started to emerge where the new well-off social groups 
found comfortable, westem-style urban living. Many neighbourhoods emerged in the 
suburban belts of large cities, some built as fortified fortresses for the new rich. Table
2.4 “Large urban development projects - framework for analysis” summarises the 
discussion in the literature review chapter.
Table 2.4 Large urban development projects - framework for analysis
Post-socialist Neo-liberal
Organisational 
structure / 
Funding
Government acts as the main 
promoter and mobilises support 
from public and private 
companies.
Funding from government 
sources with private support.
Public-private partnership.
Funding from private sources 
with government support
Rationale To strengthen a new national 
identity by promoting new values 
and erasing the traces of the 
unwanted past.
To strengthen competitiveness, 
promote the place, attract 
investment.
Spatial dimension 
/ Location 
choices
Symbolically important sites. Profit-driven location choices.
Source: compiled by the author.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed relevant literature sources that can help to understand urban 
change in post-socialist countries. The complex and dynamic transformation ongoing 
in these cities raises question concerning the theoretical interpretation of these 
changes. While the existing literature offers some tools to analyse urban 
transformation in the post-socialist world, it also has certain limitations that are 
discussed below.
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The mainstream literature conceptualises post-socialist transition in terms of 
democratisation and marketisation. In practical policy terms, “transition” has been 
about harmonising the regulatory base with that established in the west and creating 
the institutional conditions to allow markets to work “properly”. Transitional theories 
propose that changes on the ground are to be achieved through changing the 
institutions, which is why the literature on urban transition focuses on privatisation, 
the introduction of property rights, market land allocation mechanisms and planning 
techniques. Transitional theory focuses on the eliminating ‘distortions’ caused by state 
regulation and the introduction of market regulation.
The main limitation of this approach is that changes are perceived as inevitable 
and predefined by the ‘course of history’ and ‘global waves of democratisation’. This 
dogmatic view largely treats the political question as resolved (by the act of departing 
from a dictatorial rule) and focuses on tackling the legacies of the previous regime. It 
overlooks institutional continuity, the role of pre-existing institutions or the “partial 
ruins” o f communism as institutional building blocks for reconstruction (Stark and 
Bruszt 1998). This observations question the usefulness of the approaches based on a 
‘tick-box’ analysis of formal institutions as institutions such as planning and property 
right legislation may be in place but the actual performance of actors may be 
governed by traditional relations of power.
The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” implies that neo-liberal shift 
occurs through locally based institutions and governing practices which is why there 
are many “mutations” contingent on local conditions. This concept creates an 
opportunity for a more critical analysis o f urban transformation in post-socialist 
countries based not on the orthodox ‘wholesale’ approach to transition, but on a more 
context-specific analysis. This approach is not unproblematic. The following aspects 
remain under-researched and under-explained. If the ‘genetic code’ of neo-liberalism 
is known, how are the variations being constructed? Is it already full-fledged neo­
liberalism or proto-neo-liberalism? What is the relationship between other discourses 
such as Statism, nationalism and post-socialism? Does the former represent 
alternatives to neo-liberalism, or do they form the entourage of the neo-liberalist 
revolution? The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” can help to ground the 
neo-liberalisation debate into the local context but for that purposes it has to be 
operationalised.
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This research proposes that urban transformation in post-socialist cities should 
be analysed using the concept of urban governance. Although many elements of post­
socialist urban governance organisation come about as a direct borrowing of ideas 
from the West, the real ‘product’ of this borrowing seems to deviate from a 
democratic and market city described in the ‘cookbooks’ o f post-socialist transition. 
This leads to a question as to whether and how the ‘imperatives’ of post-socialist 
transition or neo-liberal shift actually pre-define the outcome of urban governance 
transformations that can be observed in Russian cities? Do urban governments ‘adapt’ 
to new imperatives (e.g. a market economy and competitiveness) according to a blue­
print?
The dominant approach in post-socialist urban studies implies that urban space 
is a mere “product” o f social change. This is not an intrinsic problem of the post­
socialist urban theory, for example, Marcuse and van Kempen (2000) and Soja (2000) 
show that the role of the space in producing social changes is sometimes 
underestimated in western urban theories as well, although the post-socialist urban 
literature reiterates it due to its normative bias. The lack of attention to the spatial 
dimension of urban governance simplifies the analysis, not only in terms o f the 
regional geographical and cultural differences but also in terms of questions of the 
spatiality of power, territorial scale, geographical inequalities, without which the 
question of urban governance cannot be fully understood. The critical reflections help 
to connect the debate to the local context but it has to be translated into the language 
of concrete case studies, institutions and policies as many claims are broad and are 
difficult to apply in a practical research situation.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 The significance of the research
This research aims to analyse large urban development projects in Kazan - the capital city 
of the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). The political, economic and social changes in post­
socialist countries have led to the dramatic transformation of urban areas (Andrusz et al 
1996; Hamilton et al 2005; Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). At the same time, cities 
have been fundamentally important for the construction of political frameworks and 
governance regimes including neo-liberalism (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and post­
socialism (Herrschel 2007; Kostinski 2001). The relations between urban development 
projects, emerging forms of urban governance and wider societal dynamics remain a 
relatively unexplored area of post-socialist urban studies. This makes the analysis of 
urban development projects an interesting way of understanding wider societal 
transformations in post-socialist societies.
3.2 Problems of the existing literature
The contemporary literature on post-socialist cities shows gaps in knowledge relating to 
urban governance and more specifically the role and rationale for causes and mechanisms 
of large urban redevelopment projects. Western literature emphasises the role of such 
factors as globalisation and neo-liberalism that ‘force’ cities to ‘respond’ to the 
imperatives they create by making deliberate efforts to strengthen their competitiveness, 
position themselves on the ‘global mental map’ and build up an internationally 
recognisable image using different techniques, not the least of them architecture and 
urban design. The literature on post-socialist urban transition is, by definition, 
geographically confined and explains urban transformation in former socialist countries 
by the societal transformations including democratisation, marketisation and 
liberalisation.
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Although western and post-socialist debates remain quite separated (Ma 2002), 
both literatures share some similarities, for example, the globalisation inspired literature 
as well as the post-socialist transition urban literature often analyse urban change within a 
dualistic model of ‘societal context’ and ‘urban response’ which portrays cities as being 
at the receiving end of societal processes (see Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic eds. 2006). 
Both explanatory routes seem to conceptualise urban change as a consequence of pre­
defined transition based on economic neoliberalisation and democratisation (in case of 
post-socialist countries). This approach underestimates the role of cities and urban 
governance in transforming the power of the state and governing mechanisms and misses 
out the nuances and the complexity of possible connections between the ‘global’ and the 
‘local’ intersecting at the city level, which forms an interesting area of study (see Brenner
2004). The literature on urban governance in post-socialist countries remains rather 
limited and fragmented. As Section 2.1 demonstrates, while the existing literature is 
focused on institutional transformation, the questions of policy making and the political 
economy of urban development in post-socialist cities so far have received relatively 
modest attention (Feldman 2000; Gel’man 2002). In particular, the aspects of the 
interaction between political and economic forces, institutional transformations and the 
implications for cities remain poorly analysed.
At the same time, the use of western theories may be severely constrained by the 
limitations of theoretical transfer. As suggested by Artobolevsky (1997) “it might initially 
seem that that the transition to a market economy would provide significant scope for the 
exploration of western experience, but in practice this has been far from the case” (p. 
130). The problems of theoretical transfer can be linked to the fundamental differences in 
the initial conditions in the west and in Russia where the traditions of authoritarianism, 
institutional ‘legacies’ of communism (McFaul 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998), the 
country’s economic structure (Aslund 2007) and socio-political conditions (Burawoy 
2001) all have made the direct transfer of western theories difficult. Also the speed of the 
post-socialist reforms has quickly outpaced the advance of theory (Murrell 1995, p. 165). 
This requires a more critical approach to the existing theory. There is thus a need to 
explore some alternatives to the traditional view of post-socialist urban transition.
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3.3 Research aim and tasks
The aim of the study is to analyse urban development projects that shape the image of on 
of Russia’s regional capital cities, Kazan, specifically the connections between urban 
redevelopment projects and programmes and wider social, economic and political 
structures and trends.
In order to realise the aim of the study the following tasks have to be solved:
1) To identify and analyse urban development projects and programmes that can best 
represent the nature of urban transformation in the present context;
2) To analyse the governing mechanisms responsible for the implementation of the 
projects and how projects and programmes are conceived, designed and 
implemented; to identify the factors and forces that are most important for 
understanding the policymaking process and processes of urban transformation;
3) To reflect back on the theory in order to understand the relative usefulness of 
different theoretical frameworks.
3.4 Research focus
The focus of the study is the process of urban governance associated with large urban 
development projects. Such projects require large government investment, involve 
different actors from both state and non-state sectors and produce a strong impact on the 
city landscape and its image. The research will focus on the following elements of urban 
governance: governing mechanisms and institutions, the policymaking process and the 
development rationale and political rhetoric used to justify the action which brings urban 
redevelopment projects into being. It is argued that studying the governing mechanisms 
can help to understand both urban redevelopment projects in post-socialist cities, and the 
social, economic and political structures lying behind them.
In order to understand wider political, economic and social transformation the 
research focuses on large urban development projects as laboratories of political and 
institutional change (Swyngedouw et al. 2003a). The research uses the concepts of urban
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governance and social production of space to link a discrete and fixed (in time and space) 
phenomenon such as large urban development projects to continuous processes in 
society. The concept of urban governance reveals main actors, regimes and institutions 
that facilitate the emergence of projects. The selection of projects has been justified by 
considering the particular types of space that are most likely to be affected by macro 
forces (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, pp. 252-253). If urban development is a result of 
social relations, the analysis of specific projects could contribute to our understanding of 
those relations therefore the selection of case studies has to be justified.
3.5 Research questions
The current study started as an enquiry into urban redevelopment projects and 
programmes that cause the transformation of Kazan’s image and urban structure. Urban 
governance is related to various aspects of social, economic and political life of the 
society. To understand what shapes a particular model of urban governance in the current 
context it is necessary to address the following questions.
The main question of this study is as follows: what are the main driving forces 
behind the urban redevelopment projects (UDPs) and programmes in a regional capital of 
post-socialist Russia, and more specifically:
1) Would it be sufficient to consider UDPs as fixed discrete tasks performed by a 
well-defined number of actors as suggested in literature on urban development in 
post-socialist capitals (Anacker 2004; Sir 2008); or do instead urban development 
projects need to be analysed within a wider research framework that treats them 
as ‘laboratories of urban change’ (Swyngedouw et al. 2003a) and analyses 
projects in terms of their governing mechanisms, strategically located actors and 
project rationale?
2) Are UDPs largely shaped by the search to enhance urban competitiveness and to 
position the city on the “international marketplace” (Savitch and Kantor 2002) 
governed by universal rational economic laws, as suggested in the mainstream
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western literature on globalisation, urban governance and competitiveness and 
literature on post-socialist transition?
3) Are urban development projects a result of the actions of predominantly local 
forces, political struggles and regulatory regimes that do not necessarily represent 
a consistent and coherent ‘transition’ towards a pre-defined institutional form or 
regime, but represent the process of ad hoc institutional adjustment, messy 
adaptation of pre-existing institutions to new conditions, as suggested in the 
critical reading of post-socialist transition literature and ‘actually existing neo- 
liberalism’ literature (Brenner and Theodore 2002)?
3.6 Research epistemology
The current study is based on the realist philosophy, which asserts that the material world 
exists independently from what people think about it. Modem natural science is based on 
the realist philosophy that clearly separates the researcher from the object of study and 
uses research methods that involve data collection (including experimental data), data 
analysis, revealing the recurrence and regularities of events and patterns and drawing 
conclusions that have the status of a ‘natural law’, i.e. a law that under similar conditions 
will recur in infinite number of cases. In the social sciences the situation is more complex 
as the researcher cannot be separated from the object of study. The way we conceptualise 
social phenomenon, processes and relationship between them affects them, influence 
their structure and performance. The scope for experimenting is severely limited 
especially in research of large socio-economic systems such as cities and regions.
The realist tradition in social science maintains the independence of the world 
from our knowledge but there are different philosophies within this tradition. Marx has 
claimed that human society develops according to societal laws that act independently of 
people’s knowledge and that are similar to the laws acting in the natural world. These 
objective societal laws, according to Marx, predetermine the succession of socio­
economic formations through the cyclical process of development of the relations of 
production and exchange in society. Popper (1992/1966) has criticised the historicist
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approach to society and introduced the concept of the “open society” that denies any 
historical necessity that is advocated by its ‘prophets’ that often have material interests in 
propagating certain views of society and its ‘destiny’ (p. 31-33). Another important 
contribution made by Popper into theory of social science is the method of falsification as 
an alternative to the principle of verification. According to the principal of falsification,
Science does not prove anything by conducting experiments, no matter how
numerous, for the very reason that no matter how often the theory is tested
there is always the possibility that it can be falsified (Delanty 2000, p.31).
To avoid social determinism and to reveal the actual societal processes and actors 
this research uses the realist philosophy in a critical way. According to Sayer (2000) 
critical realism is focused on “necessity and contingency rather than regularity, on open 
rather than closed systems, on the ways in which casual processes could produce quit 
different results in different context” (p. 5). Instead of deriving causation from regular 
succession of events, realists build their explanation on “identifying causal mechanisms 
and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what 
conditions”. Repeated occurrences of events (that positivists would register) are not 
significant as “what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of 
times we have observed it happening” (ibid, p. 14). Consistent regularities are significant 
for explaining the processes occurring in “closed systems”, i.e. those that have controlled 
conditions and limited influence from the outside world. Social systems are all open 
systems in which conditions are not controlled, the number of factors is infinite and their 
duration and impact are difficult to measure. In open systems, “same mechanisms can 
produce different outcomes according to context, or more precisely, according to its 
spatio-temporal relations with other objects, having their own casual powers and 
liabilities, which may trigger, block or modify its action” (ibid, p. 15). As social systems 
are complex, there is a risk of attributing to one mechanism effects which are actually due 
to another. According to Sayer (2000) the problem of identifying casual responsibility in 
complex open systems can be dealt with by asking a series of characteristically realist 
questions:
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• What does the existence of this object/practice presuppose? What are its 
preconditions?
• Can/could object A exist without B?
• What is it about this object which enables it to do certain things? (p. 16)
The use of these questions allows to reveal necessity, not regularity, to trace main casual 
relationship and understand what makes things happen in specific cases (ibid, p. 20).
The choice of critical realism was informed by the specificity of the current phase 
of the Russian society development. The collapse of the USSR, the dramatic processes of 
political and economic restructuring have demonstrated similarity with Popper’s 
(1992/1966) model of “open society” that at any moment moves towards the unknown as 
opposed to a pre-determined future. Critical realism also claims that “events are not pre­
defined before they happen but depend on contingent conditions, the future is open -  
things could go in many different ways (Sayer 2000, p. 15).
In parallel to the fundamental processes of economic and political restructuring, 
other social transformations have occurred, such as the reassessment of national, ethnic 
and religious identities. Although the question of national and ethnic identity is an 
important element of political mobilisation and action, these themes should be treated as 
elements of the ‘superstructure’ and hence considered as subordinated in their 
significance to more fundamental questions of economic and political power. Those have 
been the processes that defined the “transition” that can be best captured within a realist 
theoretical framework.
3.7 The role of institutions
The analysis of institutional transformation is crucial for understanding the policy process 
and exploring possible theoretical links between the debates on post-socialist urban 
transition and Neoliberal urbanisation. The use of the institutional approach (North 1997) 
can offer an alternative to the single-sided approach based on the principles of 
neoclassical economics that dominates the transition doctrines. The institutional approach 
implies that changes on the ground can be explained (and in fact instigated) by changes in
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a wide set of institutions including pre-existing institutions, cultural norm and history. 
The institutional approach can help to advance both theory and practice of transition by 
avoiding a narrow focus on market conditions and institutional arrangements required for 
markets to function but by looking at wider set of circumstances that include cultural 
norms, historic traditions, inherited institutional constellations and practices.
Gazibo (2005) argues that the new institutionalist ontology including the 
understanding of the role of institutions and their stability, and new institutional 
explanatory models for institutional genesis and change have influenced transitology in 
the way that narrows its explanatory power. Here the main theoretical problems are 
related to formalism and the overestimation of the role of institutional design, formal 
rules and ‘standard measurements’ in transition (pp. 156-58). In relation to explaining 
institutional change1 the main problem is an apparent incompatibility between the 
institutionalist ontology (understanding of the structuralist influence of institutions and 
their continuity) and the nature of the challenge of explaining rapid institutional 
transformations such as democratic change (p. 163).
Lecours (2005b) argues that new institutionalism rejects two perspectives on 
institutions i) institutions seen “as ‘neutral’, adjusting mechanically to changes in society 
so as to continually embody the current balance of power or cultural-ideological 
landscape and as always being solely at the receiving end of social change”; ii) 
institutions seen as “purely instruments that can readily be manipulated by actors”. 
Instead new institutionalism “puts forward the idea that institutions represent an 
autonomous force in politics, that their weight is felt on action and outcomes. It is 
suggested that political analysis is best served by taking institutions as the starting point” 
(p. 8). According to Lecours:
1 The question o f  institutional continuity has been actively debated in the literature (see Kingdon 1995; 
Lecours 2005; Sabatier 1999). N ew  institutionalism  has been challenged on two counts: first, critics argue 
that it should explain better institutional genesis and change without relying on references to exogenous 
forces; second, institutions might not be as stable and permanent as it is clam ed (Harty 2005, p. 53). To 
address these problems it has been proposed that endogenous institutional change has two preconditions: i) 
loss o f  legitim acy, ii) cost calculation; and can be explained with the use o f  tw o independent variables: i) 
window o f  opportunity (the tim ing o f  change), ii) resources (the means o f  change) which can be o f  non­
material or material nature (ibid, pp. 67-68).
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New institutionalists typically suggest that actors adapt their behaviour to 
existing institutional frameworks, thereby legitimising institutions and 
favouring institutional continuity. As a consequence, the possibilities for 
change may be limited because this institutional continuity produces 
repetitive behaviour on the part of actors. From this perspective, institutional 
change becomes a precondition for political change (2005b, p. 11).
3.8 The selection of case studies
There are several reasons why Kazan has been selected as a case study. First, the 
available literature on Russia’s urban transition focuses mainly on the country’s two 
largest and most globalised cities: Moscow and St. Petersburg (Evans 2000). Not only are 
they the largest cities in terms of population size and economic strength, but they also 
have a constitutional status of a federal city-region which no other Russian cities have. 
Russia’s second group of large cities with a population of one million people and above 
is called the millionniki2. With a few exceptions3 the millionniki have received quite 
modest research attention which makes a study of urban transformation in Kazan a 
relevant and intriguing task. In many ways Kazan is similar to its counterparts. All of 
them have undergone a transition from socialist industrial centres to self-governed 
municipal entities, but the level of political and economic authority the municipalities in 
Russia are enjoying remains a debated topic (see Campbell 2006; Gelman 2002a).
Second, unlike other regional capitals located in predominantly Russian regions, 
Kazan is a capital city of an ethnic region that in 1990 declared its ‘sovereignty’ from 
Russia. The special status of Kazan makes the city and the region a good site for studying 
two aspects of urban governance which may not be as observable in other regions. First, 
Tatarstan and Kazan seem to be an ideal place to study the issues of the regional aspects 
of Russia’s culture (Nougmanova 2003, p. 3). The authorities have used urban 
redevelopment projects to “Tatarize the landscape” looking for people’s political support 
and trust (Hughes 2007, p. 124). The transformation of its image has been aimed at
2 These include N ovosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, N izhniy N ovgorod, Samara, Omsk, Kazan, Cheliabinsk, 
Rostov-on-D on and Ufa (Goskomstat RF 2010).
3 For exam ple, a study o f  Tom sk housing sector by Alexandrova et al (2004), a study o f  Novosibirsk by 
Stenning (1999).
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reflecting the modernity and wealth of Tatarstan as a sovereign state (Graney 2007). 
Second, the politics of federalism and centre-periphery relations and proactive position of 
Tatarstani leadership in modernising Russia’s federalist system have influenced 
governance mechanisms and the design and implementation of regional policies of the 
central government.
Third, Kazan has undergone a remarkable urban transformation including the 
renovation of the city centre. Over the last two decades the authorities of Kazan and 
Tatarstan managed to attract significant resources into urban development projects which 
created material evidence of economic and political change. These projects represent 
good case studies to analyse the emerging model of urban governance which involves 
actors from federal, regional and local authorities. Because of the size, the length and 
complexity of the projects they may help to reveal the mechanisms of urban governance. 
These aspects make Kazan is a good case study to analyse the interplay between the 
‘global’ and ‘local’ discourses in urban redevelopment projects given its distinctive 
cultural tradition and recent policy efforts to create a more entrepreneurial urban 
governance. These policies have also been “packaged” in the discourse of city 
competitiveness theme.
The research methodology is a case study embracing two major urban 
development projects implemented in Kazan between 1995 and 2005:
1) The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005);
2) The Special Federal Programme the Preservation and Development of Kazan 
Historic Centre (2001-2005).
The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) has 
been a result of the search of a new image of the city as the capital of a ‘sovereign’ 
nation. In the 1990s the aspirations for sovereignty from Russia and growing national and 
religious awareness required relevant material symbols of admiration and worship. The 
Mosque ideally fitted to this goal because Tatarstani statehood was always linked to 
Islam. The original structure was destroyed in 1552 when the Russians conquered the 
capital of then Kazan Khanate. Since then the Mosque has been a symbol of both heroic
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resistance to the invaders and lost Tatarstani statehood. These observations provoke 
interesting questions about the expression of political and economic processes in 
architecture and urban planning. How might one explain the emergence of ‘iconic’ 
projects like the Kul-Sharif mosque? What does the project represent or symbolise?
The political economy of heritage is also an intriguing topic. The Special Federal 
Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001- 
2005) was recently implemented in Kazan. The Programme was linked with Kazan’s 
Millennium celebrations in 2005 and was a result of successful bargaining with the 
federal centre over the constitutional status of Tatarstan. The programme reveals the 
connection between competitiveness thinking and heritage. Competitiveness is 
conceptualised and materialised as a set of policies developed and implemented in order 
to compete successfully for the federal grants and private capital. Local identity is being 
actively constructed through iconic design building among other things (historiography, 
literature and language) also plays an important role in making claims based on the 
national peculiarity of Tatarstan (compared to “pure” Russian regions). In this sense, 
image production started a self-perpetuating cycle of reproducing heritage objects and 
new iconic design aimed at attracting more funds into (re)constructing iconic buildings.
3.9 The boundaries of the research
This research analyses large urban development projects implemented in Kazan from 
1995 to 2005. During this period the city has made a transition from a socialist 
manufacturing centre into the capital of a semi-sovereign state governed by regional and 
city authorities. In addition to economic and political transformations that affected cities 
during the researched period, Russia’s federal politics also changed from over-centralised 
during the socialist period to a loose federation during Yeltsin’s period, back to the 
recentralisation introduced by Putin’s administration in 2000.
Kazan is an interesting case study because the regional and the city authorities not 
only used the old distributive mechanisms inherited from the socialist state to secure 
development funding, but made systematic attempts to pursue economic opportunities on
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the emerging markets, trying to secure direct links with foreign countries and positioning 
Tatarstan as a (semi)independent state. Large urban development projects that have been 
selected as case studies for this research can illustrate the emerging structures of urban 
governance and are well connected to wider political, economic and institutional 
transformations in post-socialist Russia.
3.10 Data collection
The author has become familiar with the projects analysed in this research whilst working 
in Kazan, firstly in journalism and later working in Kazan City Administration4. The 
experience gained in other Russian cities5 has allowed the author to reflect back on 
projects in Kazan, compare experiences in different regions, contemplate similarities and 
differences, and generalise on the political, institutional and economic conditions of 
Russian urban planning and governance.
Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. The former 
includes semi-structured interviews with experts representing different reference groups. 
According to May (1997) the semi-structured interview technique is used to avoid the 
rigidness of the structured interviews approach and allow “the interviewer to have more 
latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee” 
(p. 111). Allowing a degree of flexibility during interviews has been particularly 
important because of the multidisciplinary nature of the research which is based on 
debates on governance, competitiveness, neoliberalism, federalism and nationalism. 
Experts (no matter how professional in their own field) may struggle integrating different 
disciplines under the umbrella of urban planning and development or, in fact, may not be 
familiar with some western debates at all, therefore interviews have been set up more as a 
dialogue to facilitate better interaction which would not be attainable if questionnaires 
were used.
4 In journalism  the author worked as an editor o f  a published in Kazan architectural design magazine 
‘D IN A ’ (1997-2000). Work in the Administration was first in the M ayor’s o ffice  as a special advisor on 
architecture and urban planning (2002-2003), then at the JSC ‘Urban D evelopm ent Directorate’ (2003).
5 The subsequent em ploym ent as an urban planner a large international consultancy has been a good  
opportunity to becom e familiar and actively participate in urban developm ent projects proposed by both the 
private and the public sectors in other R ussia’s regions.
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The main disadvantages of using this method were as follows. Each interview 
required getting access to the interviewee, which proved to be difficult in a number of 
cases when experts were not available or did not want to cooperate. For example, neither 
the Mayor of the city nor the City Manager was available for the interview despite the 
fact that both had previously given consent to participate. That is why the highest official 
interviewed in the City Administration was the First Deputy to the City Manager for 
economic development. Similarly, the highest rank public officials interviewed in the 
President’s Office were the Political Advisor to the President and the Chief of Foreign 
Relations. The chair of the Russian cultural society in Kazan refused to be interviewed 
despite several attempts to meet. As a result the interview has been conducted with his 
deputy (who refused to have it recorded). The Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of 
Tatarstan and did not respond to enquiries about the possibility of an interview. It was 
impossible to involve managers of some large industrial enterprises who did not seem to 
have any interest in urban research. Therefore, where possible, the missing information 
had to be obtained from alternative sources. Arranging each interview and transcribing 
the records required a considerable time input especially when the translation from 
Russian to English was required. Finally, no interviews (structured or unstructured) could 
provide a good source of numeric data on project design and implementation and as such, 
this data had to be collected from other (primarily secondary) sources.
In total, 33 interviews were held during three field trips to Kazan conducted in 
January 2007, May-June 2007 and January 2008. Each interview lasted between 10 
minutes to 2 hours. The questions used during interviews are attached in the Appendix 1. 
Many experts were drawn from the old connections established during the years of work 
in Kazan, but the majority of experts were entirely new contacts established during the 
research. The interviewees were selected with the purpose to achieve the most balanced 
representation across the professional groups that were involved in the policy making 
process or might have valuable knowledge of governing practices in Kazan and 
Tatarstan. Also it was important to achieve representation from different tiers of 
government including the federal, regional and city authorities; different sectors 
including state and non-state; different ethnic groups including Russian, Tatar and other.
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The distribution of interviewees among reference groups is shown in Table 3.1 “The 
distribution of the interviewees among reference groups” and Table 3.2 “The distribution 
of the interviewees among reference groups”.
Table 3.1 The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups
Reference group Number of 
interviews
1 The administration o f  Kazan and its subsidiaries 5
2 The administration o f  President o f  Tatarstan, Government o f  Tatarstan 
and its subsidiaries
6
3 The Government o f  the Russian Federation 1
4 Commercial firms 7
5 Education and Research Institutions 6
6 NGOs 5
7 Design institutes and private architectural design practices 3
8 Total 33
Source: compiled by the author
Table 3.2 The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups
Ethnic groups Number o f  interviews
1 Russian 10
2 Tatar 15
3 Other 6
4 Total 33
Source: compiled by the author
Since the interviews alone were not capable of providing all necessary data, 
especially data on city economic performance and project-specific data on budgeting, 
planning and evaluation, the research had to rely substantially on secondary sources of 
data which included official statistics, policy reports and government documents. In most 
cases the information was found in open sources such as government publications,
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statistical reports and policy documents. Additional information was found in articles 
published in national, regional and local press and the Internet.
The main advantage of using secondary data was easy access to statistical data on 
the city and regional level. On the other hand, it was not always relevant to the topic or 
had sufficient level of detail. For example, few reliable reports on the Special Federal 
Programme fo r the Preservation and Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-
2005) were published and all were quite modest in terms of the level of detail and quality 
of data provided. The Programme has never been formally evaluated, in that sense the 
current study is the first exercise. Policy reports in many cases provided limited 
information on selected projects and programmes. Therefore data received from different 
sources had to be cross checked to find the best approximation to the truth.
Conducting research in Tatarstan has faced some additional challenges. It is 
acknowledged by western researchers that in republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan 
people are afraid to speak critically of the government because their regions are two of 
the most authoritarian in Russia” (Dininio and Orttung 2005, p. 518). According to 
Carnegie Moscow Centre Tatarstan’s democracy rating among other 88 Russia’s regions 
is as low as 69 (Petrov 2004a, p. 247). The growth of authoritarian government in 
Tatarstan was also reported by Matsuzato (2004a). People rarely allow critical comments 
about the government, especially during recorded interviews. Those who dare to criticise 
government officials may face both legal and illegal prosecution6.
2.11 Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations become increasingly important in planning this research. 
Interviews may be specifically sensitive to ethical issues relating to research technique 
because of the issues of privacy, use of data and protection of both the interviewee and 
interviewer (Piccolo and Thomas 2009). In this respect the following rules have been
6 In 2009, one o f  the interviewees, the former press-secretary for the Tatarstani President Shaim iev, later 
the outspoken critic o f  Shaimiev, was brutally attacked near the entrance to his apartment block. After the 
recovery he faced criminal charges for interfering with President’s private life and dissem inating libel upon 
the president in his book and on-line blog. The interview ee’s w ife was sacked from work. In Decem ber  
2009 he was sentenced to 1 year and 9 moths in custody for “rousing hatred towards authorities”.
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used in the research: 1) to make a disclaimer about the purpose of the research and use of 
data obtained; 2) to use a voice-recorder with permission; and 3) to give the respondent a 
right to refuse to answer questions but to retain a right to rephrase the question so as to 
make sure the question is understood. Apart from those general rules two specific areas 
need to be discussed in more detail.
A discussion on the Tatar national identity and its relationship with the Russian 
national identity can be one of the most potentially sensitive areas to deal with because 
views of the colonisation and subsequent Russification and Christianisation of the Tatars 
may vary among the respondents. On the other side the issue of loyalty to the central 
power may have various interpretations as well. Luckily the Tatarstan Republic has 
avoided any clashes between different ethnic and confessional groups, which some other 
post-soviet regions have witnessed. The Tatarstani government has been very persistent 
in preventing the development of political extremism or religious fundamentalism and 
hostile attitudes in society. In that respect Tatarstan is not a society where politics is 
constructed along religious and ethnic divides.
Another aspect relates to the researcher’s involvement in journalism which has 
resulted in a number of articles, published between in 1998-2006 in professional 
magazines on urban design and architecture published in Kazan, Moscow and Samara. A 
number of critical articles on development policies in Kazan were published in local 
newspapers. The researcher’s active civic position has helped to establish professional 
connections as well as build a reputation of a critic of development polities in Kazan. 
Conducting interview has required making clear the difference between a scientific 
investigation and work of a journalist.
3.12 Approbation
During the course of the research its different aspects have been presented and discussed 
with various academic and professional audiences in Estonia, Poland, UK, Sweden and 
Russia (St. Petersburg and Kazan) which has helped to provide feedback on the work and 
its findings.
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Figure 1. The administrative division of Russia in 1993. Source: University of Texas 
Libraries.
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH CONTEXT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter w ill d iscu ss the political and econ om ic context o f  the study and sp ecific  
issues and d evelop m en t ch a llen ges facing the city o f  Kazan. From 1990 to 2005  R ussia  
has com p leted  a transition from state socia lism  to a prim itive m arket econ om y and 
eventually  to state cap ita lism  and authoritarian p olitica l sy stem  R u ssia ’s reg ion s adopted  
different strategies to shape their relationship  w ith  the centre and international 
com m unity and m anage their ow n territory and urban centres. The R epublic o f  Tatarstan 
in m any w ays has been a leader am ong other regions in d efin in g  n ew  con figu ration s o f  
Russian federalism . T he city  o f  Kazan, in political and eco n o m ic  term s has been  
subordinated to the region but as the capital city  played  an im portant role in m aterialising  
the ideas o f  regional identity and com petitiveness. The chapter is structured as fo llow s. 
First, the d iscussion  w ill address trends at the national and regional level and then w ill 
narrow down to the sp ec ific  issues that in fluence Kazan urban governance and urban 
d evelopm en t p olicies. The chapter seek s to explore the interplay betw een  the m ulti­
d im ensional and com p lex  issues that influence m echanism s o f  urban governance.
4.2 Russia
T h is sectio n  wi l l  provide an introduction to R u ssia ’s m odern political and eco n o m ic  
conditions. D ue to a h istorically high level o f  political and eco n o m ic  centralisation  
present in R ussia, the developm ent o f  R ussia’s c ities is dependent on the resources 
available at the national and regional levels. At the sam e tim e, it is interesting to explore  
how  key d evelop m en ts and new  regim es at the national level are shaped by local political 
conditions. Figure 1 (p. 93 ) sh ow s the adm inistrative d iv ision  o f  R ussia.
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4.2.1 Chronology (1990-2005)
In order to understand developments in Russia, it is critical to acknowledge the scale and 
pace of political change and upheaval related to the transformation of the political system 
in recent years. Since Russia proclaimed independence from the USSR (1990)1, its 
political development can be divided in several periods, used here to outline the general 
timeline of Russia’s political development in recent decades.
The first period lasted from Russia’s Declaration of Independence in June 1990 to 
December 1991 when the USSR collapsed. This period is characterised by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) losing control, growing democratisation 
and increasing competition for control of the state resources between the leadership of the 
USSR and Russia. In August 1991 a military coup organised by the conservative part of 
the Soviet leadership attempted to re-establish the power of the USSR government. After 
the coup failed and the influence of the Communist party and the government reached the 
lowest level, Yeltsin won the power struggle between the leadership of the USSR and 
Russia. The way Yeltsin seized power in Russia (effectively by dismantling the USSR) 
“had fatally weakened the political, juridical, economic and administrative mechanisms 
through which they [the new government] could exercise that power” (Clarke and 
Kabalina 1995, p. 145). The growing separatism of Russia’s provinces was described as 
the “parade of sovereignties” (Castells and Kiselyova 2000, p. 177).
The second period lasted fom December 1991 to October 1993. This period is 
characterised by the process of dismantling the elements of the command-administrative 
system, the economic liberalisation that started in 1992 and building of the institutions of 
the new Russian state. With the help of the IMF and other Western advisors the 
government launched a ‘shock therapy’ reform programme, which according to some 
commentators amounted to the ‘shock without a therapy’ (Rutkevich 1996, p. 86). The
1 On June the 12th 1990 Russia declared its state sovereignty (S ’ezd Narodnikh Deputatov RSFSR 1990), 
which effectively meant political independence from the Union governm ent and control over resources. 
The leaders o f  USSR and Russia became engaged in fierce competition for control over the country. To 
undermine R ussia’s sovereignty project the Soviet Union leadership proposed a new Union Treaty, which  
would have g iven all ethno-republics equal political rights. This proposal was accepted enthusiastically by 
many regional leaders. In August 1990 during his visit to Kazan in his turn Yeltsin proposed to Russia’s 
ethno-republics to “take as much sovereignty as they could sw allow ” ( Respublica Tatarstan, 2008).
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position of the central government was weakening due to the economic crisis, budget 
deficit and the on-going conflict between the President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. 
Regions used the weakening central control as an opportunity to expand their spheres of 
influence. The federal government feckled the threat of growing separatism by giving 
various concessions to regions.
The third period dates from October 1993 when the standoff between the reform- 
minded President and the dominated by the conservative forces Supreme Soviet was 
resolved with a use of military force against the latter. The new government initiated 
mass privatisation of the state property which led to the emergence of crony capitalism 
and so called “oligarchs” (Hoffman 2007). The practice of bargaining federalism 
continued but ihe centre retained the capacity to punish an explicit disobedience and 
launched a military action against a break-away republic of Chechnya in 1994.
The fourth period began in December 1999 when Putin became acting President 
and continues until now. During this period Moscow has strengthened the power of the 
central state and introduced several policies aimed to curtail regional autonomy. Putin’s 
reforms of 2004 have resulted in a greater formalisation of the centre-periphery relations, 
the suspension of political bargaining between the centre and regions and finally the 
centralisation of political power and budgetary subordination of regions to the centre.
4.2.2 Economic conditions
The USSR economy was characterised by a large heavy industry, small light industry, 
consumer goods and services sector, state subsidies and the presence of extensive social 
welfare system (Sachs and Woo 1994, p. 104). In the 1990s the Russian economy 
suffered a sharp decline caused by various interrelated factors including the disintegration 
of the USSR and its centralised planning system, collapse of the financial system, 
decreasing revenues from the sales of raw materials, as well as the decline of domestic 
production and investment. In 1996 GDP was 59.4% of its 1990 value. Expenditure on 
final consumption fell by 31.1% between 1990 and 1996 while Gross accumulation fell 
78.2% over the same period. Overall between 1990 and 1996 the economy suffered from
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negative GDP growth between -14.5% (1992) and -3.9% (1995). Table 4.1 shows 
Russia’s GDP as compared to other countries.
Table 4.1 Russia’s GDP in billion EUR compared to other countries (1995-2005)
Country 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Russia 277.8 359.3 345.7 385.3 475.0 624.3
EU-25 6,950.2 9,095.9 9,464.7 9,816.5 9,970.3 10,450.0 10,848.7
NL 320.5 418.0 447.7 465.2 476.9 489.8 505.6
Poland 106.4 185.8 212.2 209.4 191.4 203.9 243.8
Source: Goskomstat RF and Eurostat (2007).
In 2006 Russia’s GDP originated from the following sources: agriculture -  4.9%, 
industry -  39.3% and services -  55.8% (Economist, 2007). Although over the last 6 years 
the Russian economy has been growing at an average annual rate of between 7% and 8%, 
growth has remained short-term and investment concentrated in a few sectors due to the 
limited diversification of Russia’s economy (World Bank 2008, 5). The Russian economy 
depends too much on the revenues received from exports of natural resources which 
account for more than 80% of exports and 30% of government revenues, leaving the 
country vulnerable to swings in world commodity prices (CIA 2008). The high gains in 
the energy and raw material sectors, plus continuing degradation of high added value and 
technologically advanced manufacturing sectors created a specific production model 
based on extraction of natural recourses and a limited ability to innovate and modernise. 
Integration into the global economy made the extraction of raw materials one of the most 
profitable sectors of Russia’s economy (McCann and Schwartz 2007, pp. 1341-2).
There are luge disparities among Russia’s regions in terms of political, economic 
and social development and geographical conditions. Polarisation has tended to increase 
over time (Fedorov 2002, p. 453). According to Carluer (2005) “the gap between the 
richest and the poorest regions has grown sharply and the intermediate clubs have nearly
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disappeared” (Carluer 2005, p. 714)2. Ahrend (2005) has stated that the economic 
performance of Russia’s regions depends on their pre-reform economic structure, human 
capital and natural resource endowments (p. 290). The latter has also been an important 
variable in explaining the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the 
Russia’s regions (Iwasaki and Saganuma 2005). Economic restructuring has also led to 
disparities between large cities with diversified economy and medium size and small 
urban centres with mono-functional industrial structure (Shvetsov 2002, p. 8).
Depopulation has become a serious problem. In 2005, Russia’s population was
142.8 million people, which represents a drop from 148.3 million in 1995. The 
population decline during those years was 840,000 in 1995 and 846,500 in 2005 
(Goskomstat 2009). The negative demographic dynamic was caused by the coincidence 
of a low birth rate and hyper-mortality among the adults, unprecedented in a developed 
country (L’vov 2004; Shkolnikov 1998). According to the World Bank classification 
Russia is now categorised as an upper-middle-income country. The latest official 
statistics show that the number of people living below the subsistence level decreased 
from 29 percent in 2000 to 20.4 percent in 2003, and to below 14 percent (estimate) in 
2007 (World Bank 2008). In Russian society wealth is distributed very unequally: the 
richest 20% earn 8.4 times more than the poorest 20% of the population, while for 
instance in the EU-25 zone this indicator is half this proportion - 4.6 (?????????? and 
Eurostat 2007, p. 80).
4.2.3 Political conditions
According to the Constitution (1993), the Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic 
federative law-governed state with a republican form of government. Executive power is 
exercised by the President as head of state, and the government headed by the Prime
2 For instance, in terms o f  the population size M oscow  is 443 tim es larger than the Evenk AO. Peripheral 
regions also demonstrate striking disparities in their wealth: in terms o f  its GDP per capita the Yam alo- 
Nenetskiy AO is 36 times richer than the Republic o f  Ingushetia, but in terms o f its budget revenues per 
capita it is richer 178 times (Arinin and Marchenko 1999, p. 139, sited in Mamsourov and Kesel'brener 
2004, p. 8). There are regions “practically thrown back to a natural econom y alongside with M oscow that 
lives in the information age” (M amsourov and Kesel'brener 2004, p. 26).
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Minister, who is appointed by the President with the Parliament's approval. The 
Parliament (called the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) consists of two 
chambers: the lower house is called the State Duma, the upper house -  the Federation 
Council. The Duma has 450 members who are known as people’s deputies. The 
Federation Council has 168 members who are known as senators. Each of the 84 federal 
subjects of Russia sends two members to the Council. The Constitutional Court consists 
of 19 judges who are appointed by the President with the consent of the Federation 
Council. The Court is authorised to rule on violations of constitutional rights, arbitrate 
disputes between the executive and legislative branches and between the federal and the 
regional and local governments.
As discussed previously in Section 2.1.2 transition to democracy was not a 
straightforward process. Although Russia seems to have all formal attributes of a 
democratic state, the elections have preordained outcomes (Baker and Glasser 2005, p. 
376) are affected by coercion and fraud (McFaul and Petrov 2004, p. 51); and democracy 
remains “partial” (Robinson 2003). According to Urnov (2007) the Russian political 
regime has “lost the fundamental characteristics of democracy and become a ‘soft’ 
authoritarian regime” (p. 87). This is explained by institutional weakness (Poushkareva 
2007, p. 53) and the violation of the principle of separation of power (Sheinis 2004, p. 
68). Other argue, that under the conditions of weak state a compromised democracy can 
be more sustainable and deficiency of Russian democracy has been the reason why the 
democratic experiment has continued (Bunce 2003, p. 187). According to Krasin (2007) 
Russia’s political system has the following characteristics:
The principle of separation of power has been replaced by the domination 
of the executive branch subordinated to head of the state. The Parliament 
has been deprived of both real power leverages and control functions. 
Political parties lack either deep roots in the society, or effective channels 
of influencing public politics. Mass media is under control of the 
oligarchic groups and state bureaucracy is being used to manipulate public 
opinion. The system of free elections is deformed, human and citizen 
rights are violated in all parts including by the state (Krasin 2007, pp. 24- 
25).
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4.2.4 Political process (1990-2005)
In the late 1980s the new leadership of the USSR started reforms aimed at the 
democratisation of its political system and the liberalisation of the socialist economy 
(Castells 1998, pp 47-56). Soon the reforms came out of the Communist Party control 
and the entire Soviet political system disintegrated (Gill 1994). Russia appeared from the 
debris of the USSR as a country with fatally weakened political, juridical, economic and 
administrative mechanisms (Clarke and Kabalina 1995, p. 145). The government 
institutions and legal mechanisms had to be rebuilt, as well as the “ideological vacuum” 
(Beyme 1996) left after the collapse of communism had to be filled with new a social 
ideology.
While in other post-socialist countries new political elites used the ideology of 
nationalism based on an anti-Russian slant (Anacker 2004; Sir 2008), the political elites 
in Russia could not rely on the ideology of Russian nationalism because of the diverse 
ethnic structure of the country. With neither socialism nor ethno-national ism being 
politically acceptable, liberalism became the only feasible option (Timofeyev 2007, pp. 
110-113). The choice in favour of liberalism was made with limited analysis of the 
practicalities and implications. According to Umov (2007) “the liberals came to power on 
the high tide of hatred to the Communist party and a naive believe that its removal from 
power would make Russia a high-income country with flourishing economy and 
abundance of goods and services in 2-3 years” (p. 96). In that sense, ideas of liberalism 
contributed to the construction of “a negative identity that was based on negation of the 
Soviet identity” (Timofeyev 2007, p. 113).
The choice in favour of a liberal ideology was also influenced by the 
contingencies of a power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin which continued 
between June 1990 when Russia declared independence from the USSR and December 
1991 when the USSR disintegrated. While Gorbachev relied on the old cadres recruited 
from the Communist and Soviet nomenklatura, Yeltsin decided to form a counter-elite 
that differed from their opponents in Gorbachev’s team. To form his cabinet Yeltsin used 
new type of people who had not worked in government structures and hence had a 
completely different perspective: “the ‘new men’ did not occupy even lowly positions in
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the apparatus of the Party or government. They were recruited largely from academic 
institutions, particularly research institutes” (Lane and Ross 1995, p. 75).
In order to secure economic recovery Yeltsin and his new cabinet decided to 
proceed with radial market reforms using a neo- liberal approach According to 
Nesvetailova (2005) “Russian policymakers strived to emulate the experience of 
advanced capitalist countries, namely the US and the UK. The success of the Anglo- 
American model in overcoming a deep structural recession and inflation in the 1980s 
seemed pertinent to the challenges facing the new Russian government in 1991-1992” (p. 
239). According to Aslund (2007) Yeltsin “invited the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, which obtained extensive access from the beginning. He 
accepted that a sizable group of foreign economic advisors assisted the government” (p. 
95). The advisors delivered economic doctrines of the World Bank and IMF and 
developed programmes aimed to exercise transition from the command-administrative to 
the market economy. These doctrines put a special emphasis on the integration of Russian 
economy with the global economic system. Trade liberalisation reform, macroeconomic 
stabilisation, internal liberalisation (the abandonment of price control) and extensive 
privatisation all constitute the reform package necessary for ‘institutional harmonisation’ 
with the advanced market economies (Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 57). Despite the fact 
that the key elements of Neoliberalism have been introduced, transition from a planned to 
market economy and modem ‘competition’ state is not complete (Nesvetailova 2005, p. 
248).
Later Yeltsin realised that a split in the ruling elite between the conservative and 
the liberal parts posed a threat to his presidency, he consolidated the elite by accelerating
the integration of the conservative wings of the old party and Soviet 
upper crust into a free market system. He did this primarily through a 
privatisation policy that drew a large section of the former managerial 
elite -  ‘red directors’ of industrial and agricultural enterprises -  into the 
process of dividing up public property. By getting the red directors 
involved in the privatisation process, Yeltsin helped level off the 
difference in economic potential between the reform minded and 
conservative groups of the emergent Russian elite (Ryabov 2004, pp. 97).
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The ‘romantic’ period of liberalism ended in the late 1990s. It was noted that 
“having just emerged, the democratic institutions became prisoners of state-bureaucratic, 
oligarchic and criminal structures. Behind the democratic fa9ade hid clan interests of the 
ruling elite caring not about the public well-being but its own gains” (Krasin 2007, p. 27). 
The new elite had different values and motivation. People with more a pragmatic 
understanding of public policy and government affairs came to power. They treated both 
economic liberalism and political liberalism (i.e. in Russian case, street democracy, 
populism and separatism in provinces) as a weakness, a manifestation of liberalist 
‘romantic prejudices’ that had to be removed from the agenda. The representatives of the 
new pragmatic elite thought that
the concentration of power in single hands is the main condition of public 
policy... That is why the representatives of state power share common 
ideology, or rather, mythology about the model of totalitarian 
modernisation: from the rightist myth about Pinochet, to the leftist myth 
about ‘China’s development model’ to the nationally unique, ‘Russia’s 
special Christian Orthodox way’. The single element that makes all these 
different doctrines related is the fundamental idea about the ‘blessed’,
‘single and undivided’ dominant power, i.e. power that has no system of 
checks and balances and is not bothered by strong competitors (Umov 
2007, p. 97).
The concepts of the ‘special way’ and ‘blessed power’ can be observed on many 
occasions in the contemporary Russian political discourse. These discourses spill over 
from political life and become visible in architecture. The reconstruction of the Cathedral 
of Christ the Saviour as a symbol of statehood was discussed in the Introduction. Chapter 
6 will discuss how the Tatarstani elites used ideas of religious identity to build up 
political support and strengthen the political authority.
4.3 Russian federalism
This section will discuss the politics of centre-periphery relations in the Russian 
Federation between 1990 and 2005. This period can be quite clearly divided in two parts: 
i) the period of bargaining federalism associated with Yeltsin’s rule; 2) the period of 
recentralisation associated with the rule of Putin. During the 1990s Russia thus
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experienced a process of political and economic space fragmentation. Many regions made 
steps towards autonomy as they could benefit from greater control of local resources (e.g. 
Tatarstan would establish control over the oil industry). The need to elevate the political 
status implied the construction of a new national identity and its material symbols 
including building and spaces. Recentralisation put an end to the separatist claims and 
created new incentives for regions and cities.
4.3.1 Characteristics of Russian federalism
Russia is a federal state with a high degree of centralisation that can be traced back to the 
birth of the Soviet state. After the 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks were forced to appeal 
to federalism in order to eliminate the threat of the disintegration of Russia posed by the 
rise of nationalism in its provinces. Lenin accepted federalism as a temporary 
arrangement as long as it helped to unite the proletariat of different ethnic backgrounds in 
a joint the fight for the Soviet state (Valentey and Glichich-Zolotoreva 2008, p. 33). Later 
Stalin implemented the model of the state which envisaged different levels of autonomy 
granted to different ethic groups depending on the “level of development of their national 
self-consciousness” {ibid, p. 42). These levels included the following: a union republic, 
an autonomous republic, an autonomous oblast within a territory and an autonomous 
district. Such a division was seen as unfair by the less privileged ethic groups .
Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring) and especially the policy of glasnost 
(openness) introduced in 1985 opened up debates on the country’s history as well as 
histories of other nations populating the USSR. Intellectuals both in mainland Russia and 
in its provinces enjoyed the emerging opportunity to openly discuss issues of national 
identity, self-determination, Russification and all other topics, which had previously been 
banned. Russia itself experenced a rise in national and ethnic self-consciousness. While
3 The Stalinist system  o f  ranks was the main obstacle for the cultural developm ent o f  those ethnic provinces 
that were not granted a union republic status. For example, while a union republic was entitled to have the 
Academy o f  sciences, to receive more funds to develop national culture and have its own TV channels and 
newspapers published in national languages, autonomous republics were deprived o f  these rights 
(M ouhametdinov 2006, p. 55). The “national question” was the source o f  the state instability during the 
Soviet time but after the weakening o f  the central state power structure in the early 1990s it developed into 
full-fledged national-liberation m ovements across the Soviet Union.
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the USSR’s economic and technological conditions were deteriorating further, the 
resurgence of national identity, according to Castells (1998) first challenged and 
ultimately destroyed the Soviet state (p. 38).
Although the Constitution declares that all subjects are equal (Konstitutsia RF, 
1993/2009), in reality they have different constitutional rights and political influence on 
the political process in the country4. The state structure that formed in Russia was 
described as “federation without federalism” (Ross 2002, p. 7) and “quasi-federalism: 
federalism according to the letter of the law, unitarism according to the nature of political 
dominance” (Fedosov 2001, p. 16). Another expert on fderalism claims that “today’s 
federal system is a unitary state wearing a mask of federalism” (Blankenagel 2001, p. 
49). That happens because “behind the legal facade of the Russia’s federalism are hidden 
institutional factors that have undermined the construction of a federal model from the 
beginning” (Valentey 2008, p. 88).
As discussed in Section 3.2.3 Russia’s regions vary substantially in terms of their 
level of economic development. Russia’s regional diversity, according to many experts, 
challenges the stability of the Russian state (Fedorov 2002; Heinemann-Gruder 2002). 
Those regions with lower levels of economic and institutional development can hardly 
sustain themselves without external support and need constant help from the central 
government. The centralised model of federalism has been criticised because it creates 
incentives for the poor regions to remain poor and continue receiving transfers from the 
central government. Khamidoullin et al (2004) propose an alternative polycentric model, 
in which stronger regions would become centres of economic growth and key elements of 
a new state territorial and economic organisation in which horizontal links between 
regions would play the main role (Khamidoullin et al 2004, pp. 23-25). Cities remain 
dependent politically and financially on the regions they are located in. As a result of the
4 The legal collisions between the centre and periphery are reflected in the volum inous literature on the 
constitutional and legal aspects o f  Russia’s federalism. The essential argument has been that if  republics 
within Russia are called ‘states’ they must have state sovereignty, because a state without one is a fiction  
(Yagoudin 2001, p. 87). On the other hand, the ideologists o f  unitarism argued that Russia’s sovereignty 
over its territory could not be divided between regions.
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municipal reform cities assumed more powers in managing local affairs, the local self- 
governance in Russia remains in “embryonic state” (Lavrov 2007).
4.3.2 The contemporary politics of Russia’s federalism
The configuration of the Russian state has historically been defined through a contested 
process of delegation of sovereignty between the centre and periphery. In the early 1990s 
“the war of sovereignties that started in the Soviet Union now has spread over Russia” 
(Valentey 2008a, p. 315). The main drivers behind the decentralisation movement were 
questions of political power, control of natural resources and fiscal aspects of centre- 
periphery relationships. In that period regions and the federal centre were engaged in a 
complex negotiation process arranged on a one-to-one basis and aimed on defining the 
mutually acceptable conditions (first of all fiscal) of federalist relations (Castells and 
Kiselyova 2000; Dowley 1998).
The politics of Russia’s federalism has been defined by the relationship between 
the centre and several economically powerful and politically significant regions. The 
reconfiguring of the state power continued through a complicated and contested process 
of establishing the centre-periphery relations or the “battle for power” between the 
Kremlin and provinces (Tolz and Busygina 1997). To tackle the separatist movements, 
the centre had to adopt a flexible and largely ad hoc approach towards dealing with 
separatist claims to prevent the disintegration of the country. The development of 
bargaining practices to a large extent was predetermined by the asymmetrical federal 
structure inherited from the Soviet Union in which different units had different rights 
depending on their ethnic profile.
The period o f bargaining federalism
To avoid the disintegration of the country the federal centre adopted the model of 
bargaining federalism (Solnick 1998). When the political and military powers of the 
centre are not sufficient to confront secessionist movements effectively (as it was in the
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1990s), the centre had to engage in a complicated process of bargaining with the majority 
of provinces, reserving military action only for punishing the instances of an explicit 
disobedience (e.g. Chechnya). At the same time, loyalty could be rewarded by selective 
fiscal concessions, development funding and the partial recognition of political claims 
made by leaders of some regions. Those regional leaders in turn provided the centre with 
electoral support and compliance with fiscal and other norms. The bargaining practices 
continued during the late 1990s when “regional leaders were increasingly using the 
country’s economic decline and subsequent erosion of Moscow’s authority to gain 
leverage” (Petkov and Shklyar 1999, p. 536). The relationships between the centre and 
the periphery were actively reconfigured in a search for reconciling political, fiscal and 
funding issues. Redistributing resources during economic stagnation and the vseakened 
executive power of the central government became an especially difficult task because 
both the donors and recipients needed to be satisfied. That gave a rise to bilateral 
asymmetric deals with the units (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999). The actual deal each 
region was getting (e.g. the size of the budgetary transfers from the federal to the regional 
budget) depended on the bargaining capacity of the regional leaders. According to 
experts on the subject, the actual deals depended on
the go-getting capacity of the regional leadership and the assessment by 
the centre of the significance of the region, first of all from the political 
point of view, but not economic rationality. As far as force played such an 
important role and brought real money, regions and the centre 
demonstrated each other their force, real or imaginary (Mamsourov and 
Kesel'brener 2004, pp. 75-76).
As such factors as political bargaining and negotiation skills received priority 
over economic considerations, the distribution of aid normally benefited those regions the 
most able to bargain with the centre, and not necessarily those in greater need:
those ethno-republics who under federal arrangements are allowed to 
retain a larger proportion of their locally collected taxes, are also receiving 
the largest subsidies from the centre. Thus only 10 per cent of federal 
transfers in 1992-93 were being directed to the poorer ethno-republics and 
regions, whereas the remaining 90 per cent were being allocated to the 
richer and potentially more geo-politically problematic republics, notably 
Sakha, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan (Smith 1995, p. 31)
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Regions used various techniques to secure more advantageous positions vis-a-vis the 
federal centre. Not surprisingly, the separatist regions exploited their position to get 
greater benefits. According to Mamsourov and Kesel'brener (2004) The “opposition 
regions” i.e. those that voted against Yeltsin in 1991 and those that adopted declaration of 
sovereignty earlier than other managed to receive more generous financial transfers from 
the federal treasury... Separatism in fact became a means of survival (p. 151). Shleifer 
and Treisman (2000) came to similar conclusion:
The federal government appeased regions that threatened political or 
economic stability -  by declaring sovereignty, staging strikes, or voting for 
the opposition in elections -  by allocating them larger transfers or 
tolerating their tax withholding (p. 110).
From 1992 to 1996 three such ‘separatist’ regions (Bashkortostan, Sakha and 
Tatarstan) paid federal taxes at a significantly lower rate than average ‘subjects’ of the 
federation. For example, the Sakha Republic practically paid no taxes to the federal 
government over this period of time, while Bashkortostan and Tatarstan paid no taxes 
until 1994. Then after the Federal Treaty was signed, both republics resumed payments 
but still at lower rates than regions on average. Table 4.2 shows the p*oportion of tax, 
retained by republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan in 1992-1996 in percent.
Table 4.2 Proportion of tax, retained by republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha and 
Tatarstan in 1992-1996 (%).
Republic 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 (first 10 
months)
Bashkortostan 99.9 100 87.5 73.8 71.9
Sakha 98.8 99.8 100 99.5 70.8
Tatarstan 99.9 100 83.8 77.3 80.3
Average among constituent 
parts of the RF
48.3 62.9 64.8 59.1 57.3
Source: A. Lavrov, 1996. Asymmetry of Russia’s fiscal arrangement: problems and 
solutions. Conference paper presented at the conference Asymmetry of the Federation 20 
December, 1996. Cited in Tolz and Busygina (1997, p. 403).
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Russia’s ethnic republics used their religious and ethnic differences as an 
additional argument in the bargaining over fiscal arrangements and development funding. 
Indeed, the ‘ethnic factor’ played an important role in reconfiguring the centre-periphery 
relationships in modern Russia. In ethnically distinct provinces, economic and political 
claims were accompanied by demands of wider opportunities for development of national 
cultures, using national languages and opportunities for religious practices. Ethnicity was 
used in the bargaining process to justify claims for economic benefits and political rights. 
According to Dowley (1998)
state elites with populations that have been able to maintain a strong 
separate national identity are more likely to continue to push for the 
maximum amount of autonomy from the centre as possible, and for 
continuation of their privileged status in the federation as separate "ethnic" 
nations... But as powerful a predictor of demands for autonomy as having 
a strong, separate and distant identity is, it is not sufficient... Possession of 
natural resources of value on the on the world market is positively and 
significantly related to a state elite's position on the autonomy index...
Among the Relative Deprivation indicators, being publicly declared as a 
Critically Depressed Region by the Centre significantly increases the 
probability that a state's elite will demand autonomy form the Centre, as 
does the previous administrative status of the region, which speaks to the 
resources of the elite (Dowley 1998, pp. 377-378).
From the political point of view, the model provided a useful mechanism for 
reconciling conflicting interests in centre-region relationships. This model was an 
effective mechanism of preventing the disintegration of the country: "the extreme 
diversity of administrative situations was in fact the most efficient mechanism of federal 
control under the conditions of a relatively weak federal state, because regions usually 
competed for centrally distributed resources, rather than presenting a unified front against 
Moscow" (Castells & Kiselyova 2000, p. 180). According to Sheinis “during the period 
of institutional decay after the collapse of the Soviet regime and state, these agreements 
played a stabilising role” (Sheinis 2004, p. 71). On the other hand, the use of ethnic 
cleavages in political and economic practices was criticised for supporting the formation 
of “ethno-clan regimes” republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Tishkov 2001, p. 30) 
and the “feudalisation of the societal relationships” (Buhval’d et al 2008, p. 65).
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The transformation of the Russian state during the 1990s had several important 
characteristics. Regions were not only “picking up” powers “dropped” by the centre, as 
explained by Petrov (2004, p. 216) they actively explored any opportunity to establish 
more control over the local resources using different techniques ranging from the 
wholesale declaration of sovereignty to the negotiation of specific deals with the centre. 
In that sense, regions were not simply “reacting” to the regime changes, they actively 
constructed new regimes of interacting between the centre and provinces. For instance, 
Tatarstan was in the vanguard of the separatism movement and created a model for 
pursuing sovereignty for other regions (Hanauer 1996; Matsuzato 2004). This aspect of 
centre-periphery relations will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.
The recentralisation o f power
Putin’s reforms put an end to the bargaining federalism practices. He strengthened central 
power through building a top-down ‘ruling vertical’ and imposing more control over the 
provinces. A number of policies were introduced to recentralise Russia. These policies 
included the following: the introduction of 7 sub-national super-regions headed by the 
president’s personal envoys, the abandonment of the regional leaders elections, the 
removal of governors from the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament and hence 
depriving them of legal immunity (Nelson and Kuzes 2003; Orttung 2004).
Putin’s reforms dramatically changed the nature of the centre -  periphery 
relationships. Previously, under the weak regime of Yeltsin, both sides acted as more or 
less equal partners and actively used diplomacy and bargaining to solve political and 
economic issues. Regions used different strategies in making deals with the centre, 
including the use of threats of secessionism by republican leaders to put pressure on the 
centre (Tolz and Busygina 1997, p. 407). According to Iskhakov, “recently we have 
witnessed a serious retreat from what was achieved as the result of a struggle for rights of 
the Tatar nation in the late 80s and mid-90s. Without any doubt now the federal centre 
has adopted a policy aimed at the extermination of the national character of the republics, 
including Tatarstan” (Ishakov 2006).
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The abolishment of regional elections has significantly transformed the politics at 
the regional level. Previously, the success of the regional governors’ election campaign 
depended on the administrative and financial resources available to the candidates. The 
abolition of elections moved the power struggle into the arena of bureaucratic approvals 
and clans’ interaction (Gribanova 2007, p. 200). Regional leaderships had to adjust their 
strategies to the new conditions. As always, access to the president played a key role in 
making deals with the centre (McAuley 1997, p. 440; Medvedev 2005, p. 328; Orttung 
and Reddaway 2004, p. 281). According to one Russian commentator, after the 
reestablishment of a top-down administrative structure and readjustment of fiscal 
mechanisms in favour of the centre, regions lost the incentive for economic development. 
The main task of the regional leader thus became one of having a good relationship with 
Moscow in order to receive financial help for their region (Kovalyev2007, p. 241).
4.3.3 The emerging role of state and funding opportunities for regional projects
Perestroika has brought about fundamental shifts of the role of the state in political and 
economic life. During the turbulent 1990s the state suffered political disintegration, 
tearing up the lines of command and the weakening government control to such an extent 
that the centre was not able any longer to perform its governing functions. According to 
Smith (1995):
For its part, the centre has provided little in the way of effective 
economic policies for the regions, including policies that minimise 
disruption in the supply and demand for commodities between the 
regions... The chaos of this transition to market exchange has meant that 
the centre has been singled out by the ethno-republics and regions for 
failing to provide effective leadership in order to minimise the scale of 
economic disruption (Smith 1995, p. 29).
After the collapse of the USSR, regions and cities took over the responsibilities 
that the centralised command-administrative system used to fulfil in order to support 
economic production and distribution within their territories. Using closer geographic 
proximities and more effective control, regions emerged as the most suitable
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administrative level to perform state functions in the fragmented post-socialist political 
and economic space. Working out the new governing mechanisms was a highly contested 
process with the central government, egional political elites and businesses involved 
(Kirkow 1994, p. 1184). The devolution of economic powers to the regional level while 
the Russian economy entered a free-fall decline, required new mechanisms of political 
control. The redistributing of control over ex-state property created new centres of power 
associated with business, industrial and regional elites (Clarke and Kabalina, 1995). 
Often regional leaders
capitalised on the fact that institutional arrangements in Russian centre- 
periphery relatio ns remained blurred, administrative competences were 
not clearly defined and that Moscow did not draw a clear line between 
central and provincial/local property and taxes, which left the struggle for 
control over economic resource open-ended. Most importart, there were 
a number of contentious constitutional issues in which shared functions 
between the centre and provinces (ownership of territorial resources, 
foreign trade) were not clearly defined (Kirkow 1995, p. 941).
The regionalisation of Russia in the early 1990s led to the formation of semi­
independent political regimes that controlled the process of privatisation and the 
distribution of gains from foreign trade. In Moscow from the early stage of reforms “the 
city authority has amalgamated with the Moscow business community” (Moukhin 2005, 
p. 6). In some cases regional leaders gained so much control over the political 
appointments, the law enforcement agencies, and economic life generally, they could 
effectively oppose any attempts of the central government to intervene. This phenomenon 
was described as “regional warlordism” (Kirkow 1995, p. 923). Regional and city 
authorities in Russia’s provinces made all efforts to establish control over economic 
assets that fell into their jurisdiction (Mitchneck 1995). According to Haukkla (2002) this 
shows a fundamental difference in the origins of Russian regionalism as compared to 
Western regionalism. While the latter originated in networking and integration, the 
former is originated from disintegration of the previous political system and focused on 
protection of the interests of regions vis-a-vis the centre (pp. 127-129).
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State capitalism
The new Putin administration has become determined to put an end to the ‘chaos’ of the 
1990s and according to Orttung (2004a) “deprivatize the government so that its agencies 
would no longer be under the direct control of specific business figures” (p. 48). The re­
centralisation of power has become routinely characterised as a new authoritarianism5. 
The abundant journalistic accounts of new role of the state in regulating market in Russia 
are not yet matched by academic analysis. While some commentators argue that Putin has 
“strengthened the state” (Migranian 2005), others argue that he has “created a different 
state” (Rizhkov 2005, p. 34). These debates pose new questions as to what kind of a ‘new 
state’ has been created in Russia as a result of the Neoliberal reforms, how is the new 
governing regime different from the previous one and what are the spatial characteristics 
and implications of the new model of governance.
According to the former economic advisor to the Russian president, the political 
leadership of the country have made a choice in favour of a “corporative state” model 
aimed essentially at the redistribution of resources in favour of the “corporation 
members” (i.e. the ruling elites) using economic selectivity, discrimination and political 
oppression as the main tools (Illarionov 2005). These policies aimed at the creation of 
state-controlled super corporations n the energy sector put the government at risk of 
“committing huge resources to a number of projects that may have a negligible impact on 
its competitive positions in higher-technology activities” (Connolly 2008, p. 602). While 
the ability of the authoritarian model to stimulate economic growth is described by some 
as one of the central myths of the Putinism (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008), other 
experts argue that economic authoritarianism is ‘natural’ for Russia because of the 
general “incompatibility” of its geography and the level of infrastructure development 
with a liberal market economy (Lynch 2002, p. 39). According to Urnov (2007) the 
model of state capitalism that Russia is adopting is characterised by key economic assets 
being divided between several groups or clans - a trend that can be identified both at the 
national and the regional level (Umov 2007, p. 87).
5 The fo llow ing labels have been used to characterize R ussia’s state capitalism: Kremlin Inc. (Kramer and 
Myers 2006), KGB Inc. (Kasparov 2007)
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The emergence o f public-private partnership projects (PPPs)
Public-private partnership projects have become a preferred organisation form to 
implement projects funded from the Investment Fund of the Russian government 
established in 2006. These projects usually aimed to provide infrastructure at the national 
and interregional level. The central government imposes PPPs as an organisational form 
by offering regions funding for development projects and playing the role of a co­
investor in projects which the private sector would not implement otherwise6. The 
establishment of the Investment Fund of Russia is an important benchmark in federal 
government regional policy. It demonstrates that: i) the central government decided to 
accumulate resources from higher taxes and better fiscal discipline and then fund regional 
projects, rather than devote more economic powers to regions; ii) in theory the 
procedures would be more transparent as compared to the absolutely non-transparent 
procedures between the centre and regions so common in the 1990s which have been 
discussed in Section 3.3.
Although federal subsidies are still distributed on a largely ad hoc basis with no 
clear rules (Khamidullin et al 2004, p. 36), the federal government introduced new more 
formalised methods of funding development projects in regions. Public-private 
partnerships became the official ideology of the Investment Fund of the Russian 
Federation set up in 2005 to co-fund large development projects (Pravitel’stvo RF 2005). 
The formalised bidding process requires project promoters to submit their bids to the 
Russian Ministry of Regional Development for an appraisal as well as the submission of 
short-listed projects to the Government Commission for Investment Projects for the final 
review (Pravitel’stvo RF 2005?)7.
6 Regional developm ent projects organized in a form o f  a PPP and funded from the Investment Fund o f  the 
Russian Federation is a relatively new thing that is yet to be studied. The role o f  the Investment Fund in 
regional developm ent is an interesting research area that lies beyond the scope and the time limits o f  the 
current research.
7 The subsequent section  o f  the current chapter and the em pirical Chapters 5 and 6 w ill show  how the 
modern formalised procedures o f  bidding for the financial support from the federal government is different 
from informal political bargaining that many ethnic republics o f  Russia successfu lly  used in the 1990s to 
receive large budgetary transfers. Tatarstan was extrem ely successful in informal political bargaining but 
not so in formal bids for funding.
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Opportunities fo r  regional development
In the USSR the implementation of development projects was carried out through 
ministries responsible for particular economic sectors. According to Artobolevsky (1997) 
the ministries “acquired competences for the construction of economic units, 
infrastructure and housing, population services (e.g. shops, hotels, country homes), 
transport capacities etc. They were able to provide fully -  albeit at a minimum level -  for 
the areas within their remit” (Artobolevsky 1997, p. 134).
The transition to a market economy significantly has reduced the opportunities for 
new capital investment and severely hampered the capacity o f industries to support ‘non­
productive’ assets. The federal government uses various redistributive mechanisms to 
support social programmes in regions (through budgetary transfers) to fund development 
projects (through various ad hoc aid programmes). The main problem of all regional 
development programmes has been partial and irregular funding of adopted policies. 
According to Shvetsov (2002) ‘Despite all attempts to attract cash from all possible 
sources of funding, investment projects are being implemented inefficiently and the 
majority of them never become realised” (p. 137). The problem of matching the 
government funding with finding from other sources will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6 dedicated to analysis of implementation the Special Federal Programme for  
the Preservation and Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005).
There has been considerable debate about the best strategy to tackle existing 
regional disparities. One approach is premised upon economic logic and suggests that 
resources should be directed to the most productive regions to maximise their benefits 
which will presumably then trickle-down to ultimately benefit all other regions (see 
Pereligyn 2005). Another approach is based upon the logic of equality. According to 
Artobolevsky, “the territorial scale and diversity of Russia's territory will not allow the 
state to completely abandon the "levelling out" policy (Artobolevsky 2005) which means 
redistribution mechanisms should to some extent remain.
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After Putin came to power in 1999, separatism was eliminated but the practice of 
ad hoc funding remained. According to Nezavisimaia Gazeta (2008) governors of 
Russia’s regions have become involved in a competition for the central government's 
financial support for the most ambitious regional projects, which may be used as a smoke 
screen for getting access to funding with little prospect for the projects to be completed 
(Kulikov and Egorov 2008).
To summarise the processes of Russia’s regionalisation, it is important to note 
that Russia’s political and economic structure suffered substantial fragmentation. 
Regional political elites gained control over local resources and developed political, 
social and cultural mechanisms (nationalist ideology, architecture, etc) to strengthen their 
control. Nevertheless, since the centre had sufficient power to punish any explicit 
disobedience (e.g. Chechnya), the regional leaders had to engage in a negotiation process 
with the centre over important questions of economic ownership and taxes.
The discussion on the transformation of Russia’s federalism is important to 
understand urban governance in Russian cities for a number of reasons. First, previously, 
when regions had more power, they positioned themselves as if they were sovereign 
states (especially ethnic republics) and their capital cities had to be planned accordingly. 
Second, when regional leaders were elected, they were more concerned with their 
constituencies. The appointment system changed the incertives behind mega urban 
development projects. Now current regional leaders looking for reappointment and 
leadership aspirants looking for their first appointment had to prove to the Russian 
president that they were qualified for the position of a regional leader by showing their 
managerial skills including the skills to manage impressive urban development projects 
(this aspect will be discussed in empirical chapters). Third, the new funding opportunities 
associated with the establishment of the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation 
(2006) indicate that the federal government is planning to replace an ad hoc method of 
aid distribution to a transparent and formalisation method based on competitive bidding 
process.
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The relationship between the centre and periphery could be characterised as a 
constant trial and error process, with the possibility of re-integration occurring through 
rescaling the configuration of the socio-spatial organisation of the state with losers and 
winners among the regions. All the9S processes are far from a neat transitional path 
prescribed in the literature. The subsequent section will show how these processes played 
out in the Tatarstan Republic between 1990 and 2005. The empirical chapters discuss the 
ambitions of the Tatarstan republic to become a cultural centre for other post-socialist 
Turkic nations as well as a centre of crystallisation of emerging economic links with 
neighbouring regions, which would bypass the central government (see Chapter 4 and 5).
4.4 Tatarstan Republic
The Republic of Tatarstan is located in the centre of the European part of Russia and is 
one of its most economically developed regions. As discussed in Section 3.3 Tatarstan 
was among the group of regions most actively participating in the ‘bargaining ggmes’ 
with the centre during the 1990s.
4.4.1 Chronology
In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of TASSR declared ‘sovereignty’ of republic. The 
state institutions including Constitutional court, President, a State Council (Parliament) 
and Cabinet of Ministers replaced old socialist government and Party organs. On 21 
March 1992 a referendum was held on the constitutional status of Tatastan in relation to 
the Russian Federation. State sovereignty gained 61.4% of votes. After the bombardment 
of the Russian parliament a new Constitution was adopted in December 1993 which gave 
strong executive authorities to the President. Yeltsin’s administration started reinforcing a 
unitary state. After negotiations, political, legal and fiscal tensions between Russia and 
Tatarstan were resolved in February 1994 by the Treaty ‘On the Division of Policy Areas
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between Russia and Tatarstan Pogovor 1994)8. In March 2000 Putin became Russian 
President. The new leadership is determined to eliminate the ‘provincial separatism’ and 
distortions of the constitutional order in break-away republics.
4.4.2 Political conditions
Tatarstan is one of the so-called ‘ethnic’ republics within the Russian Federation (or 
“internal colonies” according to Artobolevsky 1997) which has a distinct position among 
Russia’s regions both culturally and ethnically. Ethnic diversity plays an important role in 
regional politics. In January 2008 the total population was 3,762.8 thousand people, 
which makes Tatarstan the eighth most populous of Russia’s regions (Goskomstat, 2008). 
In Russia itself the Tatars represent the second largest ethnic group after the Russians and 
account for 5,669 thousand people (Ishakov 2007, p. 17). According to the 2002 Census, 
ethnic Tatars represented 52.9% while the Russian represented 39.5% of the total 
population Tatarstan (Goskomstat 2002). Tatars have progressively become assimilated 
into the Russian language environment: in 1999 only 65.1% of Tatars were fluent in the 
Tatar language (as compared to 1.2% of Russians), whereas the proportion of Tatars 
fluent in Russian was 84.9% (Ishakov, 2007, 40). That tendency can partly be explained 
by the fact that the number of Tatars bom to mixed families (i.e. where the father was 
non-Tatar) has been growing from 14.1% (1990) to 24.0% (2005) {ibid, p. 30).
While there is no official data on the number of believers, according to some 
assessments the number of Muslim communities has grown from 18 in 1986 to 1,163 in 
2007 (Ishakov 2007, p. 81). According to some accounts 60% of Tatars in Tatarstan 
describe themselves as believers, but only 6% see the mullah regularly; 51% of Russians 
describe themselves as believers, but only 1% see the priest regularly (Kaariainen2000, 
p. 214, cited in Radvanyi 2005, p. 89). According to the official website of the republic,
8 Many Tatars thought that the Treaty effectively “ended Tatarstan’s thre&year period o f  de facto  political 
independence” (Smith 1995, p. 32). According to M ukhametdinov, “all nationalistic organisations 
condemned the Treaty o f  1994 as an act o f  treason because it failed to state the status o f  Tatarstan as a 
sovereign state and a subject o f  international law. In exchange o f  R ussia’s signature on the Treaty Tatarstan 
allow ed holding elections to the Russia’s Parliament on its territory. That finally turned Tatarstan’s status 
from that o f  an independent state into one o f  R ussia’s provinces” (M ukham etdinov 2006, p. 101).
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as of 1 January 2008, 1,398 religious organizations had been registered in Tatarstan, 
comprising the following faiths: Muslim, 1,055; Orthodox Christian under the Moscow 
Patriarchate, 255; Real-Orthodox Church, 5; Old Believers’ Church, 2; Catholics, 2; 
Jews, 4; Protestant communities of different doctrines, 71; and others (Tatarstan 
Republic, 2008). According Moukhametshin (2005) from 1988 Islam in Tatarstan has 
gone through processes of legalisation, institutionalisation and internal mobiisation and 
now “ceased to be an exclusively family of congregation based self consciousness, it has 
become the most significant element of ethnic self-consciousness and ideological 
comprehension of reality” (pp. 122-124).
The elites have played a central role in Russia’s political transformations 
(Kryshtanovskaya 2004; Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996). In Tatarstan the succession 
of power from the communist to the post-communist elites has been smooth. As 
discussed in the previous section on Russia’s politico-economic transformations, the 
former Party and Soviet state elite have been most likely to stay in power and form the 
new elite. At the regional level the former members of the Party and government elite or 
the apparatchiks actively participated in the privatisation processes to such a degree that 
a new term was invented to refer to their entrepreneurial talents -  “entrepreneurchiki” 
(Stoner-Weiss 2006, p. 33). These emerging groups defined the new balance of economic 
power and the pattern of ownership needed for a new political and territorial form to 
accommodate their new powers. According to Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996) 
“formerly the privileges of the Nomenklatura had been largely in kind, reflected in the 
granting of state property for private use, in money and special services; now they have 
begun to acquire an increasingly 'monetary' character, with its members allowed to 
engage in activities that were prohibited for others and to make profit from such 
activities" (Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996, p. 717).
The ethnic cleavage of the ruling elite plays an important role in regional politics. 
In 1988 members of staff of the CPSU regional committee represented 46.5% Tatars and 
44.7% Russians. During the same time, the ethnic cleavage of the republican 
nomenklatura was as follows: Tatars represented 64.6% while Russians represented 
29.9% (Ishakov, 2007, 81). According to Faroukshin by 1994 the proportion of Tatars in
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the ruling elite had risen to 78.1%. The majority of the elite members came from rural 
areas (74.7%) and from small towns (11.6%). Elements of a specific village culture, 
which include traditional forms of reverence to authority, internal rejection of the 
opposition and dissidence, goodwill towards those from a similar background (better to 
fellow-villagers), suspicion towards aliens, especially those from urban and educated 
groups, expressions of self-impeccability and narcissism -  all these cultural features were 
brought by the ruling elite in the relationships of power (Faroukshin 1994).
The Tatarstani authorities promote the idea of a multiethnic Tatarstani nation that 
embraces citizens of all ethnic backgrounds and not the Tatars only (Yuzeev 2005, p. 99). 
The doctrine of the ‘Tatarstani citizen’ is similar to the doctrine of the ‘Russian citizen’ 
(the ‘rossiyanin’) used to describe any Russian passport holder not only to the ethnic 
Russian. Those citizenship-based political identities are supposed to secure inter-ethnic 
peace and stability in multiethnic countries. In Tatarstan despite the efforts of the 
authorities, the idea faces scepticism and “is being repudiated equally by both the 
Russians and the Tatars” (Interview 2, 2007).
Not dissimilar to Russia as a whole, the Tatarstani political regime is 
characterised by “the monopolisation of a region’s political power and resources by one 
political figure in a winner takes all fashion. In such a system, the local parliament has no 
independent voice and is compelled to serve as a vehicle for implementing executive 
policy” (Ryabov 2004, p. 101). A comparative study of the ‘Level of democracy’ in 
Russia’s regions completed by Carnegie Moscow Centre on the basis of 1995-2002 data 
shows that Tatarstan’s rating among other 88 Russia’s regions is as low as 69 (Petrov 
2004a, p. 247). A similar study called the Index of Democracy in Russian Regions’ 
completed on the basis of 1999-2002 election analysis showed Tatarstan’s index as low 
as 80 out of 88 {ibid, p. 259).
Dininio and Orttung (2005) have used David Kang’s (2002) concept of ‘crony 
capitalism’ to analyse business-govemment relations in Russia’s regions and have 
characterised Tatarstan as a “predatory state” in which business is dispersed, the state is 
coherent and political leaders have full control over their political organisation (Dininio 
and Orttung 2005, p. 508). The republic’s authorities exercise control over principal
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management decisions in large Tatarstani companies. According to Khamidoullin et al 
(2004) large industries often subsidise the regional economy by constructing roads, 
housing, monuments, sports facilities, etc. As an act of reciprocity from the authorities 
the companies would receive clear or hidden fiscal benefits, assistance in debts 
restructuring, protection from bankruptcy and competition (p. 37).
The companies would also offer support of various initiatives of the ruling elites 
ranging from electoral support to granting funding to large urban development projects. 
That created opportunities to implement various development projects that dramatically 
changed the image of Kazan, e.g. the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan 
Kremlin discussed in Chapter 4.
4.4.3 Economic conditions
Tatarstan remains one of the powerhouses of Russia’s economy. According to regional 
data, in 2006 the republic’s GDP reached 620 billion roubles -  the equivalent of 23.55 
billion US dollars (Salihov 2007, p. 27). That suggests that GDP per capita is 
approximately 6,200 US dollars. In 2006 in Tatarstan the structure of the GDP was as 
follows: extraction of mineral resources (30.6%), manufacturing (16.7%), retail and 
wholesale trade (11.7%), construction (10.3%), agriculture, hunting and forestry (7.3%), 
transport and communication (6.9%), real estate operation, leasing and services provision 
(4.3%), education (2.6%), health and social services (2.3%), provision of other public 
utilities, social and personal services (1.4%), hotels and restaurants (0.6%) and finance 
(0.5%) (Goskomstat, 2006a). The Russian sources provide slightly different lower 
figures, but still Tatarstan emergps as the sixth more prosperous Russian region in terms 
of its GDP. The Table 4.3 ‘Top 10 Russia’s regions by the size of the GDP (2006)” 
show the GDP of Tatarstan as compared to 10 other most prosperous regions.
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Table 4.3 Top 10 Russia’s regions by the size of the GDP (2006)
Region GDP, million of RUB
1 Moscow 5,145,873.90
2 Tyumen Region 2,608,786.40
3 Moscow Region (without Moscow) 938,432.00
4 St. Petersburg 811,704.00
5 Sverdlovsk Region 655,026.60
6 Tatarstan Republic (inc. Kazan) 605,575.20
7 Krasnoyarsk Territory 585,879.20
8 Yamalo-Nenetsky AO 543,383.80
9 Bashkortostan Republic 505,717.30
10 Samara Region 490,197.50
Source: Goskomstat (2006a).
The region’s diverse economic base does not match the structure of its foreign 
trade which is heavily dominated by exports of raw materials. For example, in 2007 
exports of oil and oil refinery products contributed to 77% (or 11 billion US dollar) of 
total export revenues (16 billion US dollar). Manufacturing goods (machines, equipment, 
lorries, aircrafts, etc) contributed only 7.2% of total export revenues (1.04 billion US 
dollars). The structure of imports is dominated by machines and equipment (74.8%), 
petrochemical and chemical products (9.5%), metals and metal products (6.7%) 
(Ministerstvo 2008, p. 41). The table below gives more detail on the dynamics of foreign 
trade of the Tatarstan Republic from 2000 to 2007. Quite remarkably the size of the 
foreign trade balance has been growing consistently, reaching 11.7 billion US dollars in 
2007. The core of the Tatarstani economy is represented by several large companies, 
which have strategic significance for the republic’s economy. These include Kazan 
Helicopter Plant, OAO ‘Kamaz’ (heavy lorry manufacturing), OAO 
‘Nizhnekamskheftekhim’ (oil refinery, tyre manufacturing), JSC ‘Tataspirtprom’ 
(monopolist distillery), OAO ‘Tatneft’ (oil production) and others.
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Table 4.4. RT foreign trade (2000-2007) in millions US dollar.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2007
(forecast)
Export 2,802.7 2,750.5 3,274.4 4,220.4 5,871.7 9,373.2 11,589.3 13,200.0
Total 3,165.6 3,108.1 3,649.4 4,709.8 6,452.5 10,083.4 12,688.2 14,700.0
Export as 
% of total 88.5 88.5 89.7 89.6 91.0 93.0 91.3 90.0
Source: Ministerstvo (2008, p. 38).
McCann (2005) argues that “the nature of Tatarstan capitalism remains highly 
localised and has little to do with the neoliberal ideology of global market forces” 
(McCann, 2005, 10). This can be illustrated by the structure of foreign trade, investment 
and the number of foreign companies represented in Tatarstan. The few available studies 
on Tatarstani political situation suggest that informal political networking is deeply 
embedded into the regional cultural tradition and this has a decisive significance.
4.4.4 Political process (1990-2005)
As discussed in Section 3.3, during the Soviet period the ‘autonomous’ ethnic republics 
of Russia envied the political status of the USSR union republics. From the first years of 
Soviet Russia, Tatarstan attempted to establish its constitutional status as a union republic 
but succeeded only in obtaining the status of an autonomous republic (Tagirov 2004, p. 
22). During the Soviet times the Tatarstani national movement activists continued their 
attempts to ‘upgrade’ Tatarstan’s status to that of a union republic, but all attempts were 
effectively brought to a halt by the Communist Party authorities and the KGB, sometimes 
with severe consequences for the activists (Moukhamtdinov 2006, pp. 53-57). Under 
these circumstances the main nationalist claims were rediced to highlighting the need for 
better opportunities for the development of national Tatar culture, mainly through 
allowing greater use of the Tatar language in education and public and cultural life {ibid, 
55).
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The beginning of the reforms in 1985 opened opportunities for public debates in 
history, language, national identity and other topics previously tightly controlled by the 
Communist party. During the Soviet Union period the nationalist movement used 
political, social, language and ecological issues to challenge the Soviet regime and 
initiate further debates about the fate of the Tatar nation (Mirsiyapov 2004, p. 72). The 
debates did not challenge the territorial integrity of the USSR but emphasises possible 
benefits of a wider autonomy for the Tatars in terms of economic and cultural 
development (see Khakimov 1989/2007, p. 9; Ishakov 2005, pp.138).
The collapse of the USSR opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for ethnic republics 
to achieve greater independence from Russia. In 1990 the Declaration of the State 
Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic was adopted and independence finally 
became legally established (Verkhovnii Soviet RT 1990). During the ‘roll-out’ stage of 
the sovereignty project (1990-1993) Shaimiev actively used the nationalist movement to 
strengthen his bargaining powers with Moscow by presenting himself as a nationalist 
leader and trying to obtain the greatest preferences for the republic. At the same time he 
was aware of a potential danger that the nationalist movement could pose for his own 
authority. Finally he managed to subdue the nationalist movement and push the 
nationalist aside (Ponarin and Sagitova 2005, pp. 112-113).
According to Faroukshin (1994) the political process in post-socialist Tatarstan 
has been shaped by the attempts of the local elites to a gain wider autonomy from the 
federal centre. The sovereignty project was designed and implemented in order to 
position the local elite unilaterally in charge of the economy and incomes, especially 
raised from oil. All speeches and many hollow declarations and decrees about the nation 
and the national culture were just the means for achieving the above mentioned ends 
(Faroukshin 2005, p. 226).
Many Tatar intellectuals share the view that the emerging Tatar state is not 
sustainable long-term because of the growing disparities between the rich and the poor, 
the pervasive corruption, and that fact that the ideas of sovereignty have started serving a 
narrow circle of the ruling class (Gataullin and Yunousov 2006, p. 45). For instance,
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Moukhametdinov (2006a) argues that the sweetest fruits of the sovereignty have fallen 
into the hands of the ruling elite (p. 75). Some commentators argue that the Tatarstani 
political leadership lacked any coherent programme of action and essentially was 
opportunistic and motivated mainly by self interest. As Moukhametdinov points out, “the 
ruling political elite have never had any sort of a coherent and elaborate strategic 
ideology. Although they had to react in a also tactical way to the actions of the federal 
centre or the Tatar nationalist movement, or to the changes in the economic situation” 
(Moukhametdinov 2006, p. 64). Along the same lines Faroukshin points out that, “the 
main line of behaviour of the local elite in Tatarstan consists in a constant adaptation to 
the objective situation having the main goal self-preservation that allows controlling the 
redistributive mechanisms” (Faroukshin 1994).
4.5 Kazan
Kazan is a large industrial, commercial and scientific centre located in the centre of the 
western part of Russia, about 900 km east of Moscow. Kazan is also a regional centre, the 
capital of Tatarstan Republic. From 1995 to 2005 a number of urban development 
projects was adopted that made a strong impact on the development of the city. The 
following section 4.5.1 introduces the major planning policies and projects adopted in the 
city of Kazan from 1995 to 2005.
4.5.1 Chronology
In 1995 the Programme fo r Slum Clearance and the Modernisation o f Slum Blocks in 
Kazan was started. By 2005 the Programme was completed and 33,372 families were 
relocated from slums to new flats. To accommodate about 100 thousand people, 315 
high-rise blocks of flats with the total living space of 2.07 million sq m were built 
(KSND 2005). Altogether as much as $759.4 US million were collected from 35,000 
enterprises. As a result of the program thousands of families were relocated from central 
historic areas to peripheral locations which were lacking jobs and services. That policy 
created a need for workers to travel longer distances and created enormous pressure on 
the transportation system. The regional politicians strongly backed the Programme but
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poor institutional cooperation between levels of government and the desire to build as 
fast and as cheap as possible resulted in massive spatial expansion as opposed 
redevelopment of the blighted slum areas in the central city.
The authorities were also concerned with creating a new image of Kazan as the 
capital of a ‘sovereign’ state. This task implied the construction of new architectural 
projects that could symbolise the Tatarstani history and ethnic and religious 
characteristics. On 13 November 1995 the President of Tatarstan issued a decree ‘On the 
Concept o f Preservation, Development and Use o f the Ensemble o f Kazan Kremlin’ 
which envisaged the resurrection of the Mosque. The Mosque was opened in 2005 as a 
part of Kazan Kremlin heritage site. The Special Federal Programme fo r the 
Preservation and Development o f Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) was adopted by the 
Federal Government in March 2000. It played a central role in the preparation for Kazan 
Millennial celebrations and envisaged a number of large urban development projects that 
formed a new image of Kazan. The Programme was a result of successful bargaining 
between the authorities of the Tatarstan Republic and the federal centre over the federal 
government funding.
In 2002 Kazan City Centre Comprehensive Masterplan was prepared by a Kazan- 
based design institute with a commission from the Kazan Planning Department. The 
project has been prepared under the pressure of the Tatarstani President’s Administration. 
The latter attempted to introduce more design control and transparency in the allocation 
of land and granting planning permits in Kazan central areas to prevent uncoordinated 
development and speculative land privatisation. Although the Masterplan has been 
prepared, it has not been presented to the City Soviet for a review and therefore has not 
been formally approved.
In 2003 the Kazan Strategy for 2015 was adopted by the Kazan City Soviet. The 
Strategy was prepared by the Leontief Centre (St. Petersburg based think-tank) in 
cooperation with some local experts from the city Administration and academia9. The 
Strategy identifies the city’s Mission and goals and offers a series of practical objectives
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and tasks necessary to reach the goals. It is a comprehensive strategic document designed 
to provide a holistic vision of the city’s socio-economic and spatial development and 
bridge together the policy areas traditionally separated by administrative lines. Although 
it has proved to be rather difficult to actualise many of its aspirations, the Strategy has 
been an important consideration for international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank that granted a 125 million dollar loan to Kazan.
4.5.1 Political conditions
City politics in Russia lacks deep roots in democracy and accountability. In the USSR the 
main function of the Soviets was to fulfil “the myth of participatory democracy by 
serving as an intermediary between constituent, politicians, and bureaucrats” (Frolic 
1970, p. 688). In reality the “Soviet government structure has been highly centralised 
with the Communist Party in control of all strategic positions. Parallel hierarchies of 
government and Party interact at all levels, functional and geographic” (Reiner and 
Wilson 1979, p. 58). In the system of hierarchical subordination, local agencies were 
accountable to sectoral ministries “for even the smallest decisions” (Evams 2000, p. 135). 
The post-socialist reforms once again brought the issues of local self-governance to the 
top of political agenda (Campbell 2006; Evans and Gel’man 2004).
The political transformation has led to the formation of a political regime that 
stems from old authoritarian power structures, inherited from much of the soviet 
organisational principles but it used liberal rhetoric for political purposes. In that sense 
pre-existing social, economic and political structures, inherited practices and institutions 
have influenced the present. This influence has been strong because of a strong continuity 
of the local government personnel. As enthusiastic leaders who came to power during the 
first wave of democratic reforms demonstrated lack of knowledge and experience, the 
veteran administrators
were the ones who knew the ins and outs of all the localities, understood
the budgeting and implementation processes, and had the local and central
contacts that were needed for the successful management of their cities
9 In 2003 the author was a part o f  the team o f  experts responsib le for the “ Built Environment” chapter o f  
the Strategy.
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and regions. Their replacements, who enjoyed none of these advantages, 
often found themselves handicapped by their excessive enthusiasm and 
surrounded by a multitude of hostilities as local notables, numerous 
elected representatives, and superior authorities all frustrated their 
programs (Freidgut 1994, p.9).
During the period coved by the current research the political organization of the 
city was as follows. Kazan city had a unitary authority, which means a single jurisdiction, 
government and budget. The city is divided into seven districts, which is not of any 
political significance but is due to managerial and historical reasons. The city is divided 
into 50 electoral wards. The legislative branch was represented by the Kazan’s Soviet of 
People’s Deputies comprised of 120 persons elected at the ward level. The Chair, who 
was elected from among the deputies presided over the Soviet. The executive branch was 
represented by the Kazan City Administration which was led by the Head (or City 
Mayor). The Mayor was appointed by the President of Tatarstan Republic.
De jure, Kazan City Administration was subordinated to the Soviet and was 
responsible for implementing the Soviet’s decisions. De facto , the Administration 
dominated the decision-making process, while the Soviet played the more a ceremonial 
role of a voting machine that legalised documents produced by the bureaucrats. While the 
members of the Soviet were political volunteers and “amateurs” in city management, the 
Administration was organised on the civil service principle and recruited professional 
bureaucrats. The Administration’s institutional capacity, if measured by the number of 
staff, offices, equipment, and funds, by far exceeded that of the Soviet.
After the Kazan city Communist Party Committee ceased to exist along with the 
Party, the executive committee of Kazan Soviet naturally expanded its role from 
instrumental to political and became a real decision-making centre and subsequently 
changed its name into that of the Kazan City Administration. The Administration 
managed the city on a day-to-day basis, controlled the budget, controlled access to land 
and infrastructure and provided services to the city residents. Similar to the socialist 
period, the Soviet did not manage to gain much political influence and remained rather a 
ceremonial body. Mr Kamil Iskhakov, the former Communist party official,
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simultaneously served as Chair of the Soviet and Head of the Administration (or Mayor). 
This created a Kafkaesque situation where Iskhakov as Chair of the Kazan Soviet 
adopted directives for the Administration and then as the Administration’s Head 
promised to the Soviet to carry them out.
Despite on-going debates on the need for greater municipal self-governance 
Russia’s cities have never had a high political profile. On the contrary, the regional 
leaders have been very keen to control cities economic resources and benefit from the 
votes collected in urban areas. The attempts launched in some cities to gain political and 
economic autonomy from the region ended in a harsh conflict between the mayor and the 
governor. In Tatarstan cities are subordinated to the regional administration. Until 2006 
the Mayor of Kazan was appointed directly by the President of the republic. The political 
and budgetary dependence from the region made Kazan a mere subdivision of the 
republican administrative system. The fiscal arrangements were such that in terms of tax 
revenue Kazan gained relatively little from the industrial enterprises located in its 
jurisdiction. At the same time, it was responsible for substantial budgetary expenditures 
not supported sufficiently by revenues, which made Kazan very dependent on revenue 
transfers from the upper levels of government.
According to Sheinis (2004), the development of local self-government in Russia 
is still at the “embryonic state”. It is hampered in three ways: 1) by lack of material and 
financial resources in the face of large responsibilities; 2) by pressure from state bodies; 
and 3) by low prestige (Sheinis 2004, p. 73). Election turnout is quite low; many people 
are sceptical about prospects for their influence on appointments and decision making. 
This gives the government enormous and virtually unchallenged power to plan and 
implement changes. Lack of civic traditions is explained by the fact that the Soviet 
industrialisation caused a massive influx of the former peasantry into the city. The flood 
of rural migrants over a short period of time contributed to the marginal character of 
Russia’s the urban population. The newcomers had difficulties adapting to the new 
environment with its new rules and new system of values (Pivovarov2003, p. 50).
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4.5.3 Socio-economic conditions
The dismantling of the administrative-planning system with guaranteed state orders 
exposed former-socialist enterprises to the global markets and had a significant impact on 
Russian cities. Many state enterprises that were protected for decades by subsidies and an 
artificial non-competitive environment faced enormous difficulties surviving in the 
conditions of the global market. As the result of fiscal decentralisation and the inability of 
industrial enterprises to support the communal and social facilities that they used to own 
and maintain during the socialist period, regional and local authorities received new 
expenditure responsiblities that they struggled to fulfil without increased revenues and 
access to capital. Painful impacts have been triggered by rising fuel and raw material 
prices. The cost of maintenance and development of all urban services and infrastructure 
has become too high for limited city budgets. Under these conditions “some expenditures 
are reimbursed by the federal budget. Some central mandates, however, are not 
reimbursed to the local level” (Mitchneck 1997, p. 1003). At the period of economic 
crisis local governments were unable to “focus effectively on planning the future of the 
local economies and envisioning urban development needs while attempting to prevent 
fiscal and economic disaster” (Mitchneck 1997, p. 1010).
During Soviet times, Kazan experienced rapid industrialisation and population
growth. Soviet planning considered cities as production centres and the population as a
labour resource (Lappo 1992, p. 530). At the brink of the collapse of the USSR 47% of
total employment in Kazan was in manufacturing, of which 25-35% was in the military
industrial sector (Melo de et al 1999, p. 584). The economic restructuring of the 1990s
made many industries redundant and by 2004, the proportion of industrial employment
had fallen to 26.2% (Department 2005, p. 18). Nevertheless, through the 1990s Kazan
restructured much of its military industries and re-emerged as a city with more diverse
economy. In 2004 the largest contributors to the city’s GDP were industrial production -
25.9%; wholesale trade, retail and public catering -  19.6%; transport and communication
«
-  12.4%; construction -9 .5%  (Administratsia 2005).
Many Russian cities suffered from a significant shrinking of their economic base 
caused by the crisis of the national economy and the collapse of the financial system.
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Large cities suffered population losses caused by economic restructuring. The crisis 
enlarged the gap between few successful centres and extensive peripheries, many of 
which faced heavy impoverishment and neo-ruralisation (Nefedova and Treivish, 2000, 
76). As Table 4.11 shows, only two of Russia’s millionniki (with exception to the two 
Russia’s capitals) sustained their population size.
Table 4.11 Population dynamics in large Russian cities (1989-2005).
Population in thousands
1989 2005 Change
Moscow 8,677 10,407 + 1,730
St. Petersburg 4,435 4,600 +165
Novosibirsk 1,436 1,406 -30
Yekaterinburg 1,363 1,304 -59
Nizhniy Novgorod 1,435 1,289 -146
Omsk 1,149 1,143 -6
Samara 1,257 1,133 -124
Kazan 1,085 1,110 +25
Chelyabinsk 1,142 1,095 -47
Rostov-on-Don 1,008 1,058 +50
Ufa 1,080 1,036 -44
Perm 1,092 989 -103
Source: Goskomstat (2008).
In 2002 Kazan’s population was 1,105,289 residents (Goskomstat, 2002). The 
population has been slowly growing due to the influx of newcomers from other parts of 
Tatarstan, Russia and the CIS countries. In 2002 the majority of residents were Russians - 
538,874 people or 48.8% (down from 593,839 or 54.7% in 1989). Tatars represented a 
second largest ethnic group - 524,724 people or 47.5% (up from 439,811 or 40.5%) 
(Gataullin 2005, p. 9).
Current trends
The GDP nearly doubled between 2000 and 2004 which can be partially explained by the 
influx of development funding linked with the Millennium Programme. As Table 4.12
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“ Kazan gross territorial product (2000-2004)” shows, the production of services grew 
faster than the production of goods which can also be explained by the large volume of 
construction work.
Table 4.12 Kazan gross territorial product (2000-2004)
GTP in million US dollars 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 2,024.1 2,043.9 2,527.1 3,262.6 3,982.1
1 Inc. production of goods 783 906.7 980.2 1,116.5 1,631.1
2 Inc. production of services 873.4 1,043.6 1,379.7 1,883.1 2,205.9
GTP per capita in US dollars 1,838.7 1,875 2,143.5 2,948.6 3,826.8
Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 62).
The growth of GDP was accompanied by a persistently high proportion of unprofitable 
enterprises. Many of them are military industries struggling in new economic conditions 
and subsidised by the government.
Table 4.13 The proportion of loss-making enterprises located in Kazan by sectors 
(2000-2004)
% of unprofitable enterprises in 
different sectors
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 39,0 34,4 37,3 35,8 32,8
Manufacturing 36,9 33,1 38,8 35,9 33,6
Transport, communication, mail 42,3 41,9 32,9 35,4 31,3
Construction 39,7 33,8 37,3 36,2 31,3
Trade 40,9 40,6 44,8 30,1 25,5
Retail and catering 41,1 33,6 36,9 36,4 32,1
Communal services 40,7 50,5 32,6 31,4 34,4
Credit, financing, pension funds 29,3 41,3 29,5 25,3 28,4
Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 64).
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Kazan also remains a very industrial city with a very significant number of jobs 
located in heavy manufacturing, chemical, petrochemical and construction industries. 
This is a legacy of the heavily militarised economy of the USSR of which Kazan was one 
of the leading centres.
Table 4.14 Structure of Kazan employment (2000-2004).
Jobs in thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total 457.3 448.7 450.2 435.0 453.3
Industrial Manufacturing 
and Construction 155.7 159.1 151.0 142.0 145.9
Transport 36.6 36.4 37.1 34.2 35.4
Retail, Public Catering 41.9 41.5 42.5 44.2 47.3
Housing Services and 
Communal Services 25.9 24.4 25.6 28.6 36.3
Health, Social Security, 
Education, Culture, Science 123.6 121.8
123.5 120.1 128.5
Finance and Pension Funds 10.5 11.0 12.9 8.6 9.5
Administration 30.1 23.5 23.8 26.9 19.1
Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 18)
The structure of capital investment in large and medium size enterprises registered in 
Kazan shows that foreign direct investment (mainly arriving in the form of credit) 
represent only a small part of the total volume of investment. In 2006 Kazan had the 
highest proportion of budget investment as a share of total capital investment (35.7%) 
among other cities of similar size (Bashkortostanstat 2007).
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Table 4.15 Capital investment in Kazan (2000-2004)
Capital investment in millions of US dollar
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total capital investment 501.5 636.8 680.9 933.4 1,233.2
Of which own funds 177.8 190.7 229.5 321.6 315.9
Of which budget funds 
(federal, regional and local) 187.1 340.8 249.6 368.1 562.7
FDI 23.2 8.3 1.0 75.1 76.6
FDI as a share of total 
capital investment (%) 4.6% 1.3% 0.14% 8.0% 6.2%
Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 89).
A very limited integration of Kazan into the global market can also be seen from when 
foreign trade is compared to the Gross territorial product (GTP). The table 2 shows 
foreign trade as a percentage of GTP.
Table 4.16 Foreign trade as a percentage of the GTP in Kazan (2000-2004).
Economic activities in 
millions of $US 2000 2001 2002 2003
2004
Gross territorial product 
(GTP) 2,024.1 2,043.9 2,527.1 3,262.7 4,241.9
Foreign trade 23.2 18.8 34.0 30.2 107.1
Foreign trade as a 
percentage of the GTP 1.1
0.9 1.3 0.9 2.5
Source: Gataullin (2005, pp. 89-94).
The public sector has remained a very important player in development issues 
sector and often is a direct provider of housing and services. At the same time, cities have 
more fluid sources of funding at their disposal to finance development projects. The cities
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entered an era of competition for federal grants, private investments, credits and financial 
assistance projects provided by international lending organisations. Also cities have 
become responsible for their development policies. The role of urban managers changed 
dramatically from mostly instrumental to entrepreneurial. At the same time the city 
government organisational structures have been almost entirely inherited from socialist 
times.
Kazan remained a wealthy city due to the economic potential of both the city 
itself and the fact that it is an oil-rich region, which can fund various development 
programmes using the positive ‘foreign’ trade balance. With the growing division 
between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ among Russia’s cities (Lappo and Polian, 1999, p. 
41), city leaders increasingly adopted entrepreneurial strategies and techniques to 
compete for development funding. Politically the disintegration of the USSR and 
subsequent devolution of economic and political powers to the regions and cities opened 
up new opportunities for the wealthiest regions to undertake ambitious urban 
regeneration programmes.
4.6 Conclusions
Over the last two decades Russia has gone through several periods of instability 
associated with the collapse of the socialist state, the establishment of new governing 
mechanisms, the complex processes of reconfiguring the relationship between the centre 
and provinces, before adopting the model of a highly centralised federation and market 
economy dominated by large state corporations. All these factors have had a profound 
impact on its cities. The choice in favour of liberal reforms and the subsequent growth of 
authoritarian tendencies have been based upon the circumstances of the political moment. 
The literature leaves a number of questions open, such as whether the ‘transitional’ 
project was ‘inevitable’ or contingent. Some episodes of Russia’s transition show that the 
use of liberal ideology was instrumental in the power struggle between elite groups. At 
the same time, the elites had a choice of different ideologies and rhetoric to be used 
against the political opponents that leave the question whether the choice was premised 
upon any structural reason or was instead intrinsically contingent.
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Dysfunctional democratic institutions, lack of experience of active participation 
and general scepticism among the citizens about their role in politics, plus increasingly 
oppressive policies against the political opponents made the executive branch of power 
the single most important political player. Political debates practically disappeared and 
decision making shifted from the arena of public politics to that of bureaucratic 
government. Under such circumstances, accountability became unnecessary as political 
appointments are made within the bureaucratic system. That transforms the politics itself 
and creates a system of loyalties, incentives and behavioural patterns.
Russia has inherited its complicated administrative-territorial structure from the 
USSR. The “subjects” of the federation not only have different constitutional status and 
authority, but also vary substantially in geographical, economic and social terms. 
Historically more powers have been devoted to the ethnic republics of Russia (e.g. Tatar 
and other ethnically distinct provinces) than to other “subjects” of the Federation. Taking 
into account the diversity of Russia’s territories, regional politics has always played an 
important role in the political development of the country. There are visible signs of the 
reconfiguration of the state power -  new ‘unconstitutional’ forms such as federal districts 
and agglomerations as an attempt to rationalise the economic space.
In the early 1990s, during the period of a weakened central control, some regions 
(many of which were ethnic republics) saw an opportunity to gain more control over their 
resources. In order to strengthen their political claims vis-a-vis the central government, 
nationalist leaders actively used rhetoric based on ethnic, language and religions 
arguments. In that respect ethnic regions were in more advantageous position than 
‘ordinary’ Russian regions, which were not able to exploit nationalist arguments. 
However, there is no direct correlation between the status of an ethnic republic and its 
separatist behaviour (Treisman 1997). The federal centre had to satisfy the demands for 
more autonomy in exchange for the regional leadership’s commitment to the territorial 
integrity of Russia.
From 1990 to 1994, Tatarstan achieved a high degree of autonomy from Russia. 
To raise social mobilisation around the separatist slogan the political elite appealed to the 
popular feelings of Tatar national identity and strengthened those feelings by promoting
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the national language and culture including architectural design. Cultural, political and 
economic claims were made to mutually reinforce each other and to achieve greater 
results in implementing the sovereignty project. Tatarstan led the practice of signing one- 
to-one treaties with the federal centre, through which the republic secured economic 
benefits and political autonomy. The years of bargaining during the period of declared 
sovereignty helped Tatarstan to develop the necessary skills and institutional base that 
continued to be effectively used during Putin’s presidency.
Under the new regime (1999-onwards) the regional leaders were keen to 
demonstrate their loyalty, their dedication to the goal of protecting the country’s 
territorial integrity and their managerial efficiency (including by managing large urban 
development projects). The change of political regime associated with Putin’s presidency 
made separatist claims impractical. The central government introduced new legislation 
that effectively eliminated the political (by appointing regional leaders), legal (by 
bringing regional legislation in line with federal) and budgetary (by reconfiguring the 
taxation system in favour of the centre) foundations of separatism. Regions adjusted their 
political strategies to the new regime of federal politics to maximise their potential 
benefits from the central sources. If during the 1990s greater benefits could be achieved 
through power bargaining with centre and the use of separatist threats, after 2000 benefits 
became available through the support of the centre initiatives and demonstration of 
loyalty. The change of regime significantly changed the system of incentives and 
behaviour of regional politicians.
The implications for urban development have been as follows: the city enjoyed 
funding available from the republican budget or non-budget sources and federal funding 
received through the republican channels as the result of negotiations with the central 
government. Due to the nature of the funding available from the external sources, urban 
development projects reflected the views and served the interests of the regional ruling 
elites. The role of the city politicians was limited to the task of management of projects. 
The main incentive of the city leadership was the hope to get more funding from similar 
sources and the hope for personal promotions received as a result of successful 
completion of the managerial task.
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With Putin’s administration pursuing the recentralisation agenda more 
aggressively the scope for political bargaining between the centre and periphery reduced 
to a minimum. In the political field president Putin first distanced himself from the 
regional leaders by introducing seven super-regions - a new tier of government between 
the federal and the regional level. Then in 2004 the gubernatorial elections were 
abandoned and regional governors lost much of their political legitimacy. Both Kremlin’s 
initiatives severely hampered the ability of regional leaders to negotiate deals with 
Kremlin. In economic terms the relationship between the centre and periphery changed 
became more formalised and with harsh budgetary and fiscal discipline introduced by the 
federal government throughout the country. The practice of ad hoc deals between 
political leaders that Tatarstan was so good at became rare. Instead of ad hoc grants the 
federal government set up the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation which 
(presumably) distributed grants on the basis of clear criteria. These developments might 
indicate that the policy initiatives similar to the Programme would not be repeated in the 
future and regions would be competing for federal grants on the basis of clear criteria.
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Figure 2. The Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin. Destroyed 1552, resurrected 
1996-2005. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY 1:
THE RESURRECTION OF THE KUL-SHARIF MOSQUE1
This chapter analyses the resurrection of the Kuk Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin 
(1995-2005) as an important element in the new image of Kazan and the Tatarstan 
Republic. The chapter seeks to conceptualise the links between the project, the wider 
social, economic and political context and the formation of a new urban governance 
model in Kazan. The chapter is organised as follows. Sections 5.1 through 5.3 discuss the 
context, the history and the origins of the project. Section 5.4 discusses the process of the 
project design. Section 5.5 is dedicated to the analysis of the project including the 
organisational and financial arrangements, the rationale and the choice to locate the 
Mosque nside the Kazan Kremlin. The case study will explore the urban governance 
mechanisms during the period when the federal centre was weak and republics were 
strong. The project illustrates how Tatarstani authorities reinforced the position of power 
in relation to the centre and influential groups within the republic and projected 
Tatarstani sovereignty abroad.
5.1 The chronology
The Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin has a long history that dates back to the pre- 
Russian period (pre-1552). According to the latest archaeological findings Kazan 
emerged between the end of the X and the beginning of XI century as a frontier fortress 
of the Volga Boulgaria to control and protect the merchant ships sailing along the River 
Volga (Khoozin and Sitdikov 2005, p. 8). In 1445 Kazan became the capital of the Kazan 
Khanate (1445-1552) which was one of the khanates that emerged from the disintegration 
of the Golden Horde. During the period of the Kazan Khanate the Tatar civilisation 
flourished and many grand structures were built in the Kremlin such as the Khan’s
1 Some findings presented in the current chapter have been published previously: N. Kinossian, 2008. The 
Politics o f  the City Image: The Resurrection o f  the Kul-Sharif M osque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005), 
Architectural Theory R eview , 13 (2 ), pp. 190-208.
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Palace, the fortifications and several mosques, including the Kul-Sharif Mosque {ibid, 
p.84).
On 16 October 1552 Kazan was conquered by the Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible. 
During and after the siege, the Kazan Kremlin was ruined and most of the defenders and 
civilians killed. Kazan became a city divided between the Russian and the Tatar parts. 
The Tatars were treated as an occupied nation, were deprived of rights and subjected to 
forced Christianisation and Russification (Khairoolin 2007; Zagidoullin 1997). The 
context chapter has briefly discuss the positions of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic in the USSR, the suppression of the right for national self-determination, the 
restrictions on the use of the Tatar language and limited opportunities for the 
development on the national culture.
On 30 August 1990 all changed when the Declaration of the state sovereignty was 
adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic. On 13 November 1995 the 
President of Tatarstan Republic issued a decree ‘On the Concept o f Preservation, 
Development and Use o f the Ensemble o f Kazan Kremlin ’ which envisaged the 
resurrection of the Mosque. On 21 February 1996 a memorial stone was erected on the 
development site and subsequently an architectural design competition was announced by 
the government. The construction of the Mosque started in 1996 and the grand opening of 
the Kul-Sharif Mosque was held in June 2005.
5.2 Historic background of the project
The plans to build the Mosque emerged at a very special moment in Tatarstan’s political 
history. As the chapter will show the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque was widely 
seen as an important symbol of the restoration of the Tatarstani statehood and the revival 
of the Tatar culture. The chapter explores the role of the Mosque in the region’s modem 
politics and the formation of a new governance regime in Kazan.
The USSR had a complex administrative structure in which provinces had 
different ranks. While the union republics were the most privileged and had the highest 
degree of self-governance which was possible within a centralised state, so called 
‘autonomous republics’ of Russia formed the second tier. Such a division was considered 
as inherently unfair towards the less privileged nations. Initially, the supporters of
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Tatarstani sovereignty were inspired by the ideas of national cultural development, which 
emphasised the themes of healing scars of the colonisation, forced Russification and 
Christianisation (Taimasov 2007, p. 137; Ishakov 1997, p. 25; Zagidoullin 1997, p. 47). 
Later the nationalist movement became increasingly concerned with establishing regional 
control over political and economic issues. Eventually the state institutions fully adopted 
nationalist ideology and made systematic efforts to elevate the constitutional status of the 
republic, establish Tatarstani sovereignty and to become independent from the Russian 
Federation (Faroukshin 1994). In the early 1990s Tatarstan developed many features of a 
‘sovereign’ state, including the development of a Constitution and an independent 
political system. Furthermore, Tatarstani authorities regulated economic processes within 
the region, exercised social and educational policies and unilaterally defined the format 
of fiscal relationships with the federal government. However, a successful execution of 
the Tatarstani sovereignty project required additional efforts in areas of culture national 
identity and symbolic representation.
According to Graney (2009), in order to successfully implement the Tatarstani 
sovereignty project the elites needed to develop not only the formal state institutions but 
symbob of sovereignty as well. For example, at interview a senior lecturer in Kazan 
School of Architecture revealed that the Mosque was an easy to understand symbol and 
accessible for the masses “cultural packaging” of political ideas of sovereignty and 
national self-determination (Interview 31, 2008). The new image of Kazan as the capital 
city played ai important role in projecting Tatarstani sovereignty. The capital city of 
Tatarstan, Kazan ‘has also become a significant symbol, employed by the republic's 
leaders as one of the most visible manifestations of Tatarstan's fifteen-year campaign to 
upgrade its political status and to remake the Russian Federation as a truly federal and a 
multicultural entity” (Graney 2007, p. 17). That is why the city of Kazan “has undergone 
a remarkable transformation and ‘repackaging’ to serve the republic’s goal of extending 
its sovereignty and institutionalising greater ethno-cultural pluralism in the Russian 
Federation” {ibid, p. 18).
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5.3 The origins of the project
5.3.1 Debates around the Monument to the “Fallen Defenders of Kazan”
In the 1990s Russia experienced dramatic political, economic and cultural 
transformations. Similar processes in Tatarstan coincided with the active search of a new 
national identity. According to the director of a Kazan-based museum,
in the early 1990s people in Tatarstan stopped considering themselves as 
being a part of Russia. Self-consciousness transformed dramatically.
People became increasingly interested in national culture and history and 
started sponsoring development of arts. When Shaimiev came to power he 
started supporting cultural and scientific developments. Naturally 
(emphasised by the author) emerged the plan to resurrect the Kul-Sharif 
Mosque (Interview 9, 2008).
One of the first accounts of public debate about the new post-Soviet image of 
Kazan appeared in May 1990 when a candidate for the chief architect position 
(interestingly Russian by ethnic origin) stated that one of the best ways to initiate the 
process of re-creating the national theme in the image of Kazan would be to hold a design 
contest for a monument in “memories of the defenders of Kazan who fell in 1552” 
(Sanachin 1990).
It took nine years until the authorities first design contest was announced in June 
1999 (Kabinet Minisrov RT 1999; Glava Administratsii 1999). The contest failed to 
produce any preferred design option. Subsequently, the second (April 2000) and the third 
(October 2000) tours were held with the intention to “create the image of a monument 
that would reflect the spirit of the Tatar people who carefully safeguard the heritage of 
their great and ancient civilisation” (Glava 2000d). Again no decision was taken As a 
member of the design review committee reflected during interview, many project bids 
had been received, some quite primitive, other hyperbolised, nevertheless none was 
capable o f  adequately communicating the idea of commemorating the fallen defenders of 
Kazan (Interview 9, 2008). A senior planner in a Kazan based design institute explained 
during interview that any monument would have been too small for the planned purpose: 
“no monument would have had sufficient size comparable with the size of a building and 
Tatars like physical size” (Interview 29, 2007). A chief research fellow in the Tatarstan
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Republic Academy of Science suggested that the relationships with Russian authorities 
were at a delicate stage, therefore the authorities tried to avoid any additional 
controversies that the monument could have caused (Interview 2, 2007).
As the idea of the monument failed to get necessary support, a new and more 
radical idea emerged to build a mosque in Kazan Kremlin. Khalitov (1997a) claimed 
authorship of this idea. A former chief of a department in the Ka2an Planning Department 
made similar claims (Interview 13, 2008). First the idea of resurrecting a mosque was 
received ambiguously, but later it gained numerous supporters (Khalitov 1997a, p. 234). 
Graney (2007) cites an open letter published in November 1992 by a group of Tatar 
nationalists and Muslim activists to the President Shaimiev reminding him that “the 
churches in the Kazan Kremlin had been built “on the graves of Tatars and foundations of 
their mosques'” and demanding that his government provide a more “national face” for 
Kazan by rebuilding the mosques inside the Kremlin walls” (Graney 2007, p. 21). The 
proposals to rebuild mosques in the Kremlin converged with the earlier proposals to erect 
a monument and eventually it was recognised by more people that a mosque could be the 
best monument to the fallen defenders o f Kazan because
for Tatars the mosque is the centre of spirituality and cultural life. The 
mosque embraces everything a real Tatar worships. At the same time Kul- 
Sharif is such a ‘brand ’... It symbolises the return to the very best that our 
people have had, to the sources of wisdom ... What would have possibly 
been better than the Kul-Sharif Mosque? It has been built in 
commemoration of our people, the defenders of Kazan, who were the last 
representatives o f  the free Tatar people on Earth (emphasised by the 
author) (Interview 9, 2008).
The Muslim clergy also accepted the idea that a mosque could fulfil the role of 
monument to the defenders of Kazan. The Muslim Religious Board of Tatarstan describe 
the main ideas laid in the foundation of the Mosque as follows: “the revival of the 
statehood, the commemoration of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland ... The new Kul- 
Sharif Mosque is not simply the main mosque of Kazan and the state. This is a new 
symbol of Kazan and Tatarstan and the centre of gravity for the Tatars of the world” 
(Muslim Religious Board 2009).
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5.3.2 Political support of the project
The plans to build a mosque in Kazan Kremlin finally received official recognition. On 
13 November 1995 the President of Tatarstan Republic issued a decree ‘On the Concept 
o f Preservation, Development and Use o f the Ensemble o f Kazan Kremlin ’. The concept 
enlisted the resurrection of the Mosque as a part of the comprehensive Kazan Kremlin 
heritage preservation programme that also included plans to restore some Christian 
heritage sites2. This approach appeared to be more politically appropriate as compared to 
the plans to erect a monument dedicated specifically to the Tatar defenders of Kazan that 
could have caused controversies. The President Shaimiev stated that “the destiny of the 
Mosque is the destiny of the people” implying that the resurrection of the Mosque 
represents the restoration o f the spiritual, cultural and political status of the Tatars 
(President RT 2001). According to a chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic 
Academy of Science, the President Shaimiev as a former communist supported the 
resurrection of the Mosque for purely ideological reasons:
after the Communist ideology ceased to exist it was replaced by religion 
but religion understood in a peculiar way, as a communist and post­
communist political leader and an atheist at heart would understand it -  
as a symbol only but without any religious or spiritual contents 
(Interview 2, 2007).
The Mosque was named after Kul-Sharif who was the legendary Seid of the 
Khanate’s main mosque and one of the heroic defenders of Kazan during the siege. The 
director of the Kul-Sharif Fund gave the following account of the role of the Mosque in 
restoring the historical succession of the Tatar state:
in November 1995 the President of Tatarstan Republic signed a decree in 
which he announced the resurrection of Kul-Sharif Mosque ... Before 
long the idea of revival of Kul-Sharif Mosque, the age-old hope, the dream 
of the whole Tatar nation began to make a reality ... The resurrection of 
Kul-Sharif Mosque by its significance, by the scale of what is being done, 
stands along with the adoption of the Declaration of state sovereignty of 
Tatarstan Republic, enriching it and filling it with substance (Safin 1996).
2 For exam ple the C om plex o f  the Annunciation Cathedral built between 1556 and 1562 (Khoozin and 
Sitdikov 2005. p 140).
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While this statement suggests that the role of the Mosque was to legitimise the 
new political regime emerging in the post-Soviet semi-sovereign Tatarstan, during 
interviews some respondents denied the political role of the Mosque and insisted that the 
resurrection of the Mosque was a cultural phenomenon. For instance, a senior member of 
staff in the Tatarstani President Administration gave the following account of the Mosque 
resurrection projects:
Mosque is the house of Allah. It cannot symbolise statehood, but can 
symbolise the power of the state or the spirituality of a country. If nobody 
attends mosques, there is no spirituality in the country. If the mosque and 
church buildings stay abandoned, there is no economic base in the 
country. It indicates the stability of the state as well (Interview 27, 2007).
Another senior member of staff in the Tatarstani President Administration suggested that 
although the new building represented the mosques that had been destroyed by the 
Russians in 1552, was linked with the modem political tasks:
It is a historical symbol. There was a mosque and it was called Kul-Sharif 
Mosque. So the context of the project was historical but the task was 
political (Interview 33, 2007).
The fact that the Mosque has received different assessments even within one institutional 
environment (i.e. top regional state bureaucracy) may suggest that the Mosque 
resurrection project and related debates on its location and shape as well as the process of 
implementation have been a laboratory that the authorities have used to experiment with 
the limits of sovereignty in the politics of Russian federalism and domestic politics in 
Tatarstan, testing different “recipes” for the regional state.
5.3.3 The role of the Muslin clergy
In the Muslim states of Central Asia as well as in Russia’s regions with a majority 
Muslim population, the state used religious dentities to gain political support (Laruelle 
and Peyrouse 2005, p. 7). In Tatarstan, Islam was both a survival mechanism in the 
hostile environment of Russia and the instrument of constructing new socio-political
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relations (Moukhametshin 2005, p. 221). According to a chief research fellow in the 
Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science,
studying on the history of Islam in Volga region was a legal way to study 
and discuss the Tatarstani statehood because the Kazan Khanate and Islam 
were inseparable ... They [Russian authorities -  N.K.] could take away the 
statehood, ban Tatar television and newspapers but they could not take the 
religion away. Nowadays Tatarstan has surrendered all positions in 
language, education and culture. Religion remains the only area that is still 
independent. We have our own Mufti despite the Moscow’s hard attempts 
to impose a single Mufti for all of Russia. Here we are still completely 
independent (Interview 2, 2007).
As was discussed in Section 4.3, the Tatarstani authorities fully realised the significance 
of religion in constructing a new post-socialist identity and promoted the role of religion 
in public life. Although, the support was not granted to any religious organisation or 
movement but only to those that collaborated with the authorities.
According to Ponarin (2007) the Tatarstani authorities initially needed support of 
the natbnalist and religious leaders to raise the stakes in the negotiation table with 
Moscow. Once the Russia -  Tatarstan Treaty was signed in 1994, the authorities started 
prosecuting the independent organisations and their leaders (Ponarin 2007, p. 203). 
According to Mouhametdinov (2006) while the authorities did everything to ruin the 
nationalist movement, they decided “to organise the spiritual life of fie wide Tatar 
masses on the basis of the Islamic values ... That is linked to the state support for the 
construction of mosques and establishing of the Russia’s Islamic university” (p. 84). The 
authorities considered the mass mobilisation around Islam to be more acceptable than that 
around the nationalist ideology because religious organisations were easier to control 
than political organisations. For instance, religious organisations would not become 
directly involved in political struggles due the legal restrictions on such involvement (e.g. 
legal ban on religious or ethnic political parties).
The state supported Muslim religious organisations because of the special role 
Islam played in constructing the Tatar national identity. Whilst tie Muslim Religious 
Board of the Republic of Tatarstan was settled in a refurbished building in the centre of 
the city, the offices of The Kazan Diocese of Russian Orthodox Church were located in a
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remote city area near to the North industrial zone. Although president Shaimiev denies 
that the Tatarstani state gives Islam a special priority, according to some commentators 
“with no doubt president Shaimiev should be given credit of having so many mosques 
constructed during such a short period of time” (Yakupov 2006, p. 97). The support was 
also given to the construction of educational institutions such as the Russia’s Islamic 
university (Mouhametdinov 2006, p. 84).
Another reason why the Tatarstani authorities were involved in religious affairs 
was the threat the radial Wahhabism version of Islam could pose to the political regime 
and stability in Tatarstan (Ponarin 2007). The state offered the Muslin clergy of Tatarstan 
the approved version of Islam. The political advisor to the president actively theorised on 
the specifically Tatar version of Islam -  Djadidisme or Euroislam (see Khakimov 2003a; 
2003b; 2005a). Euroislam was thought to be fundamentally important for securing inter 
ethnic peace in the region. The political leadership promoted Tatarstan as a model region 
where peoples of different nationalities and religious beliefs aould peacefully coexist. 
This concept has appeared on many occasions during the interview stage, with the most 
popular illustration being a proximate location of the newly built Kul-Sharif Mosque and 
the historical Annunciation Cathedral the Kazan Kremlin.
While the construction of mosques in Tatarstan was on the rise, the Muslim 
communities were not able to provide sufficient economic support to the clergy, religious 
educational institutions, to build and maintain the ir mosques and medreses 
(Moukhametshin 2005, p. 123). According to Poranin (2007) during the period of 
intensive construction of mosques3 too many mosques had been built, sometimes for too 
small communities, which subsequently became unable to support the imams {p. 210). In 
this situation the clergy could obtain economic support only from the state or businesses. 
That is why Shaimiev’s presidential administration created “strong incentives” for local 
businessmen to support mosques, congregations and the Muslim Religious Board of 
Tatarstan which received a new headquarter in the centre of Kazan and direct state budget 
subsidies (Ponarin 2007, p. 214). The Muslim clergy accepted the help which resulted in 
“an unambiguously paternalistic” attitude of the Tatarstani authorities towards the clergy
3 In the post-Soviet period the number o f  m osques has increased dramatically from 22 in the Soviet period 
to more than one thousand by 2006 (figures g iven  in Section 4.4.2).
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and put the clergy in a dependent position in front of the state (Moukharliamov 2006, p. 
57). During interview a Kazan-based journalist and a former press-secretary to the 
president Shaimiev stated that in Tatarstan
religion was used as an instrument of political marginalisation of people 
and sacral isation of the authorities. That is why the authorities were 
‘making advances’ to the religious leaders. Long ago religious leaders had 
been co-opted into the system o f power. Both Gusman Hazrat (the chair of 
the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan -  N.K.) and the 
Archbishop of Kazan Anastasiy were driven in cars with special 
registration plates that only top government officials had been issued.
They had been incorporated into the power structure and served the power. 
Effectively they had become government ministers. One for the Muslim 
religion, another one for the Russian Orthodox religion (Interview 14,
2007).
In exchange for economic support, religious leaders offered loyalty to the political 
regime. According to Moukhametshin (2005), one of the leaders of the Tatar Muslim 
clergy officially opposed any involvement of Muslim religious organisations in politics 
but at the same time urged the believers to support the political authorities in their 
regions. He stated that political leaders, especially the presidents of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, had to be granted a lifelong term in the office and also called to prevent 
the alien ideas of democracy from penetrating our public and political life (pp. 190-191).
Despite the explicit expression of loyalty and a powerful convergence of interests 
of politicians and the Muslim clergy, the former carefully measured out the level of 
political influence the latter could gain, especially in relation to the construction of a 
mosque in Kazan Kremlin -  the historical centre and a symbolic site o f political power in 
the region. There is no surprise that precautious measures were taken to limit such 
influence.
For example, the potential influence of the clergy has been clearly restricted by 
the decision to keep the Mosque building as a part of the civic institution -  the Museum- 
which is the preserve of the Kazan Kremlin and which implies it has full operational 
control and the need to authorise major events. To emphasise the cultural role of the 
Mosque a small museum of Islam was organised in its basement. The chief research
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fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science complained that 99% of the items 
were new pieces having no historical value. Most interesting thing was that beside a 
Koran was displayed a Bible -  definitely not an appropriate item in a museum of Islam 
(Interview 2, 2007). According to Kazanskie Vedomosti the Muslim Religious Board of 
the Republic of Tatarstan tried to oppose the idea of locating a museum in the Mosque 
building on the grounds that visitors to the museum might consume tobacco and 
champagne at public receptions. The chief architect responded that the presidential decree 
made provisions for museum that s why the museum would be built and would be 
accessible through a separate entrance (Ivanicheva 1997b, p. 4). The idea of providing a 
separate entrance was never implemented and now both tourists and believers enter the 
Mosque through a single entrance equipped with a metal detector.
According to the government decree the use of the mosque for mass religious 
services was restricted to two religious festivals per year: Uraza Bayram and Kurban 
Bayram. The rest of the year the mosque would be mainly used as a museum (Kabinet 
Minisrov RT 1995). This decision received different evaluations revealed during the 
interview stage. For example, a journalist and the former press-secretary to the Tatarstani 
president revealed that the decision to keep the Mosque a part of the rruseum complex 
was caused by a lack of clarity about the possible outcome of the Islamisation of 
Tatarstan:
There was no confidence, that the Islamic leaders would be successfully 
co-opted into the power structure. What if the Islamisation of Tatarstan 
would have taken wrong direction? What if the political power in the 
republic changed hands in favour of the religious leaders? Now everything 
is normal and manageable but then the situation was different (Interview 
14, 2007).
The opening of a ‘normal’ mosque in the Kremlin could have also caused a negative 
reaction from the ethnic minorities, first and foremost the Russians. In the opinion of a 
senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute had Kul-Sharif Mosque opened as a 
mosque, the ‘sleeping’ Russian population (not even from Kazan, the Russians in Kazan 
would have swallowed that) from other Russia’s regions would have been made 
indignant (Interview 29, 2007). The special advisor to the president of Tatarstan Republic
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explained the use of the Mosque as a museum as follows: “the Kremlin is a secular site 
and the state in Tatarstan is separate from religion” (Interview 32, 2007). The chief 
architect of a state^owned design institute has offered a more prosaic explanation:
the reason is the proximity of the president’s administration offices. The 
flow of people attending the ceremonies would be difficult to control, and 
only devil knows who could penetrate the Kremlin blending in the crowd 
of believers... That would become a constant headache for the president’s 
security service (Interview 3, 2007).
The analysis reveals that the project of Mosque resurrection was used by the authorities 
as a laboratory to search for the most appropriate format of the relations between the 
secular and religious authorities. The Muslim clergy received support from the authorities 
and other ‘gifts’ such as religious buildings (formerly occupied by various users), new 
office premises and buildings for schools. In exchange the clergy played their role n 
national mobilisation but in a way that would not represent a challenge to the dominant 
position of the political leaders. They were effectively placated and appeased and the 
threat of separatism or unrest significantly reduced.
5.4 The design process
The construction of a new mosque in the Kremlin was a demanding task and had to be 
carefully thought through. There were many practical obstacles to the project such as the 
fact that the preferred site was occupied by the Russian military garrison that had to be 
removed (Interview 13, 2008). There were various professional considerations that made 
the project difficult: the absence of sufficient data on the original mosque that was 
destroyed during the siege to inform the “resurrection” as well as the lack o f design skills 
among the architects who must have had only a limited opportunity to design anything in 
“national style” during the Soviet period. From the ethical point of view difficult choices 
had to be made about incorporating a Tatar and Muslim structure into the urban 
landscape dominated by Russian Orthodox churches or associated with Russian 
Imperialism buildings (government offices) without damaging any material (foundations 
and graves) or perceived (legend and myths) heritage. Also, from the planning point of
150
Chapter 5 Case study I
view the Kremlin was governed by various preservation policies that had to be amended 
to allow new development. Finally, the political considerations were equally important as 
it was not clear what reaction the construction of a mosque on the site of the Russian 
material and symbolic heritage could cause from the federal centre and among the 
Russian population. All these issues will be discussed in the chapter.
5.4.1 Reconstruction of Kazan Kremlin: the politics of heritage
After the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 the Russians rebuilt the Kazan Kremlin 
in the Russian architectural tradition, which is why now the Kremlin is perceived by 
many Tatars as a symbol of Russian colonisation. The Kremlin became a prime site on 
which the new political realities of semi-sovereign Tatarstan were staged. The Tatarstani 
state which had been restored after more than four centuries of Russian domination 
urgently needed a new symbol of statehood and power. That task immediately posed an 
additional set o f  problems as to how a ‘Tatar design’ could be integrated into the 
predominantly Russian context.
The movement for sovereignty fuelled interest in discovering the ‘genuine’ 
cultural roots of the region (Interview 9, 2008). The Kazan Kremlin as the historic core of 
the city became the site of exploration of the city’s historical roots and at the same time 
the place that witnessed the construction of a new history. Since all structures from the 
pre-Russian period were destroyed during and after the siege and the existing Kazan 
Kremlin was built entirely during the Russian period, the task to discover sufficient 
material evidence from the pre-Russian period was problematic. Archaeologists and 
historians started looking for the Boulgar and Tatar origins of the Kremlin in order to 
challenge the traditional interpretation of the Kremlin being a result of work of Russian 
craftsmen acting under the order of Ivan the Terrible and to substantiate the claim that 
Kazan had been a successive capital of the Tatar state. The Tatarstani scientists Khalitov 
(1997), Aidarova (2000), Khouzin and Sitdikov (2005) argued that Kazan’s planning 
structure and material heritage was the result of a consecutive superimposition of the 
Boulgar, Tatar and Russian civilisation layers on the site of Kazan Kremlin:
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there are more grounds to see the Kremlin as a monument of the medieval 
town-planning art of Boulgars-Tatars, which was reconstructed under 
Russian period with preservation of the most important parameters 
(location, function, bases of planning and composition) that take root in 
the earliest stages of the town’s existence (Khouzin and Sitdikov 2005, p.
114).
the Kazan Kremlin is a unique complex of monument of history, 
archaeology, and architecture, and symbolises the thousand year-old 
history of the capital of Tatarstan, the glorious past of the multimillion 
Tatar people, the uniqueness of the monument is manifested, first of all, 
in the fact that it is the only Russian-Tatar fortress of the XV-XVI 
century in our country, which preserved in its main parts the more 
ancient Boulgar town-planning tradition {ibid, p. 171).
The argument that Kazan Kremlin is “Russia’s only surviving Tatar fortress” the 
history of which could be traced a thousand years back to Boulgar, Golden Horde, Kazan 
Khanate, Italian, Russian and modem Tatar periods has been in the Kazan Kremlin 
documentation for World Heritage List (see World Heritage Committee 2000, p. 123).
The first step to transform the Kremlin was the creation in January 1994 of the 
State History, Architecture and Arts Museum-Preserve ‘Kazan Kremlin’ with the 
“purpose of preservation and development of historical and cultural heritage of the 
peoples of Tatarstan and revitalisation of Kazan Kremlin as the historical, cultural and 
administrative centre of Tatarstan Republic” (President RT 1994). During 1993-1994 two 
leading Tatarstani architectural history academics Aidarov and Khalikov drafted The 
Scientific Concept o f Reconstruction, Development and Use o f the Ensemble o f Kazan 
Kremlin (1994) that essentially envisaged the restoration of the Kremlin based on 
conservation principles. The document received a negative review by the Tatarstani 
Academy of Science because it aligned with the Soviet historiography tradition that saw 
the Kremlin first of all as an example of the Russian architecture.
The deputy director of the Museum-Preserve Administration criticised the authors 
for “ignoring completely the idea of a complex reconstruction of the Kremlin and the 
possibilities of new construction on its territory” (Khalitov 1997?, p. 235). According to 
Khalitov the conservation approach adopted in the Concept (1994) inevitably raised the
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question as to what exactly had to be preserved? {ibid p. 235). Two methodological 
approaches had clashed here according to Khalitov. One called “Russian” and based on 
conservation principles; another called “Tatar” and based on reconstruction principles. 
Essentially, Khalitov’s argument can be summarised as follows: the former approach 
implied restoration of only those buildings which did not contradict with the historical 
context and could be verified by valid historic evidence. If we followed this logic, argued 
Khalitov, we would have to reconstruct Russian churches and monasteries, which had 
formed the silhouette of the Kremlin in the past However that would be inappropriate on 
political and moral grounds because the reconstructed churches would have become 
“monuments to the barbaric demolition of the sacred for the Muslim part o f Kazani 
population buildings: mosques, tombs of khans and the saints” (Khalitov 1997?, p. 237;
1996). To avoid the deadlock situation, Khalitov suggested that the whole concept of 
historical heritage had to be critically reviewed {ibid, p. 238). Khalitov continued that the 
Kazan Kremlin
is the most significant architectural dominant in the city centre visible 
from everywhere and shaping the city silhouette... the Kremlin as the 
hearth of the Tatar statehood must an adequate architectural development 
and be subjected to a radical... Reconstruction of the Kremlin as a
stronghold of the state power and a symbol of its state history today is not
a mere architectural task but also a political act and its necessity can not be 
doubted {ibid, p. 239).
The first and foremost step of the Kremlin rehabilitation was, according to 
Khalitov, the construction of a new mosque {ibid, p. 240). That could not be just a replica
of the medieval mosque that had existed in the Kremlin before the Russian invasion; the
new project had a very different role:
the idea of the recreation of a mosque in the Kazan Kremlin marked a 
radical turn in our people’s consciousness, it finished forever 450 years of 
slavery inside the Christian Empire. After almost half a millennium since 
the Bulgar state fell, having fought with the Moscow predator for its 
freedom; ancient Kazan became the centre of a restoring state and the 
place of residence of its president... its architecture once again gains the 
Tatar flavour. Hence, Kul-Sharif is not a mere mosque, and not even the 
main mosque of Kazan and the state. It is the new symbol of Kazan and 
Tatarstan, the centre of attraction of the entire Tatar Diaspora {ibid, pp. 
242-243).
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Eventually the Tatar political leadership acknowledged Khalitov’s argument. As a 
professor in the Kazan school of architecture explained during an interview, president 
Shaimiev liked the idea of creating the new image of Kazan and did not like too much the 
idea of preserving the heritage most of which would be Russian and alien to him:
it became clear that in the new social realities we could not adopt the 
traditional conservationist approach and preserve ruins converting a 
modem city into ruins... President Shaimiev specifically mentioned that 
when he visited Rome he did not like that the city was full of ruins: “ruins 
all over the place, this cannot suit the city”. That is why the decision was 
made to locate the new mosque on a completely different site... to ensure 
that the structure could be seen from the River Volga and the image of the 
Kremlin corresponds with its status of both Russian and Tatar heritage 
site. Therefore the reconstruction of the Kremlin was carried out with 
consideration of the new social realities.
It was expected that the Kremlin reflected truthfully its historic nature.
The Kremlin had existed before Kazan Khanate was annexed by the 
Russian state ... there were the walls, towers, the Khan’s palace and 
mosques. Because Kazan was the capital of a national republic, the 
interests of the local ‘aborigines’ had to be met justly and they had a right 
to have them met (Interview 23, 2007).
In 1995 the President Shaimiev issued another decree on the Kazan Kremlin 
entitled On the Concept o f Preservation, Development and Use o f the Ensemble o f Kazan 
Kremlin (1995) which envisaged the construction of a new mosque. Indeed, the decree 
first referred to restoration of the Blagoveschenskii (Annunciation) Cathedral (built 1556- 
1562) and then to the recreation of the Kul-Sharif mosque with the purpose of 
“preserving the historical succession” (President RT, 1995). This was not accidental: 
although Tatar leadership was eager to “Tatarise the Kremlin” (Interview 14, 2008), they 
were also cautious about the possible reaction from both Moscow and the Russian part of 
the Tatarstani population on the decision to build a mosque in the Kazan Kremlin 
constructed by Russians (Interview 29, 2007). That is why the subtle language of 
“preservation” and “restoration” of Kazan Kremlin” was used which would imply the 
restoration of Orthodox churches and monasteries as well and the “resurrection” of the 
Mosque.
154
Chapter 5 Case study 1
Figure 3. The Kul-Sharf Mosque (in the centre) in Kazan Kremlin. Aerial view. Source: 
Google Earth (2009).
5.4.2 The design of the Mosque
On 19 December 1995 the Tatarstan Republic government announced a design contest 
“for the best project for the revival of the mosque on the basis of combining the traditions 
of national architecture with modem developments in architecture with the purpose of 
rehabilitation of the Kazan Kremlin and preservation of its historical succession” 
(Kabinet Minisrov RT 1995). The design brief was very concise which created a lot of 
opportunities for design teams and politicians to interpret what ought to be built but at the 
same time gave no clarity on what the actual design would look like and offered no 
information on possible sources of knowledge that might be used to collect information
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about the legendary mosque. That was a particularly difficult part because according to 
archaeological surveys, not only there was no data on the mosque's form or appearance, 
but even its location in the Kremlin was yet to be found (Sitdikov 2006, pp. 110-111).
That was left up to the contestants to decide whether to align with the 
conservation approach and consider the Kremlin as predominantly Russian architectural 
ensemble or to align with the reconstruction approach more oriented towards recreating 
the Kremlin as the centre of the capital of Tatarstan Republic. The former approach 
would be difficult due to the absence of sufficient data, the latter approach would also be 
problematic due to the lack of skills and expertise in creating Tatar national architecture. 
During the Soviet period rothing apart from few mundane utilitarian structures had been 
built in the Kremlin (e.g. garages and a dining hall) so the architects had no experience in 
designing anything on the Kazan's number one site. During the Soviet period the 
expression of nationalism in monumental art and architecture was restricted. The 
architects did not have experience in designing Islamic architecture either. According to 
Khalitov, it turned out that “we did not know anything about Tatar traditions and knew 
even less about the Islamic traditions” (Khalitov 1996). Galiamova (1997) argues that 
during the Soviet period Tatar creative intelligentsia was “enslaved” by the Communist 
party and lost any national pride (p. 202). That is why the task the architects were 
charged with i.e. to create a symbol of Tatar nationalism was completely new to them and 
neither the politicians, nor planner knew little about the practical implication of the 
project.
The design context brief gave some general aspirations about the project mission 
and die architects fully embraced the idea of political symbolism in their submissions. 
One team, for example, stated the mission of the project as follows: “the planning 
solution of the project matches the significance of Tatarstani capital and Kazan Kremlin 
and also the desire of the Tatar people to immortalise the memories of its glorious 
predecessors” (Sattarov 1996). Another design team states in its competition entry that 
the mosque would become “one of the Muslim sacred places in the most northern region 
of the Muslim culture expansion comparable with and similar to Mecca and Medina” 
(Kompleks 1996). The search continued through a second tour which was announced to 
“further develop the ideas discovered during the first tour”. The design brief stated that
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the Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin will be erected in commemoration of 
the revival of culture and statehood of Tatarstan. This idea is connected 
with the construction of the new mosque in memory of the historical Kul- 
Sharif Mosque -  the symbol of freedom and independence in the memory 
of the Tatar people (Kabinet Ministrov RT, 1996).
Similar to the first tour the aspirations about the project were quite clear, but there 
was very little clarity about how to proceed with “reconstruction” of a historical building 
that had no valid records (only a few vague descriptions), leave alone plans or drawing. It 
was not explained what went wrong with the project that had been nominated originally 
and no clear directions were given as to what needed to be done in the new design. On 26 
June 1996 the design team lead by Sattarov finally won the context and the winning 
project was described as follows:
the authors managed to create the image of the building that manifests 
triumph, festiveness, integrity and artistic expressiveness... A design 
solution was found that combines the modem language of expression of 
both Muslim traditions and typological links with Boulgar religious 
structures”. At the same time, “the traditional motives of Tatar architecture 
and monumental decorative art received little expression in the decoration 
of facades (Khalitov et al 1997).
Although the winning project was nominated, the continuation of work at the 
design stage faced unexpected difficulties. As was previously mentioned the expertise in 
doing design in complex conditions of Kremlin was limited as was the capacity to deliver 
the task architects were charged with. These circumstances caused certain problems when 
the project developed into the technical stage. According to Khalitov the winning team 
led by Sattarov produced an attractive concept design that was liked by the president 
Shaimiev but later failed to develop the project to the sufficient level of detail (1997b p. 
2). Kazanskie Vedomosti reported that the winning team altered the concept design that 
had been selected during the architectural contest and failed to communicate effectively 
with the design institute that was commissioned the technical design and the planning 
department that tried to influence the design process (Ivanicheva 1997a p. 4). The chief 
architect shared with Kazanskie Vedomosti that the winning team had failed to take on 
board the recommendations produced by the planning department (Ivanicheva 1997b p.
157
Chapter 5 Case study I
4). On 17 February 1997 the chief architect of the city took a decision to organise another 
design context in attempt to “help” the winning team (Glavnoe upravlenie 
gradostroitel’stva 1997).
As a result a new conceptual design was adopted that looked differently from the 
original scheme prepared by the team lead by Sattarov. Instead of vertical walls that 
formed traditional in Islamic architecture cubic composition, in the new scheme prepared 
by Saifoullin the building envelope was formed by a series of crossing lancet arches 
which supported the dome. The deputy chief architect Loginov speaking for the Planning 
department of the city denied that that new project was substantially different from the 
original project prepared by the team lead by Sattarov and argued that the new scheme 
was built upon the basic principles the previously selected scheme (Loginov 1997).
The apparent ‘substitution’ of a new scheme for one that had been officially 
nominated as a design context winner caused a heated public debate. Sattarov responded 
in Kazanskie Vedomosti that it had nothing to do with the original project and that the 
new project ‘did not look like a Muslim mosque but looked like a Christian Gothic 
church” (Ivanicheva, 1997c, p. 4). Local political commentator reported that the clash 
was between two concepts of the Mosque: “national” and “international” (Akhmetov 
1997b, p. 1).
The Muslim Religious Board of Russia commented that the facades of the new 
scheme associated with the neo-Gothic motives in Russian architecture of the XVII-XIX 
centuries as did the colours chosen which were based on a combination of the blue dome 
and the white walls common in the Russian churches (Sabitov 1997). Vremya i D en’gi 
made a similar point that the new scheme broke away from the Muslim architectural 
tradition and bore distinct features of the Christian culture. Moreover its character failed 
to match the expectations about the republic’s main mosque which was intended to 
symbolise the revival of Tatarstani statehood (Saiganova 1997). Akhmetov reported that 
according to academician Aidarov, lancet arches were element of western architecture, 
but not Tatar (Akhmetov, 1997a). Argumenti i Facti suggested that the arches would be 
appropriate especially in the era of religious tolerance (Valiullina 1997). The debates of 
1996-1997 reflected back on the clashes between the conservation and reconstruction
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approaches towards Kazan Kremlin development discussed in Section 5.4.1. Molodezh' 
Tatarstana reported that according to a member of staff of the Tatar Academy of science 
Valeeva-Suleimanova, once again the question clashes between the Russian and the Tatar 
heritages came to the fore. It had to be decided whether 4tto preserve the “colonial” image 
of the Kremlin or develop Kremlin as a centre of the capital of Tatarsan Republic that 
embodied the traditions of Tatar culture”. According to Valeeva-Suleimanova the new 
scheme would have suited the Kremlin’s Russian architecture especially if the 
conservation approach had been adopted. But the Mosque would have never fitted the 
Kremlin “stuffed with churches, as Islam and Orthodox Christianity were the two 
radically different religions as were Russian and Tatar cultures” (Sitdikova 1997, p. 6).
To resolve the issue, on the 1 July 1997 a conference was held at the Institute of 
History of the Tatar Academy of Science. Khakimov, the director of the institute and the 
political advisor to the president of Tatarsatn chaired the meeting. The author was present 
at the meeting and it was noticeable from how the discussion was structured that the 
presidential administration acted in favour of the new scheme prepared by Saifullin’s 
team. No definite decision was made to give either team exclusive rights to continue 
work so the task was split as follows: while the design team led by Sattarov became 
responsible for designing the interiors of the Mosque, the design team lead by Saifullin 
was authorised to develop further the scheme based on the use of arches and finalise the 
exterior of the Mosque. Eventually the Mosque was built as a symmetrical composition 
based on “a square within a square” plan symbolising the Bismillah. The central dome 
was supported by a series of crossing lancet arches which formed a dynamic composition 
of the facades.
5.4.3 Public debates about the project
The resurrection of the Mosque gained public support because for “many centuries the 
mosque lived in the memories of the people symbolising freedom and happiness” 
(Valiullina 1997). In relation to the construction of the mosque, one of the Tatarstani 
people’s deputies wrote: “the Tatar intelligentsia always saw the Kremlin as a symbol of 
colonisation, as a symbol of the empire. Today we can change the situation” (Kharisov
159
Chapter 5 Case study 1
1997). The head of a Tatar noble society stated that the Mosque was a sign of 
Renaissance of the Tatar culture and Tatar nation (Interview 16, 2008). During the 
interview stage this opinion has emerged on many other occasions.
While the resurrection of the Mosque was very popular among the Tatar element 
of the population, the decision to construct a mosque in the heart of the historic city was 
not received unanimously. Questions were raised as to whether the construction of a new 
building (although presented as the “resurrection” of something previously in existence) 
could be justified: “if the Mosque is being constructed while the only thing known about 
it is the number of minarets, why not to restore the ancient Spassky Cathedral of XVI 
century has a perfectly preserved basement as well as necessary archival data” 
(Zhooravskiy 1995). Concerns were also raised about the fact that the site of one of the 
oldest buildings in Kazan, the Spaso-Preobrazhensky (Saviour-Transfiguration) 
Monastery located in the Kremlin next to the Kul-Sharif Mosque construction site, was 
converted into little more than a dumping ground, to which demolition debris and waste 
was shipped from other construction sites including those located right next to the Kul 
Sharif mosque construction site (Frolov 1997).
That implied a fundamental conflict between the Russian and the Tatar heritage 
located in a close proximity. The decision to construct a new mosque in the heart of the 
historic city was not received unanimously. Questions were raised as to whether the 
construction of a new building (although presented as ‘resurrection’) could be justified:
if the Mosque is being constructed while the only thing known about it is 
the number of minarets, why not to restore the ancient Saviour- 
Transfiguration Cathedral of XVI century has a perfectly preserved 
basement as well as necessary archival data (Zhooravskiy 1995).
The Deputy chair of the Russian Cultural Society revealed during interview that 
the Society sent several letters to the Administration of the Tatarstan President about the 
need to reconstruct the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Monastery in the Kremlin but received no 
response. That was not a single episode when rights of the Russian residents of Kazan 
were ignored. When the Russian Cultural Society approached the Ministry of Culture o f 
Tatarstan requesting the transfer of the bell tower of the church of Epiphany back to the
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church in order to form a single property with other buildings that had been transferred 
back previously, the Tatarstani Minister of culture responded that “as a Tatar he would 
prevent this from happening” (Interview 4, 2008). There have been other similar cases 
reported in press when authorities in Kazan refused to facilitate the transfer of the former 
church structures back to Russian Orthodox communities.
5.5 Analysis and discussion
5.5.1 Organisational structure and funding arrangements
A special Kul-Sharif Mosque Fund was established by the government to accumulate 
donations and manage the construction process. Funds for construction were collected 
from various sources. Although no official information was given on the construction 
cost, the Tatarstani authorities maintained that voluntary donations were the only source 
of funding. In the interview the special advisor to the president of Tatarstan revealed that
There was mass support from the population o f Tatarstan and sometimes 
agricultural workers even donated grain. The Kul-Sharif Fund would then 
sell the grain and use the money for construction. Foreign donations were 
very modest. The Iranians donated the carpets; 120,000 US dollars came 
from Kuwait... What was it? Just some small change, good for putting up 
one crescent only (Interview 32, 2007).
The main bulk of the required funding came from large industries that played the main 
role in supporting the construction. The Tatarstani president Shaimiev explained the 
origin of funding as follows (cited in Yakupov 2006):
The oik industry workers4 have helped to construct the Mosque. Although 
Islamic states offered money to build the Mosque, we said5 that the 
Mosque was significant for the republic and would be built by ourselves.
We did a God pleasing thing when we decided to do so... It happened that 
there was a good harvest that year. I called together the heads of district 
administrations and told them: God sent us rain in time and we have 
collected two extra centners of grain from a hectare, which we otherwise 
would have not collected” Then, according to Yakoupov, meetings were
4 In Tatarstan the top-m anagem ent o f  oil companies is often referred to as 'oil-industry workers’ -  no 
doubts that for the president they are no more than that.
5 The royal 'w e ’ often used by Shaim iev.
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held in villages where people voluntary decided to transfer surplus grain
as a donation to the Kul Sharif Fund (2006, p. 181).
In Tatarstan the mechanism of ‘voluntary donations’ by businesses worked in a 
peculiar way. As the deputy chair of the Russian cultural society revealed during 
interview, the society approached several businessmen asking for charitable donations for 
the cultural and educational projects the society run. Although the businesses would not 
reject the idea of giving money to a Russian charity on any principle grounds, they would 
refuse to donate because they had been ordered by the authorities to support numerous 
Tatar cultural projects and they would not be able to afford supporting both Tatar and 
Russian projects. The businessmen said that if there had been an order from the 
authorities to support the Russian charities as well they would have done so (Interview 4,
2008).
Other methods used by the authorities were even more controversial. For 
example, in July 1996 the mayor of Kazan issued a decree that established the size of the 
donation that each administrative district of Kazan was obliged to contribute to the 
construction of the Kul-Sharif Mosque. The total amount of money that Kazan had to 
spare was defined as an equivalent of 308,442.20 US dollars or about $0.39 from each 
adult. Heads of district administrations were made responsible for the fulfilment of the 
assignments in time for that purpose ‘they had to conduct necessary consultation work in 
support of the construction of Kul-Sharif Mosque among the enterprise management, 
peoples’ deputies and the population”. To ensure that the voluntary contributions were 
coming in on time, all seven district heads, all eight mayor’s deputies as well as the heads 
of the economic and financial departments were made responsible for collecting money 
(Glava administratsii 1996).
5.5.2 The rationale behind the project
It is argued in this chapter that Kul-Sharif Mosque as a project not only symbolised the 
restoration of the Tatarstani statehood but also helped the Tatarstani authorities to work 
out the format of Tatarstani sovereignty and its specific dimensions: Tatarstan’s
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relationship with the international community and the federal centre; the relationship 
between the secular and religious authorities; the relationship between the authorities, 
large businesses and the nationalist movements.
International dimension
The processes of state building at the domestic level and that of projecting sovereignty 
internationally were seen as interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For instance, 
behaving Tike a state’ on the international area helped to elevate the Tatarstani positions 
within Russia. In a similar way, strengthening the Tatarstani state and creating the 
attributes of state power domestically elevated the region’s position on the international 
arena (Graney 1999; 2009). On the global level the construction of the Mosque helped to 
project the Tatarstani sovereignty internationally by aligning Tatarstan with the Muslim 
world. According to Khakimov, Euroislam could also help Tatarstan integrate into 
Europe:
We need to make a definite choice in favour of Europe, but in that case a 
natural question arises: what can we bring to Europe? The only real 
contribution is Euroislam, i.e. a system of beliefs that bring together 
liberal ideas with the Islamic values. This is an orientation of public 
thoughts which takes Tatars beyond the national boundaries and at the 
same time builds bridges between the East and the West (Khakimov 2005, 
p. 291).
According to the head of a Tatar noble society, Islam for the Tatars was the way of both 
preserving their national identity and integrating into the wider Muslim community. 
During the interview he revealed that
The Mosque symbolised links with Islamic countries ... The chairman of 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) attended the opening 
ceremony in Kazan Kremlin. It is important for Russia’s geopolitical 
interests to join the OIC... Tatarstan as a Muslim country inside Russia 
could play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy and its relations 
with the OIC (Interview 16, 2008).
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The idea of the Mosque as aimed at the international audience was reflected in its 
architecture. A then senior member of staff of the Kazan Planning Department explained 
the influence of the Tatar version of Islam on the design of the Mosque as follows:
The Mosque is a symbol of cultural identification in the globalising world.
It was designed in such a way to reflect the global tendencies... It is not a 
traditional Tatar type of mosque where the minaret stood above an 
ordinaiy wooden house, and was easy to pull down n case the Russians 
arrived with to check. In Kazan the historical mosque had eight minarets 
and stood next to the Khan’s palace and was visited by foreign guests. The 
modem mosque also combines international motives: Central Asian 
architecture, Tatar ornaments, Mauritanian elements... The design is not 
specifically Tatar -  it combines global Muslim principles. Importantly,
Zufar-Hazrat (the Imam of the Mosque -  N.K.) says to visitors from 
outside Tatarstan: ‘Here we have the names of all prophets: Isa (Jesus),
Mussa (Moses), Ibrahim (Abraham) inscribed in the ornaments. They are 
your prophets too, and we all respect them. One God -  different faiths’. It 
was important to reflect in the design that Islam is a part of the global 
culture... They wanted to bring into design all best achievements and 
show the tolerant and open character of Islam (Interview 13, 2007).
Russia’s federalism dimension
The idea to reconstruct the legendary mosque worked out well in the political context. 
Politicians saw the role of the project n emphasising the new political status of the 
republic as a sovereign state as opposed to that of a ‘subject’ of the Russian Federation. 
The Mosque helped to strengthen Tatarstan’s positions of a semi-sovereign republic 
within Russia by emphasising its unique ethnic and religious composition and its 
significance for preserving the peace in a multiethnic country. These public discourses 
rolled out to full extent in connection to the Mosque. The presidential decree dedicated to 
the opening of the Mosque emphasised the balance of Islam and Christianity:
due to finishing the resurrection of Kul-Sharif Mosque and restoration of 
Annunciation Cathedral; with the purpose of revival of the architectural- 
historic complex of the Kazan Kremlin as a UNESCO site of world 
cultural and natural heritage; in order to create conditions for holding 
solemn religious ceremonies and strengthening inter-national and inter­
confessional accord in the Republic of Tatarstan (President RT, 2005).
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It is an interesting that the argument made for the UNESCO attribution used a 
slightly different logic. During an interview then a senior member of staff of the Kazan 
Planning Department revealed that
When we submitted our application, the construction was under way.
People thought that we would have no chance. The UNESCO expert also 
had doubts about the eligibility of our claim. We explained to him that 
Kul-Sharif Mosque was one of the five mosques destroyed in the XVI 
century and the resurrection was very important because it was better to 
restore a mosque in the Kremlin than to have a new Chechnya here. The 
deputy prime minister and the advisor to the President explained that the 
project had a great political importance in terms of tolerant and peaceful 
co-existence of all religions and balance of cultures and confessions. The 
expert liked this idea (Interview 13, 2007).
These two passages show that depending on the situation, Tatarstan appears in the 
political discourse either as a modekregion of stability and tolerance, or as a potentially 
inflammable ethnic region similar to Chechnya. President Shaimiev’s biographers argue 
that the ostensibly fragile peace aould only be preserved because a balanced political 
course and wisdom of the Tatarstani president (Bukharaev 1999, p. 111). The 
government controlled media made those discourses so dominant, that hardly any 
interviewee avoided references to “religious tolerance” and “balance of culture”.
The director of a Kazan government-owned company explained that that was the 
“game plan” Tatarstani authorities offered to Russia’s authorities: to present the region as 
nationalist and potentially inflammable, but always counterbalance the threat by the 
arguments of peaceful coexistence and religious tolerance (Interview 11, 2008). The 
federal centre seemed to accept the “game plan” offered by Tatarstaa According to a 
professor of history in Kazan State University,
Tatarstan and Kazan were the quintessence of the ideas of multi­
nationalism, multi-culturalism and multi-confessionalism promoted by the 
federal centre. In this respect Tatarstan became a showcase of Russia’s 
national policy, the most successful project of coexistence of different 
nations and cultures. Russia would put that on show when an example of 
successful coexistence o f different ethnic groups was needed. Kazan was 
convenient when the centre needed a region where the declarations and
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dreams materialise because there were always problems in the outlying 
provinces: either everybody would live peacefully on the basis of common 
poverty or separate rich clans would endlessly fight with each other 
(Interview 25, 2007).
Domestic politics
Kul-Sharif Mosque played a significant role in substantiating the Tatarstani statehood 
with national and cultural identity. The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque was an 
interesting example of inventing heritage as a part of the wider process of constructing a 
new Tatar identity. In the 1990s in Tatarstan the aspirations for sovereignty from Russia 
and growing national and religious awareness required relevant material symbols of 
admiration and worship. According to the local commentator, the cultural, spiritual and 
ethnic national identification were important conditions for the consolidation and proper 
“functioning” of the Tatar nation in the federal state and globalising world as a whole 
(Zakirov 2006, pp. 204-205). As a symbol of the Tatar state the Mosque has helped the 
Tatars to “straighten their shoulders” (Interview 29, 2007).
As was previously discussed, the project helped the authorities to refine the 
format of the relationship with the religious organisations. The project of the Mosque 
resurrection showed that the political authorities of Tatarstan clearly took the lead and 
made all the significant decision during the design and implementation process such as 
the decisions on the function o f the Mosque as a museum and control of the building 
operation by the administration o f the Museum-preserve “Kazan Kremlin”. The 
execution of the project gives a good illustration of the established Tatarstan model of the 
relationship between the clergy and the civil authorities, where the former exchange their 
loyalty for economic support provided by the authorities.
The rhetoric of historical justice, national revival and cultural renaissance that 
surrounded the project served the goal of internal political legitimisation. That is why 
flagship projects such as the Kul-Sharif Mosque became a part of the regional 
sovereignty experiment. While the mosque had its important mission to satisfy the 
expectations of the Tatar part of the population, it did not symbolise a creation of an
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Islamist state. In Kazan the Kul-Sharif Mosque was praised as the most vivid 
representation of the Tatarstani statehood restoration and the nation’s spiritual 
renaissance. The Mosque worked as “cultural packaging” of the ideas ofsovereignty that 
helped to communicate the message of Tatarstan’s special status domestically, to the 
Russian authorities and beyond in the most effective and long lasting way.
The state supported the project using the government controlled industries as 
financial donors. In the way similar to the relationship between the authorities and the 
Muslim clergy, a quid pro quo model of relationship formed between large industries and 
authorities. The businesses supported various projects initiated by the authorities and 
received protection in exchange. Both the state and the industries benefited from 
Tatarstan’s special fiscal arrangements with Russia’s central authorities as a result of 
Tatarstani sovereignty.
Regional competitiveness in Russia
The special status of the republic created certain ‘competitive advantages’ in regards to 
other republics. These advantages existed in a form of direct aid or privileges granted by 
the Russian government. According to Valooyev (2007): gaining certain privileges 
(taxation benefits, free economic zone status, etc.) could make significant impact on 
international and foreign trade links o f the region, as they strengthened competitiveness 
and attractiveness of the region as compared to other regions of the Russian Federation 
(Valooyev 2007).
Competing for the resources of the federal centre required the deployment of 
various techniques including negotiation, bargaining and making secessionist threats. The 
Mosque has helped to substantiate those claims and threats using its powerful image. 
During the interview the director of a Kazan government owned company explained the 
fact that the authorities decided to build one huge mosque in the capital instead of many 
smaller mosques in rural communities as follows:
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Because the Mosque in the Kremlin was not about faith... The Mosque 
was not selected as a symbol that could represent the stronger competitive 
position of the region... It was selected as a symbol of threat, hostile 
threat... They exploited weakness of the central state; they did not develop 
competitiveness. Kazan used the possible disintegration of Russia as an 
opportunity to take advantage in the competition for federal financial 
flows. They created the Tatar civic Centre, introduced the republican own 
privatisation voucher, organised the rallies... It was all about frightening 
and blackmailing a weak Russia... (Interview 11, 2008).
Although the interviews have not suggested that any direct connection between 
the resurrection of the Mosque and the competitive strength of Tatarstan on the 
international market is in place, the Tatarstani diplomacy skilfully used the regional 
ethnic and cultural characteristics to promote foreign trade and international relations. As 
a senior member of the Presidential administration has stated during interview:
We produce a lot of goods but they will be impossible to sell in the UK.
That is why we are looking at the Asian and Turkic markets... The Tatar 
language helps to work on those markets. It is easier for us to work with 
the Muslims because they understand us better. But v\e use Orthodox 
Christianity as well when visiting Greece for instance - we say here are 
our Christian traditions, when dealing with an Islamic country -  here are 
our Muslim traditions. Little tricks... (Interview 32, 2007).
A lecturer in the Kazan school of architecture and one of the architects of the Mosque 
noticed that after the opening
the Mosque became a kind of brand that represents the image of the city of 
Kazan on the world map. It is a festive mosque. It is full of people...
There is an endless stream of tourists who come from all over Russia. It 
has become a centre of pilgrimage. Not even religious but cultural. For 
visitors the first thing to do is to look at the mosque (Interview 21, 2007).
Additionally the image of the Mosque became publicised and reproduced in all 
promotional materials about Tatarstan and Kazan (see, Figure 4). The Investment Guide 
to Kazan called “Kazan -  the third capital o f Russia”, described the Mosque as 
“magnificent” and the “biggest in Europe”. According to the guide, the Mosque was built 
as “a symbol of revival of the national and religious traditions of the Tatar people and 
their desire to have equal relationship with other peoples” (Merya Kazani 2007). The
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Mosque was also mentioned in the investment guide for the Tatarstan Republic along 
with other ‘grand projects’ (Ministerstvo Torgovli 2007). The guides are published on 
annual basis and distributed at foreign investment forums and are presented to visiting 
Tatarstan delegations.
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Figure 4. The front cover of Finanzen magazine special issue (June 
2007) distributed to the participants of the EBRD Annual meeting in 
Kazan. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
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5.5.3 Spatial dimension
In post-socialist countries irban planning and architecture have played an important role 
in symbolic representation of new political regimes by providing new urban spaces, 
government offices as well as monuments representing the ideas of nation, ethnic 
belonging and history (see Adams 2008; Anacker 2004; Sir 2008). In Russia a number of 
economically strong and politically ambitions regions used urban development projects to 
strengthen their economic positions and political ambitions (Pagonis and Thornley 2000).
For centuries he Kazan Kremlin was perceived as a symbolic seat of power. 
Different groups fought for the right to control the site which implied control over the 
existing heritage and the right to place new monuments on the site. A chief research 
fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science revealed during interview that the 
Kremlin had always been a symbol of alien power because of the Russian garrison and 
Governor’s palace. That is why it was so important to demonstrate that the Tatarstani 
authorities had the political power and economic strength to build such an ambitious 
project in the Kremlin. The symbol of the Tatarstani statehood revival re-emerged exactly 
where the statehood was lost (Interview 2, 2007).
During the Tatarstani sovereignty the Kremlin once again became a site for 
symbolically important projects (Khalit 1996). Tatarstan “behaved like a state” and its 
authorities made deliberate efforts to substantiate the political claims with the cultural 
component including efforts to work out the ‘proper’ Tatar architecture and create the 
new image of the capital city Kazan (Graney 2009; 2007). The resurrection of the Kul- 
Sharif Mosque represents a good example of how urban space can be used to express 
political visions as well as to position the city of the national and international mental 
maps.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin 
(1995-2005) as a central element of the new image of Kazan as the capital of ‘sovereign’ 
Tatarstan Republic. The chapter has also revealed the links between the project and the
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formation of a new urban governance model in Kazan in the context of wider social, 
economic and political transformation and the relationship between Russia’s federal 
centre and one of its provinces.
The resurrection of the Kul Sharif Mosque was embedded into political, economic 
and social conditions in Tatarstan which were different from those in Russia’s non-ethnic 
provinces. The analysis demonstrates that the Tatarstani leadership used the resurrection 
of the Mosque to raise public awareness, to mobilise supporters of the state sovereignty 
movement and to build a new national identity for Tatarstan. Acting within a centralised 
federal state, the Tatarstani leadership skilfully used the combination of political and 
economic claims in order to secure Tatarstan’s special position within the federation to 
allow various concessions and benefits that other parts of the federation could only dream 
of. The new image of Kazan and the visual impact of the Mosque helped to reinforce the 
political and economic claims and substantiate them with a strong cultural and national 
identity component.
While the resurrection of the Mosque was deeply rooted in the history of the 
region and the politics of centre periphery relations, it was also built to respond to the 
modem challenges of the globalising world. The new political and economic realities of 
globalisation and regionalisation were reflected in the construction of a new image of the 
city. As the analysis of the debates and the contest documentation demonstrates, one of 
the roles of the project has been to help position Kazan and Tatarstan on the global map 
as an economically prosperous and politically stable region, an attractive location for 
investment and a model region for peaceful coexistence of people of different religious 
backgrounds and ethnic origin.
Although the resurrection of the Mosque seems to be the materialisation of the 
political and social processes that Tatarstan went through in the 1990s, the role of the 
project in feeding back into those processes cannot be ignored. It is argued that as much 
as the Tatarstani sovereignty made the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque possible, 
the public debate around the Mosque, the search for its design and the implementation 
process, all helped to shape the Tatar national identity and ultimately the Tatarstani 
statehood. Not only did the project represent complex social processes movements, but it
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also became an important factor in the identity construction and crystallisation of 
emerging political order in Tatarstan and emerging configuration of centre-periphery 
relations.
The resurrection of the Mosque was highlighted by a very special moment in the 
modem history of Russia. In the 1990s many Russia’s regions were experimenting with 
the limits of self-governance and some regions such as Tatarstan and Chechnya took it to 
the extreme of declaring the independence from Russia. The claims for extended 
economic and political rights always went hand-in-hand with the claims for cultural 
revival of the region. The two processes were reciprocal: while cultural uniqueness of the 
region was used to justify claims for more political and economic autonomy, the latter 
stimulated development of national culture.
The resurrection of the Mosque has facilitated the formation of a new model of 
urban governance led by government initiatives, reliant on the financial support from the 
government and government-control led industries and aimed to serve the ambitions of 
the political leadership. The emerging governance model has produced a large, highly 
visible flagship project connected with current debates in politics and national identity. 
The Kazan Kremlin has become the central site where the political transformation in 
Tatarstan was staged. During times of political transformation the questions of power and 
national identity are in a constant state of flux. Heritage projects which were 
implemented in cities reflected ideas of historical destiny, belonging, while new ‘grand 
projects’ represented the ideas of economic strength and progress.
The Mosque was not a mere ‘product’, but also an important creative element of 
the sovereignty project. It did not simply show the return to ‘the cultural roots’ but gave 
the federal government in Moscow a clear message that Tatarstan was different from the 
rest of Russia and was looking for more independence. The mosque was called to 
demonstrate to the federal centre the capacity of the Tatars to mobilise and see 
themselves as a nation with symbolic attributes of a nation (e.g. the state and Presidency, 
monumental art and architecture). That potential was skilfully used to negotiate benefits 
which would not be available to Russian regions.
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The following chapter will show how the policies of image construction 
transformed during the Putin’s administration. With the increasing recentralisation of 
power, Tatarstan withdrew most of its sovereignty claims. The case study on the 
preparation to the Millennial celebrations will show how Kazan received federal funding 
as a form of “settlement” for abandoning the sovereignty project. Both types of design 
were aimed to distinguish cities from their counterparts, advertise themselves and help to 
secure a better position on the market. Increasingly, important commercial and public 
buildings are built according to the ‘international design standards’ with the idea of 
holding the test of the ‘international competition’.
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CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY 2: THE PRESERVATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE KAZAN HISTORIC CENTRE1
6.1 Introduction
This chapter will analyse the government policies aimed at the preparation of the city for 
the Kazan Millennial celebrations in 2005. The Special Federal Programme for the 
Preservation and Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) played a 
central role in the preparation for Kazan Millennial celebrations and included a number 
of large urban development projects to help form a new image for Kazan. The 
programme was the result of successful bargaining between the authorities of the 
Tatarstan Republic and the federal centre over federal government funding. The 
Programme was the largest investment in urban projects in Kazan’s post-socialist history 
and made a significant impact on the development of Kazan. The preparation for the 
Millennium represents a good case study because it demonstrates how urban 
development policies in Kazan are adopted and implemented, illustrates the relationship 
between different levels of government (federal, regional and city) and other important 
actors involved in the process of governing the post-socialist city. The pursuit of 
development with visual impact influenced the design and implementation of the 
programme and became especially observable towards the final part of the 
implementation when painful decisions on the selection of projects had to be made due to 
budget cuts and delays.
This chapter is organised as follows. The first four sections document and explain 
the genesis of the Programme including the rationale behind the programme, the 
organisational structure and the programme design. Section 6.5 documents the process of 
the Programme implementation including delivery steps, the interactions between 
institutions and the selection of priorities. The final section places the analysis of the
1 Some findings presented in the current chapter have been previously published in N.Kinossian 2006. 
Urban redevelopment programmes in Kazan (Russia). In: Sasha Tsenkova and Zorica N edovic-B udic  
eds. The urban mosaic o f postnSocialist Europe: space, institutions and policy, N ew  York: Springer, pp. 
319-337.
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Programme in the context of the centre-periphery relationship and the search for city and 
regional competitiveness and, finally outlines the emerging model of urban governance. 
The Table 6.1 below shows the benchmark events of the programme design and 
implementation.
Table 6.1 The Programme timeline
1 Sept 1999 The Russian and the Tatarstani Presidents issue decrees of the same 
name: On Celebration o f the 1000-years Anniversary o f the Foundation 
of Kazan.
4 Sept 1999 Kazan Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years 
anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by Kazan 
Administration.
28 Jan 2000 The State Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years 
anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by the Russian 
Government.
13 March 2000 The State Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years 
anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by the Tatarstani 
Government.
3 March 2001 The Programme for the Preparation for Celebrations o f the 1000-year 
Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan is adopted by a resolution of 
the Russian Government (Pravitel stvo RF 2001 b).
14 March 2001 The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development 
o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) is adopted by the resolution 
of the Russian government (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c).
6 Feb 2002 President Putin states that all necessary programme documents had 
been adopted at the federal level and now on main responsibilities 
moved down to the local level.
1 March 2002 The Kazan Soviet of people’s deputies approves a package of policies 
aimed at the preparation for the Millennium".
2 the Corrplex Programme for preparation for celebrations o f  the 1000-year anniversary o f  foundation o f  
Kazan, including the following sub-policies: i) the Programme for preparation for celebrations o f  the 1000- 
year anniversary o f  foundation o f  Kazan; ii) the Special federal programme for preservation and 
development o f  Kazan historic centre (2001-2005); iii) the Republican plan for preparation for the 1000- 
year anniversary o f  foundation o f  Kazan; iv) draft o f  the City plan for preparation and holding the 1000- 
year anniversary o f  foundation o f  Kazan; v) draft o f  the Special programme for improvement o f  living  
conditions o f  population o f  Kazan.
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12 Sept 2002 The Russian Deputy Prime Minister announces that not all projects 
originally included in the programme would be finished by the Jubilee.
Sept 2003 The Kazan City revises the original list of projects and reduces the total 
number from 131 to 106.
30 June 2005 Kazan City Soviet reports on 8 completed projects and 21 in various 
degrees of completion. According to the report, the overall completion 
of the Programme estimated in monetary terms is 51.4% (KSND 2005c,
p. 2).
26-30 Aug 2005 The Millennial celebrations are held in Kazan and include the CIS 
Summit, the grand openings of the 1000-year anniversary of Kazan 
Park, the Metro, the Ice Rink, the Horse Racing track and other events.
Source: compiled by the author.
6.2 The origins of the Programme
According to Khousin and Sitdikov (2003) the question of Kazan’s age has been debated 
since the XVII century. Although Kazan’s 700-year anniversary was celebrated in 1979, 
some archaeological evidence suggested that Kazan might have been 300 years older than 
it was previously thought. The excavations in the Kazan Kremlin led in 1976-1978 by 
Khalikov revealed the evidence of Kazan’s pre-Mongolian age (i.e. pre-1236), although 
they were not conclusive. In the new context of the centre-periphery relationship and the 
growing competition between Russia’s regions, the ability to demonstrate a rich history 
became a political issue. The excavations resumed in 1994 as a part of the government 
efforts to preserve the Kazan Kremlin. In 1997 the discovery of a medieval Czech coin 
issued presumably in 930 sparked off debates about the possible 1000-year age of Kazan 
which finally led to further investigations aimed at establishing the true age of Kazan 
which eventually confirmed the hypothesis of the city’s 1000-year history (Khousin and 
Sitdikov 2003, pp. 19-30). The Tatarstan Republic’s authorities used the discovery to 
justify the need for the federal government funding to support the preservation works on 
Kazan heritage sites first and foremost the Kremlin.
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Success in competing for federal funds was politicised and depended primarily on 
the ability of Tatarstani authorities to make good bargaining deals with the federal 
authorities (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). As was discussed in the Chapter 4, the weak 
Yeltsin administration put up with regional separatism as long as the region did not take 
explicit acts to break away (Hanauer 1996; Dowley 1998; Solnick 1998). Since 2000, the 
new Russian leadership3 started the process of the recentralisation of power. The 
Tatarstani leadership was forced to curtail the sovereignty project, but continued to use 
the mechanisms of negotiation to make direct deals with the new administration. The 
support of the Russian government became possible as a result of personal negotiation 
between two presidents and demonstrated the federal government’s recognition of 
Tatarstan’s political and economic significance.
There is clear evidence to suggest that Tatarstan used its ‘special status’ to 
negotiate substantial financial benefits received from the federal centre through the 
bargaining process. A senior member of staff of the Tatarstani Presidential 
Administration explained how Tatarstan had secured funding through the Special Federal 
Programme for Socio-economic Development o f Tatarstan Republic as follows:
We had a different taxation system and strong taxation benefits. We 
invested the money in infrastructure projects... Something that the 
federation should have dealt with, we did. We agreed that gradually 
Tatarstan would return to the common taxation system. Although if we were 
to lose benefits too quickly, it would make it uncertain how people vote at 
the next elections, and Tatarstan gives a lot of votes. Not only because of the 
size of our population, but because of an accurate turn up. That is why those 
votes were needed. So we agreed, that Tatarstan would turn to the common 
taxation regime, and Russia would return what we were to lose (Interview 
33, June 2007).
In 2004 in the address b the Kazan Soviet Resident Shaimiev described the 
process of bargaining as follows:
3 Putin was elected President o f  Russia on March 26 and inaugurated on May 7, 2000. Between December 
31, 1999 (date o f  Yeltsin’s resignation) and May 7, 2000 Putin was acting President.
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Before V. Putin was elected for the first term, we worked out the terms 
for Tatarstan to enter the Russia’s common legal framework. We had a 
serious discussion. The ultimate result of our discussion was as follows: 
is Tatarstan was to enter the Russia’s common legal and fiscal 
framework, a special federal programme for social and economic 
development of Tatarstan till 2006 needed to be adopted. If we had not 
had such a programme, and within the programme, the capital 
investment projects for Kazan Millennium, it would have been very 
difficult to accomplish the things that we are doing today. I am saying 
this to make sure that we all aware of the primary source of all our 
accomplishments. And we do achieve a lot especially in the capital city 
of the republic (President RT 2004a).
The Tatarstani President revealed that the funding received under the Special 
Federal Programme for the Socio-Economic Development o f Tatarstan Republic for  
2006 (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001a) of which the Special Federal Programme fo r the 
Preservation and Development o f Kazan Historic Centre (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c) was a 
part, was directly linked to Tatarstan re-entering the common political, legal and fiscal 
framework of the Russian Federation. The implication of this act was that Tatarstan had 
to pay more taxes to the federal centre. Hence the programme could be considered as 
‘compensation’ that the federal government offered Tatarstan to renounce its sovereignty 
claims made in the early 1990s.
6.3 Setting the organisational structure
On 14 March, 2001 the Russian Government adopted the Special Federal Programme fo r  
the Preservation and Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) (hereafter -  
the Programme). It became the backbone of several other development programmes and 
schemes introduced by the Russian, Tatarstani and Kazan authorities, all dedicated to the 
preparation for the Millennium that was scheduled for August 2005. The Programme 
stemmed from two ‘parent’ presidential decrees by the Russian and Tatarstani presidents.
The decrees justified the celebration of the Millennium by referring to Kazan’s 
history and economic significance. While the Russian President’s decree refers to “the 
historical and cultural importance of Kazan as one the largest political, scientific, 
industrial and cultural centre of Russia, which contributed significantly to the treasure -
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house of the world civilisation and the approaching in 2005 1000-year anniversary of the 
city” (President RF 1999). The Tatarstani President’s decree referred to
the results of the wide-scale scientific research on history of Kazan which 
were conducted by home and foreign researchers and the findings of the 
Academy of Science of the Republic of Tatarstan on the foundation of the 
city of Kazan, supported by the History Department of the Russian 
Academy of Science; special importance of the city of Kazan as the capital 
of the Tatarstan Republic and political, scientific, industrial and cultural 
centre (President RT 1999).
While the Russian President’s decree emphasised the role of Kazan as one o f  
Russia's urban centres, the Tatarstani President’s decree called attention to the history of 
Kazan, its capital status and the significance as a political, scientific, industrial and 
cultural centre, which represents two different visions of the position of Kazan on 
Russia’s mental map4. The State Commission fo r the Preparation fo r Celebrations o f the 
1000-year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f  Kazan {hereafter -  the Russian State 
Commission) was formed on 28 January 2000 by a resolution of the Russian Government 
(Pravitel'stvo RF 2000). The State Commission fo r  the Preparation for Celebrations o f 
the 1000-year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f  Kazan which was founded in Tatarstan 
(hereafter - the Tatarstani State commission) was formed on 13 March 2000 by a 
resolution of the Tatarstani Government (Kabinet Ministrov RT 2000).
The City of Kazan became involved in the decision making process after 
fundamental decisions were taken at higher political levels. On 4 September 1999 the 
Presidium of Kazan Soviet of People Deputies thereafter -  Kazan Soviet) passed a 
resolution On the Immediate Measures on the Preparations fo r  Celebrations o f the 1000- 
Year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan. The document referred to the presidential 
decrees adopted days earlier, replicated both passages which justified the Millennial 
celebrations in Kazan and founded the City commission for preparations for the
4 The Tatarstani President’s decree stated that the Cabinet o f  M inisters o f  the Tatarstan Republic by January 
1, 2000 had to “prepare and approve the programme o f  m easures on the preparation and holding the 
1000-year anniversary o f  the foundation o f  Kazan” (President RT, 1999). The Russian President’s decree 
in its turn stated that in August 2000 The Russian State C om m ission had to prepare and submit to the 
Government o f  the Russian Federation a draft o f  the Programme fo r  Preparations fo r  the Celebration, 
having defined projects for construction and reconstruction and volum es and sources o f  funding 
(President RF 1999).
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celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan {hereafter -  the City 
Commission). On 23 September 1999 on the Kazan Soviet passed a resolution On the 
Immediate Measures on the Preparations fo r  Celebrations o f the 1000-year Anniversary 
o f the Foundation o f Kazan. The resolution confirmed the foundation of the City 
commission and founded a special city administration Department fo r  the Preparation 
for Celebrations o f the 1000-year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan (hereafter -  
The City Department for Preparations). The Kazan Soviet bound the City administration 
to develop the concept of preparation for die Kazan Millennium including: the economic 
development strategy, the location scheme outlining areas where the celebration events 
would take place and the list of building projects and landscape improvements all to be 
approved after consultations with the public (KSND 1999).
Subsequently the Kazan Mayor Iskhakov finalised the organisational 
arrangements. On 26 June, 2000 the Special Department for Preparations was given the 
task of “the preparation and holding of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation o f 
Kazan; coordination and control of implementation of policies; organisational, legal and 
informational support of the state Commissions” (Glava Administratsii 2000c). On 18 
October 2000 the Mayor founded the City Special Fund “Kazan-1000” with the purpose 
of raising and spending funds of the federal, republican and city budgets; non-budget 
funds, funds of international organisations, twin cities, historic and other cities, judic ial 
persons of Russia and foreign countries directed to the preparation for celebrations” 
(Glava Administratsii 2000b).
The representation of different social groups in each commission (in percentage 
terms) reflects the balance of power in the society and the influence different groups 
exercise on policymaking process. As the Table 6.2 shows, government bureaucrats had 
an overwhelming majority in both Russian (80%) and Tatarstani (77.4%) State 
Commissions. The Kazan Commission was more ‘democratic’ with bureaucrats 
representing only 45.1% on the total number of members. The second largest group was 
formed by the representatives of academic and research institutions, media and cultural 
organisations. Business community was not represented either in the Russian or the 
Tatarstani State Commissions and formed one fifths of the City Commission only.
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Table 6.2. The representation structure of the three commissions for the 
preparations for celebration.
Members representing The Russian State 
Commission
The Tatarstani 
State Commission
The City 
Commission
1 Government organisations 20 (80%) 24 (77.4%) 14(45.1%)
2 Business community 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6(19.3%)
2) NGOs and local 
communities
0 (0%) 1 (3.2%) 4(13%)
4 Academic and research 
institutions, media, cultural 
organisations
5 (20%) 6 (19.4%) 7 (22.6%)
5 Total 25 (100%) 31 (100%) 31 (100%)
Source: compiled by the author using official government documents.
To summarise the first stage of preparation of the Programme (September -  
October 1999), the following organisational framework was established in order to 
coordinate works for preparation for Kazan Millennial preparations:
1) Commissions at three different administrative levels (national, republican and city);
2) The Organisational Committee at the city level (led by the Mayor Iskhakov);
3) The Special Department for preparation of the City administration (led by the 
Deputy Mayor Gusmanov);
4) The Special Fund “Kazan-1000” responsible for coordinating financial flows.
6.4 The Programme design
The previous section outlined the process of establishing the organisational structure of 
the Programme. The current section documents the process of the Programme planning 
and putting proposals for specific projects and sites together. The analysis of documents, 
statements and political rhetoric demonstrates how different actors used the process as a 
negotiating platform for pursuing their interests.
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The first meeting of the Russian State Commission took place on 22 March 2000 
in the Kazan Kremlin. President Putin as chairman delivered a speech where he expressed 
his admiration of Kazan and its uniqie history as a place where the Oriental and Western 
cultures closely intertwined. The President referred to the Islamic and Orthodox 
traditions, mentioned the Mosque and the Cathedral both being reconstructed in Kazan 
Kremlin in connection to the history peaceful coexistence of peoples of different ethnic 
and religious background. At the same time, Putin repeatedly addressed the issue of 
federalism and centre-periphery relations. Putin noted the role of the Treaty5 of 1994 
between Tatarstan and Russia in securing political stability both in the region and the 
relationship with Russia and noted that the modem policy of the federal centre must be 
consistent with previous policies. At the same time the President stated that:
The Russian Constitution has a norm about equality of all parts of the 
Federation. Gradually and incrementally we are pulling ourselves up to 
meet the requirements of the Constitution. This is not an easy task, but 
we have to solve it... It is important that regions, concentrating power in 
their hands could effectively solve state tasks, maintaining a single 
economic space of the country and securing stable economic growth.
That has been achieved in Tatarstan... Building a federation is a very 
demanding daily task. I think that we have all reasons to believe that we 
will be moving forward in that direction... The plans which we have 
outlined in relation to 1000-years anniversary of Kazan will be the best 
confirmation and the best proof of us acting in a right way (President of 
Russia 2000).
Only a small part of the speech was dedicated to celebration itself. The President 
stated that “the 1000-years anniversary of Kazan is an event of not only all-Russia but of 
the international scale. That is why our common task is to make the jubilee celebrations a 
bright and remarkable event that will be worthy of the great city of Kazan, the Tatarstan 
Republic and whole Russia” (ibid). This statement reveals the President’s vision of the 
Programme as a significant joint undertaking of the Tatarstani and the Russian authorities 
that could help both to work out the format of centre-periphery relationship and a 
‘proper’ model for Russia’s federalism.
3 The Treaty o f 1994 gave Tatarstan large fiscal autonomy.
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In 2000 the Mayor Iskhakov (Glava Administratsii 2000a) justified the need for 
Kazan’s centre redevelopment as follows. The Mayor described the archaeological 
findings which led a group of Russian and foreign scientists to new conclusions about 
Kazan’s age. According to Iskhakov, Kazan had 759 historical monuments and 4 
thousand buildings of historic value: “to preserve and revitalise the monuments, including 
those that had been lost, is one of the main tasks and approaches towards the preparation 
for celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan”. According to 
Iskhakov there were several reasons for the poor condition of many monuments. The first 
was associated with the twentieth century’s cataclysms: the Revolution and the WWII 
that brought thousands of the resettled residents to the city. The sscond reason was the 
construction of the hydro-electrical power station (1956), which had raised the water 
horizon and affected the building foundations in the lower parts of the historic centre. 
The third reason was that recourses were diverted from Kazan during the development of 
oil exploration in the republic and the construction of new petrochemical and automobile 
industries and new cities elsewhere which negatively affected investment in housing 
construction and maintenance in Kazan. Therefore celebrating the anniversary in such a 
shameful appearance was not appropriate.
Despite the fact that the current poor condition of Kazan’s heritage and 
infrastructure were predetermined by the historic circumstances largely external to the 
city, the Mayor stated that all citizens of Kazan were responsible for making their city 
ready for the Millennium. The Mayor explained that initiatives were brought up by 
anonymous Kazani families who allegedly were willing to donate up to a thousand hours 
of voluntary labour on the construction sites, in industries and on the streets of the city. 
“The image of a new Kazan is that of a city where every citizen is the master” -  declared 
the Mayor. The industries also allegedly came with their own initiatives: “oil, lorries, 
petrochemical products, grain, farming products would be used for the good of the capital 
of Tatarstan” - concluded Iskhakov (Glava Administratsii 2000a). That might sound as a 
paradoxical conclusion, but in fact, similar “public initiatives” were widely used by the 
Communist party organs to mobilise support for the fulfilment of development goals, 
especially those that required the input of extra labour (see Hough 1969, p. 130).
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It would be naive to expect that voluntary labour and donations of grain and 
trucks could solve the problems which had accumulated over decades of maintenance 
negligence and under-investment. That obviously was not the kind of funding anybody 
would expect to rely on to implement the grand plans to modernise the Kazan city centre. 
The main target must have been to receive a federal grant similar to that St. Petersburg 
had previously received for preparation of the city’s 300-years anniversary. The rhetoric 
of “voluntary labour” and “grain donations” were intended to create the impression of 
strong community support for the government initiatives and to urge the federal 
government to match ‘public initiatives’ with funding. The Mayor concluded that Kazan 
expected the federal centre to demonstrate a similar commitment as it had shown during 
the preparation to celebrations of St. Petersburg 300-years anniversary.
On 19 October, 2000 the Kazan Soviet passed a resolution on the Course o f  
Implementation o f the Immediate Measures on the Preparation fo r Celebrations o f the 
1000-year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan. The Deputy Mayor Gusmanov 
reported to the Kazan Soviet that the draft Programme fo r  the Preparation for the 1000- 
year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan had been “finalised with the indication of 
sites for construction and reconstruction; the size and source of funding” (KSND 2000). 
According to the document “the proposed measures give hope that the Jubilee... will help 
to revitalise many glorious traditions of the peoples residing on the territory of the city 
and the republic; to contribute to the subsequent strengthening of the inter-confessional 
and inter-ethnic relationship and to attract the attention o f  the global community” (Italic- 
N.K.).
The second meeting of the Russian State Commission was held on 19 January 
2001 in Moscow Kremlin. President Putin’s addressed the issue of the “ideology of 
celebrations”:
when celebrations are being discussed, it is meant to be not only some 
actions of superficial nature. It is desired that all measures that we are 
planning are focused not only on a visual effect -  even though it is 
important to create the atmosphere of celebration and according feelings 
among the people. But the most important thing is to achieve a different 
goal -  to make sure that the whole complex of policies that is being 
planned in that respect will form a serious socio-economic project. A
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project, aimed not only on preservation and reconstruction of the historic 
centre and monuments of architecture and history, but aimed on making 
the life of people more comfortable, more modern and making the living 
environment that as it has to be in the XXI century (President RF 2001).
The President once again suggested that during the preparation the mechanisms of 
collaboration between different tiers of authority and administration, including regional 
and federal levels can be worked out and “rolled smooth” (Italic -  N.K.). This is a 
significant comment as the federal government will use urban development projects in 
Kazan as a ‘testing site’ for administrative machinery again in 2009-20136. The President 
also stated that “it is iccessary to proceed to the stage of approval of a specific list of 
projects which we have focused in the first place (Italic -  N.K.). This is a significant 
comment as well because fess than five years before the celebration it was made clear 
that some projects had to be prioritised. The rest of the chapter will analyse what was the 
main rationale behind short-listing some projects and abandoning other.
On 3 March 2001 the Russian Government passed a resolution on the Programme 
for the Preparation fo r the 1000-year Anniversary o f  the Foundation o f Kazan. The 
textual part of the programme was as lengthy as three lines while the rest of the document 
was a list of events and development projects associated with celebrations of the 
Millennium. Those events embraced among other things the Rudolf Nureyev’s7 Ballet 
Festival, the Cultural days of Kazan in Japan, the all- Russia contest for dog trainers, the 
International Forum “Cultural heritage of Islamic cities”, the World hockey 
Championship and the photo exhibition on Kazan in Rio-de-Janeiro. The text of the 
programme also for the first time publicised a provisional list of sites of construction and 
reconstruction containing 54 projects divided in four groups:
1) 24 projects aimed at the preservation and reconstruction of the historic, 
cultural architectural and town planning art heritage;
2) 11 projects for traffic reliefin the historic centre;
6 According to Deputy Prime-Minister o f the Russian Federation Igor Schouvalov, the preparations for Student 
Olympics in Kazan in 2013 would allow the federal government to test the readiness o f the whole administrative 
machinery for holding the Winter Olympic in Sochi in 2014 (see Abdoullin 2010). Kazan hence has become a site 
where the federal government tests pilot projects which can be replicated in other Russia’s regions.
7 The famous ballet dancer Nureyev was ethic Tatar.
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3) 14 projects aimed at the modernisation and development of engineering 
infrastructure;
4) 7 projects aimed at the development of tourism, retail and communication 
services (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001b).
Eleven days later the Programme was adopted by the resolution of the Russian 
Government. The text of the Programme replicated the message of the presidential 
decrees and other political statements. According to the Programme, “celebrating the 
1000-year anniversary of the foundation of Kazan in 2005 is significant not only for all 
people living in the Russian Federation, but has a big international significance for 
preserving historical and cultural links between European and Asiatic peoples” 
(Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c, p. 7). The next step was made on 24 August 2001 the 
Programme was inserted into the Special federal programme for socio-economic 
development o f Tatarstan Republic for 2006 (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001a). Also a new 
programme was introduced: the City Complex Staged Programme fo r  Preparations for  
the Celebration for 2005, “to include a scheme of the zones of celebrations, a list of sites 
for construction, reconstruction and beautification and to be discussed with the public 
after the Federal targeted Programme is adopted” (KSND 2000).
As the result of the planning stage four main programmes have been adopted, 
which included the following:
1) The Programme for the Preparation fo r  the 1000-year Anniversary o f the 
Foundation o f Kazan (Resolution of the Russian Government No. 295 -p, 3 
March, 2001), of which the next programme in the list was “a mechanism of 
realisation”;
2) The Special Federal Programme fo r the Preservation and Development o f the 
Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) (Resolution of the Russian Government No. 
180, March 14, 2001), which was inserted in the next in the list programme as a 
“sub-programme”;
3) The Special Federal Programme fo r Social and Economic Development o f 
Tatarstan Republic fo r  2006 (Resolution of the Russian Government No 625, 
August 24, 2001);
4) The City Complex Staged Programme fo r  the Preparation for Celebrations in 
2005 (KSND, 2000), which embraced the first two in the list as an overarching 
programme as well as other programmes adopted on the city level.
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Although each programme was linked with the preparation to Kazan Millennial 
celebrations,8 only the Special Federal Programme fo r  the Preservation and 
Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) listed the development projects 
and allocated funding to urban development projects in Kazan (and hence was the main 
focus of the current research).
The adoption of more than one programme aimed at one task reflects the 
involvement of different government bodies into a complex multi-level policy making 
process. The federal government does not normally offer funding to cities directly9 that is 
why funding for urban development projects in Kazan was ‘inserted’ into a regional 
development programme. Kazan, as a ‘sovereign’ political entity with its own budgeting 
and planning powers, replicated the federal and regional policies through its own policy­
making mechanism. Such a complicated organisational scheme, on the one hand, could 
help to mobilise resources from state and non-state sources and channel them to specific 
issues in Kazan historic centre. On the other hand, the emergence of seventeen 
programmes out of one (that was initially announced) could lead to a dysfunctional and 
unaccountable managerial arrangement. Further analysis is needed to shed light on this 
complex issue.
The Programme’s goals and objectives
The main goal of the programme embraced three statements: “the restoration of the 
unique Eurasian culture-historical and architecture-planning heritage of the peoples 
inhabiting the Central European part of Russia; the modernisation of infrastructure of the
8 W hile the Programme (1) was designed to “ further strengthen the im age o f  Kazan on the international 
arena and, as a whole was aimed on adequate preparation for celebrations o f  the 1000-year anniversary o f  
foundation o f  Kazan” (KSND, 2005. p. 2); the Special Federal Programme (2) embraced construction 
projects dedicated to the Jubilee; the Special Federal Programme for Social and Econom ic Developm ent o f  
Tatarstan Republic (3) was a com prehensive programme o f  federal aid: and, finally, the City Complex 
Staged Programme (4) which integrated both the construction projects and promotional events. Later on, a 
fifth programme was introduced called “The improvement o f  living conditions o f  the population o f  Kazan” 
(5) which embraced several other programmes which were being im plem ented in Kazan. Altogether the 
total number o f  programmes associated with preparations for the celebration reached 17 (K SN D  2005?).
9 Exceptions are ‘closed’ towns where military bases and military related industries are based (see a study 
by Shvetsov 2002)
187
Chapter 6 Case study 2
city’s historical centre for its preservation and functioning; development of inter-regional 
and international historical, cultural and business links between European and Asian 
peoples” (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c, p. 3). The goals were to be accomplished through a set 
of tasks including the following:
• to provide for preservation and efficient use of historical, cultural,
architectural and town planning art heritage; to restore the most valuable
monuments of history and culture;
• to restore the housing stock in the historical centre;
• to mitigate negative impact of industrial enterprises and communal facilities
on the natural environment;
• to relieve the traffic load on the historic centre, and achieve more equal 
distribution of transport flows; to improve transport links between the areas of 
residential development, to redistribute transport flows to bypass the historic 
centre; to create modem transport infrastructure;
• to provide for flood defence and reliable supply of the historic centre with 
water, electricity and heat;
• to improve the sanitary-epidemiologic situation and solve the problem of 
waste utilisation;
• to provide for urban amenities in the historic centre in order to create 
comfortable conditions for living and recreation for city’s residents and 
visitors and enhancing the attractiveness of the image of the city as a whole;
• to improve the quality of life and culture of the historic centre residents;
• to strengthen the city’s tax base; to secure the supply of a wide range of 
locally produced goods and services for the city’s residents and visitors;
• to improve the level of retail and tourist services;
• to create new jobs.
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The Programme tasks were grouped into five major sections including the following 1) 
the preservation and restoration of historical, cultural, architectural and town building art 
heritage; 2) transport relief for the historic centre; 3) the modernisation of the city’s 
engineering infrastructures; 4) improvement of recreational areas and landscapes; 5) 
strengthening the city’s tax base through the development of inter-regional and 
international business and trade links, development of tourism and investment projects 
(Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c pp. 3-4). The first section was the most important and was 
supposed to contribute to the preservation of Kazan heritage which was a creation of
many generations of Eastern and European architects... in terms of the 
number, diversity and quality of monuments of history, culture, architecture 
and urbanism art Kazan is one of the most recognised world historical 
centres... The Kazan Kremlin in 2000 was listed as the UNESCO heritage 
site and is a unique historical and cultural complex where the following 
structures are located: Blagoveschensky Cathedral (1562), some buildings of 
the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Monastery (1596), the Khan’s Palace, the 
Muraleva Mosque, the Suumbeki Tower, and the Bogoyavlenskaya Church 
(Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c, p. 8)10.
The parts of the Programme dedicated to the problems of the housing stock in the 
historic centre echoed the speech delivered by Iskhavov at the first meeting of the State 
Commission and also blamed the external factors for the poor state of housing. According 
to the Programme, since 1996 18,446 families had already been re-housed from the 
slums, but 18,077 were still waiting for new accommodation while living in sub-standard 
accommodation. The quality of public services, including the public transport, the 
heating, water, gas and electrical supply and sewage lines was described as appalling too. 
Practically all urban utility systems were worn out and acted carried loads above the 
capacity. The programme also addressed current problems in the retail industry (needed 
to be “civilised”), the tourism sector (the need to achieve “international industry 
standards”), external transport (envisaged the modernisation of the airport and the river
10 Neither the Khan’s Palace nor the Muraleva M osque were “ located in the Kremlin” -  there were only 
som e remains o f  foundations which were thought to belong to those legendary buildings. The Suumbeki 
Tower was worshiped by some Tatars as the last standing structure o f  the Kazan Khanate, but, in fact, it 
was built by the Russians long after the old Tatar Kremlin had been ruined.
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port), the task of “supplying the city residents and guests with a wide range of locally 
produced gpods” was also mentioned (Pravitel’stvo RF 2001c, pp. 10-11).
Selection o f projects
The Programme enlisted 131 separate projects: 82 focused on heritage protection, 6 on 
transport infrastructure, 8 - on community facilities, 3 - on landscape and recreation 
amenities, and 32- on tourist and business development. The anticipated results included 
the restoration of the historical, cultural and architectural heritage of Kazan’s historical 
centre on 13 sites; construction of a metro line and 30 km of new and inproved ring and 
radial roads; improvements in the quality of life for the residents of the historical centre; 
restoration of the ecological balance; turning Kazan into an inter-regional business and 
tourist centre; and the creation of 15,000 new jobs {ibid, p. 5). All projects were to be 
completed by the Millennium celebration in August 2005.
The interviewees almost unanimously agreed that large urban development 
projects were an appropriate way of addressing the problems and preparing the city for 
the celebrations. As the Chief architect of a state-owned design institute stated:
What else could have the preparations for celebration of Kazan 1000-year 
anniversary been expressed by, if not by the improvement of the city 
image? Quite naturally, it was expresses in important for the residents and 
guests urban development projects... Our impressions of a capital city are 
always linked to some bright, interesting architectural projects, therefore 
preparation for the celebration was naturally associated with construction 
of image-orientated projects, which also happened because of the 
attraction of huge development funding...
At the same time, the same expert added that
There was a contradiction... The preparations for celebration of Kazan 
1000-year anniversary did not do enough to emphasise the historical 
development of Kazan and focused instead on building the image of a 
future Kazan. ...generally the 1000-year anniversary was used as a pretext 
to modernise the city (Interview 3, 2008).
The modernisation of the city was perceived in a very peculiar way. According to 
the Director of a government-owned company the selection of projects was informed by
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the Mayor’s understanding of the role of Kazan as the capital city and the role of 
development projects with a visual impact in strengthening this role:
Why was the construction of the Metro selected as the preferred option to 
solve the traffic problem? Because all projects in Kazan were image 
projects... They emphasised the status of the city, hence the status of the 
Mayor, because the Mayor was the master... They did not emphasise the 
status of the city residents... The image of the capital was not seen as 
based on the quality of education, culture, the openness of the city, the 
ability to improve the built environment... The ambitions o f particular 
people decided everything. (Interview 11, January 2008).
These responses depict the rationale behind choosing projects: the main motivation of the 
Mayor was to complete those projects that could contribute to a new image of the city 
and apparently the image of the Mayor himself and his power.
Funding
The Programme was planned to have four sources of funding including federal (30.42%), 
republican (30.58%) and city (9.36%) budgets, and an off-budget source through private 
investments and credits (29.64%). The total projected budget was as high as 64.93 billion 
roubles (approximately $US 2.19 billion). The structure of funding (by sources) as it was 
envisaged by the programme document is shown in the Table 6.3. As the table 
demonstrates, over 70% of all funding were expected to be received from the state 
sources and only 10.60% from enterprises (including controlled by the state). The federal 
and republican budgets shared the expenses in equal proportion (over 30% each) while 
the city budget was expected to contribute over 9% of the expenses. The funding 
arrangements demonstrated that the Programme relied heavily of government funding 
provided mostly from the external to the city sources. The funds from the federal and the 
republican budgets plus foreign credits were intended to contribute up to 76%, taking into 
account credit from commercial banks and enterprises registered outside Kazan this 
figure would be even higher.
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Table 6.3. Structure of the Programme total funding
Source of funding In RU billion In percentage
1. Federal budget, including 19.75 30.42%
• Direct transfers 7.75
• Credit guarantees 12.0
2. Tatarstan republic budget 19.85 30.58%
3. Kazan city budget 6.08 9.36%
4. Funds of enterprises and organisations 6.88 10.60%
5. Credits from commercial banks 2.64 4.06%
6. Foreign credits 9.73 14.98%
Total 64.93 100%
Source: The Federal Programme (2001).
6.5 Implementation
This section analyses the Programme implementation. The analysis of the Programme 
delivery steps is based on official documents, internal reports and the media coverage. The 
analysis demonstrates how a profound mismatch developed between what was planned and 
what was achieved over the course of the Programme implementation. The socially 
significant components were cut back, while visually prominent and symbolically 
important projects were pushed forward.
6.5.1 Delivery steps
During 2001 and 2002 the major efforts were paid to the preparation of the blue-prints and 
obtaining planning and building permissions, setting up the organisation structure and 
establishing links between various institutional players. Only a few practical steps were 
taken on the ground. While the politicians’ statements were saturated with an egalitarian 
rhetoric, the actual achievements pointed to the contrary.
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A week after the Federal Programme was adopted on 14 March 2001 the first 
meeting of The Tatarstani State Commission was held in the Kazani Kremlin on 22 March 
2001. The Tatarstani President Shaimiev who chaired the meeting stated that:
the whole Republic is getting involved in the preparation process; all 
financial resources are being mobilised including the city budget and other 
sources of funding. The republic also relies on credits secured by the 
Russian government... We have a unique opportunity to restore Kazan, to 
learn how to build quickly and nicely, to make sure finally that people in 
the capital of Tatarstan feel comfortable (Tatnews 2001).
On 6 February 2002 at the third meeting of the Russian State Commission 
President Putin pointed out that all the necessary programme documents had been 
adopted and the main responsibilities moved down to the local level. Once again the 
President emphasised that the preparations first of all had to serve people’s interests: 
“behind the Jubilee we should not forget about the social wellbeing of people, about new 
housing and social services. In the course of the events people must feel a real difference 
in their lives” (President RF 2002b). Later that year Putin once again assured that:
The goal of celebrations is not simply to have a bright commemoration of 
the jubilee and have fun. We are facing a serious and multi-faceted socio­
economic task. The task oriented on qualitative progress of the whole 
urban environment of Kazan, on the restoration of historical and cultural 
monuments, and ultimately on the formation of decent, more comfortable 
conditions for life and work for people”. The President also pointed out 
that “the development of city infrastructure, strengthening of interregional 
and international links -  all works directly towards investment 
attractiveness, improving business environment and enlargement of the 
cultural space.
Nevertheless, right from its start the implementation of the Programme deviated 
from the plan. The delivery process chronically lagged behind the schedule due to the 
interruptions in funds transfers. For example, a regional newspaper reported in October 
2001, that 250 million roubles were transferred from the centre and stuck on the city’s 
accounts like “dead weight” because the blue-prints for the construction were not ready 
(Izvestiya Tatarstan 2001). In April 2002 the Deputy Mayor announced that the
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reconstruction was going slower than expected and that the deadlines could be missed 
(Pahomova, 2002). While the total budget was as high as 64.93 billion roubles, by May 
2004 (after 37 month of programme implementation and 15 months before the 
completion) only 14 billion roubles, or 21% of what was planned has been has been 
materialised (Kommersant, 2004). In the end of June 2005 (or two months before its 
completion) the deputy head reported at the session of the Kazan Soviet of People’s 
Deputies that the Programme received only half of the expected funding (Intertat 2005).
The Administration of Kazan City delivered a series of reports on preparations for 
the celebration to the Kazan Soviet. The Administration’s internal reports were never 
published, only the resolutions of the Kazan Soviet were. Only one out of five resolutions 
was dedicated specifically to the evaluation of the Programme, the rest referred to 
“preparations for the celebration”. Analysis of the resolutions shows how the 
administration systematically slipped from a consistent and honest evaluation.
On 1 March 2002 The Kazan Soviet reported on the progress in preparation for 
Kazan Millennium from September 1999 to March 2002. The resolution acknowledged 
that during the period 2 years and 6 months “considerable preliminary work has been 
done and necessary conditions were created for drawing residents of Kazan and labour 
teams from other districts and cities of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in 
celebrating the jubilee of Kazan by doing concrete deeds and labour presents” (KSND 
2002). The Mayor Iskhakov reported on some aspects of the city economic development, 
although largely irrelevant to the topic of the resolution:
during the preparation to the 1000-anniversary the city acquired 
international recognition, became a full member of ten international 
organisations; Kazan attracted attention of such organisations as the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation of “Islam 
Conference”, UNESCO, the International Centre for Research in History,
Culture and Art of Islam, the European Association of Historical Cities, 
the Organisation of World Heritage Cities under the aegis of which many 
events dedicated to the 1000-years anniversary of the foundation of Kazan 
{ibid).
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The Mayor continued that “one billion roubles was allocated from the federal budget and 
was “assimilated”. The 9.1 million dollars credit was obtained from the World Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development; 3.9 billion roubles were received from the Tatarstan 
Republic budget. The works were conducted on the reconstruction of the Kazan Kremlin 
and the Kazan State University; on construction of the smaller and the larger Ring roads, 
radial roads, the Metro; on the liquidation of the dilapidated housing stock; the 
reconstruction of the objects of culture, architecture of the historic centre (ibid). The 
progress was reported in very general terms, lacking details on a number of specific sites 
where construction works were conducted.
By the autumn of the year 2003 it became apparent that the Programme was 
running behind the timetable. At the forth meeting of the Russian State Commission held 
on 12 September 2003 the Russian Deputy Prime-Minister Kudrin stated that despite all 
efforts being made by the local authorities, not all projects assigned for completion would 
be finished by the Jubilee. The reason for this was given as inadequate funding, including 
funding from the federal centre. Nevertheless, it was asserted that everything that had 
been planned would be completed, if not by the Jubilee, a little later (Intertat.ru 2003).
The next report on the Course o f Preparations for the Celebration o f the 1000- 
year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan was delivered by the head of the Special 
Department to the Kazan Soviet on 26 December 2003. It sounded even more pitiful than 
the Head’s report delivered in March 2002. A two-page document contains three lines on 
the progress of the Special Federal Programme:
in the course of the implementation of the Programme for preservation and 
development of Kazan historic centre works were conducted on the most 
important Kazan sites of construction and reconstruction for the Jubilee of 
the city (KSND 2003).
The rest of the document contained data on industrial output, housing 
construction, wages, collected taxes as if all these activities were not part of government 
everyday management routine but special events dedicated to the preparation cf the 
Jubilee. The document specifically reported on the events aimed at “the promotion of the 
international image of Kazan” - the World Congress of the Tatars, the International
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theatrical festival of Turk countries, Kazan’s Jubilee being enlisted as a UNESCO date of 
commemoration, establishing of the World Heritage City Organisation branch office in 
Kazan; and arrangements for the jubilee media coverage and other events, altogether 49 
events, including 23 international ones. The composition of the report and the 
corresponding organisational structure served well the goal of concealing the real 
progress of the Programme by reporting on things of marginal significance or relevance, 
for example housing construction at the city edge.
The next report on the Course of preparations for celebration of the 1000-year 
anniversary of the foundation of Kazan was delivered to the Kazan Soviet on 30 March 
2005. The report had a very similar structure to the previous report that was delivered 15 
months previously. A two-page document contained three lines on the Programme 
implementation which copied word by word the previous report statement:
in the course of the implementation of the Programme for preservation and 
development of Kazan historic centre works were conducted on the most 
important Kazan sites of construction and reconstruction for the jubilee of 
the city (KSND 2005e, p. 1).
The rest of the document described the general economic performance of Kazan (largely 
irrelevart to the topic); commented on the implementation of other programmes and 
numerous international events ‘the holding of which contributed to strengthening of the 
image of the Tatarstan Republic and the city o f Kazan on the international arena and 
worked on international recognition of the 1000-year anniversary of Kazan” (KSND 
2005e, p. 2).
On 30 June 2005 the Kazan Soviet passed three resolutions in relation to the 
Jubilee celebrations. Each of them was a two-page document summarising achievements 
of the preparation process. The main programme of the Millennial celebrations -  the 
Programme did not deserve a separate evaluation and was reported on in few lines 
between paragraphs dedicated to housing construction and ballet festivals. Full figures on 
the programme financial evaluation have never been published, which is why we have to 
rely on what was available through alternative sources. One resolution reported on the 
deeds of Kazan’s townspeople and labour collectives dedicated to the preparation to
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celebrations. For instance, the pupils collected 78 tonnes of recyclable paper worth 50 
thousand roubles; the school No. 122 rather mysteriously managed to donate 180 
thousand roubles; the local food supermarket chain promised to plant 1,000 trees and 
donate 1,000 balls to sports schools (KSND 2005b). The second resolution summarised 
progress in preparation for the celebrations according to the Programme for Preparations 
fo r the 1000-year Anniversary o f the Foundation o f Kazan. It was reported that out of 114 
events envisaged by the programme 101 have been held, including 39 international and 
36 for all of Russia. Those included two international opera, ballet and music festivals; an 
international conference of the World Heritage Cities organisation; a regional UNESCO 
seminar and other events which all facilitated “the effective development of the city of 
Kazan; further improvement of the image of Kazan on the international arena, and as a 
whole were aimed at adequate preparations for the celebration of the 1000-year 
anniversary of the foundation of Kazan” (KSND 2005d). The third resolution was 
focused on the Complex Programme fo r Preparation fo r  Celebrations o f the 1000-year 
Anniversary o f Foundation o f Kazan. As was discussed earlier, the complex programme 
was a shell housing five other programmes associated with the Jubilee and, the most 
importantly, the Programme. As usual, much of the resolution was dedicated to events 
aimed at “the strengthening the image of Kazan on the international arena” (KSND, 
2005c) as opposed to reconstruction and construction projects in Kazan historic centre. 
According to the resolution:
As a whole, the implementation of the Complex Programme fo r  
Preparation for Celebrations o f the 1000-year Anniversary o f Foundation 
o f Kazan contributed to the improved living conditions and the quality of 
life of Kazan townspeople; to the improved image of Kazan on the 
international arena; and worked for effective development of our city. At 
the same time one of the sections of the Complex Programme -  the 
Special Federal Programme for  “Preservation and Development o f the 
Historic Centre o f Kazan" remains unrealised by 49.6% and requires 
additional measures (KSND 2005c).
As the report clearly indicated, the Programme received only half of the 
anticipated funding, which means even less in terms of implemented projects taking into 
account the inflation and appreciation of construction materials and labour. In order to 
smooth the bad impression that the drawbacks might have caused, the Programme was
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presented as “one section” of the Complex Programme fo r  Preparation -  a shelHike 
arrangement of the City Administration which contained policies with various aims, 
deadlines and sources of funding all associated with the preparation for the Millennium. 
This arrangement could become a useful tool of misleading the public opinion and 
creating a false impression of accomplishment. While the core programme was not 
performing well, non-specialists could not detect the problem because the drawbacks 
were camouflaged by other policies all merged together in one programme.
From what was available from the official sources it is discernable that “from the 
beginning the Programme has been financed up to 32.52 billion roubles which makes up 
50.4% of what was envisaged by the programme” (KSND 2005c, p. 1). Out of the total 
funding actually received (32.52 billion roubles) 7.1 billion roubles or 35.9% of what was 
initially excepted came from the federal budget; 18.07 billion roubles or 91% of what 
was initially expected came fromTatarstan Republic’s budget; and 7.51 billion roubles or 
39% of what was initially expected came from off-budget sources, including credits and 
the participation of enterprises (including those controlled by the state). The data is 
summarised in the Table 6.4.
Despite the fact that the resolutions by the Soviet and the Mayor claimed “to take 
steps to attract non-budget funds to finance policies on preparation for the celebration of 
the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; to support and develop initiatives of 
the citizens and labour collectives” (Glava Administratsii 2003) the commitment of the 
non-state sector was very weak. So-called “off-budget sources” formed 17.6% of the 
Programme’s 2004 budget. The contributions from non-state sector were even lower, as 
the “non-budget sources” included government borrowings from banks. The Tatarstani 
authorities encouraged the government controlled industries to participate in the 
Programme. The largest local distillery JSC Tatspirtprom’ picked up the 2 billion 
roubles bill for the construction of the International Horse Racing Complex and the 
largest Tatarstani oil company OAO ‘Tatneft’ contributed 570 million roubles to the 
construction of a large housing estate (Figure 5) built to accommodate the Jdbilee’s VIP 
guests (Choudodeyev 2005, p. 21). Officially these generous activities were described as
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“business social responsibility” but practically they were compulsory donations arranged 
by the authorities.
Table 6.4 The financial evaluation of the Programme
Funds by sources Envisaged -  A Obtained - B
in RU 
billions
Share 
of the 
total
in RU 
billions
Share 
of the 
total
B/A (%)
1. Federal Budget, including
• Direct transfers
• Credit Guarantees
19.75
7.75
12.0
30.42 7.1 21.83 35.95
2. Tatarstan Republic Budget 19.85 30.58 18.07 55.57 91.03
3. Kazan City Budget 6.08 9.36 ? 7 n/a
4. Funds of enterprises and 
organisations
6.88 10.60 7.51 23.09 39.01
5. Credits from commercial banks 2.64 4.06
6. Foreign credits 9.73 14.98
Total 64.93 100 32.52 100 50.08
Source: Compiled by the author using various sources.
6.5.2 Progress on project sites
Constant delays with funding, preparing the blueprints and obtaining approvals and 
permissions had a significant effect on holding back effect the overall Programme 
delivery. Part of the problem was the poor coordination between the administrative tiers. 
For example, the Russian Minister of Finance explained that the delays in financing were 
partly caused by the fact that “the papers sat for a long time in the federal government 
office despite the fact they had been approved” (Tatarstan Republic 2004). The Deputy 
Mayor of Kazan blamed the insufficient institutional capacity that caused delays in the
199
Chapter 6 Case study 2
preparation of plans which had a slowing-down effect on the design review process and 
as a result affected the payment schedule:
In some cases projects did not have blue-prints complete, in other cases 
blue-prints were complete but were not approved by the planning 
authorities. As a result the Russian Treasury withheld cash transfers to the 
local authorities (Vechernyaya Kazan’ 2002).
This shows that delays in funding and design had a mutually aggravating effect. The 
implementation of some projects suffered from the lack of technical expertise. For 
instance, the contractors for the Metro received a new technical brief on electrical 
equipment just four months before the construction final deadline. For 15 months prior to 
that, construction works had been conducted according to the old brief which turned to be 
incorrect (Aksenov 2005). While the funds from budget sources were coming in more or 
less timely, foreign borrowings were hindered by the decision of the Russian government 
not to accept financial liabilities of municipalities. As Mayor Iskhakov acknowledged, 
out of 12 billion roubles that were expected earlier to receive in a form of credits the city 
managed to obtain only 4 billion roubles (Rossiyskaya Gazyeta 2004).
Eventually it became clear that only a fraction of what was planned could be 
realistically achieved by August 2005. In September 2003 it was announced that the 
problem was going to be solved by a substantial reduction in the number of projects to be 
supported (Korneyeva 2004). The local press reported that the Administration of the City 
decided to exclude 50 projects from the list, but add 26 new projects - making the new 
total of 106 instead of 131 (Tihonov 2003). In 2004 the Federal Audit Office reported 
that “due to insufficient funding the construction and restoration of 48 projects listed in 
the Programme had not been initiated, in 2002 there were no construction works on 62 
sites and in 2003 this increased to 131 sites” (Schyetnaya Palata RF 2005).
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Figure 5. The housing estate built to accommodate the Jubilee’s VIP guests. Photo: N. 
Kinossian
Figure 6. The State Pension Fund Offices in Kazan city centre. Photo: N. Kinossian 
(2007).
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According to one of the few official documents available on the Programme evaluation, 
by the end of June 2005 (or two months before the Jubilee) eight projects were listed as 
completed" and twenty one as to be finished12, which makes the total of 29. In July 2005 
the Minister for Construction, Architecture and the Communal Services announced that 
by the end of August main projects 51 in number would be definitely completed. Among 
those were the City Hall, the Opera and Ballet Theatre, the Horse Racing Complex, the 
Ice Rink, the Local train station and the new bridge across Kazanka River. Also 200 
facades would be painted (half of them along the so called “guests’ routs”13 and the 
obvious disgrace would be simply demolished, totally 500 structures (including 100 in 
the centre) (Leskova, 2005). The official web site for the Millennium Celebration listed 
41 projects to be completed before the celebration, of which over 20 were finalised. 
Among the completed projects were 5 metro stations on a 7 km long line at a cost of 14.3 
billion roubles (about $US 482 million), the Horse Racing Complex, the Ice Rink, and an 
up-scale housing development for the VIP guests attending the celebration. None of those 
projects had anything to do with heritage restoration.
The local expert who worked at the time of the implementation of the Programme 
in the Ministry for Construction of the Republic of Tatarstan interpreted the situation as 
follows:
As it often happens with state-funded development programme, in the 
beginning the budget was not clearly set up and people tried to squeeze in 
as many projects as possible... When the budget was finalised, it became 
clear that the list of the projects had to be revised and priorities changed 
during the course of the Programme... Some projects required larger 
budgets than it was originally expected, hence the number of projects had 
to be reduced. Another question was how was the original list revised and 
who established the priorities... (Interview 3, January 2007).
11 Am ong them the K a/an State University (the East w ing. W est sem i-circle building and engineering  
infrastructure); the Gubernatorial Palace; the Youth Theatre (first stage); the Basket-Hall; the Central 
market; Reconstructed 2 .4 1 2 .2  thousand sq m o f  roads; Built 1.5 km o f  roads o f  the Smaller Ring; Built 
3.65 km o f  roads o f  the Larger Ring and other (K SN D . 2 0 0 5 d ).
12 Am ong them; the first K a/an M etro line; a bridge across the River Kazanka; the Ensem ble o f  Kazan 
Kremlin; Kazan Rathaus; the Opera and Ballet Theatre; the Com plex o f  the city Duma; the Marjani 
Mosque; the Peter and Paul Cathedral; the A lexander Passage; the local trains terminal; the hotel Soviet 
and other (K SN D . 2005d ).
13 The expression " guest routs" is com m only used in Kazan to describe major city transport arteries used by VIP guests 
such as the rout from the airport to the Presidential Palace for example.
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Figure 7. Moskovskaya Street in Kazan city centre did not receive initially 
anticipated investment. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
Figure 8. Hotel Kazan in Kazan city centre did not receive mitia 
anticipated investment. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
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Despite the fact that the Programme was the largest public investment in Kazan urban 
development during the post-socialist period it was never formally evaluated which 
appeared to be a very common practice in Kazan (Interview 3, June 2007). The empirical 
study has revealed that what was actually achieved only partially met the initial goals of 
the Programme. The total number of projects represented only a fraction of the originally 
adopted list. The overall construction cost spent on the sites was about a half of what was 
planned. In many ways the Programme deviated from the original focus on the 
preservation of the Kazan historic centre.
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6.6 Analysis and discussion
Following the analytical framework developed in the literature review chapter this 
section will discuss the organisation, funding arrangements, spatial choices and the 
rationale behind the large development projects implemented as a part of the preparation 
for Kazan’s Millennium celebrations in 2005.
6.6.1 Organisation structure and funding arrangements
The Programme was not the first occasion when Kazan attracted external funding for 
urban development projects. In previous years the city successfully attracted two smaller 
EBRD loans for urban infrastructure development1. Although the Programme secured 
much larger funding, it was designed in line with the socialist tradition of government- led 
urban development. The budget funding was guaranteed and the government also secured 
the contribution of the state-controlled industries. The structure of funding inevitably 
influenced the type and selection of projects.
According to a senior planner in the Kazan-based design institute, the very 
mechanism of government funding required a tangible, manageable and easily verifiable 
set of tasks. Construction projects were ideal for that purpose as every line represented a 
concrete project which the Moscow authorities could easily single out and control in 
terms of budgeting and schedule (Interview 29, 2007). Once the budget funding was 
secured, the government officials who were in charge of the Programme design and 
implementation did not have to think about commercial feasibility of the projects and the 
need to meet the requirements of investment returns. With the emphasis on government 
funding, where economic feasibility was not an issue, the authorities failed to create 
conditions for businesses to invest and failed to use the government-led projects as 
triggers of business-led growth. The chief architect of a state-owned design institute 
commented on the impact of the Programme on private investment as follows:
1 One loan to fund modem infrastructure cm a site previously occupied by dilapidated housing for its commercial re­
use. The second loan was used to modernise municipal heating facilities using energy efficient equipment. According 
to the requirements o f the Bank both projects were commercially viable and returns were expected. Nevertheless the 
size o f the loans (10 and 9 million US dollars respectively) was small as compared to the public investment into 
urban development projects.
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Investors demonstrated interest, but there were no examples of significant 
investment in Kazan made... Many opportunities were lost because the 
city authorities demanded too much from the investors. Not everybody 
would meet high demands also the rules of the game are not clear... 
(Interview 3, 2007).
Even if the non-government sector was involved in project implementation, the 
authorities used the well-proven socialist practice of making big enterprises responsible 
for the implementation of large urban development projects. As a senior staff member of 
the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation revealed during interview:
Authorities in Tatarstan are very proud of the practice of using the private 
money to build public projects. This is a merge of public and private 
sector... They think why to make state^controlled enterprises pay more 
taxes when they could be asked to invest in something instead. Then it 
becomes unclear who controls what assets; the unpredictable demands (to 
support public projects -  N.K.) make it difficult for the enterprises to do 
financial planning and creates an additional fiscal load. It creates a 
negative incentive for foreign investors who hesitate to invest in 
enterprises that are the pressure of uncertainty. But on the other side, state- 
controlled enterprises will always get some protection from the 
authorities... Tatarstan is the region of state-capital ism, it may have 
enough internal resources to achieve growth, and if the economy generates 
enough investment, why to attract external sources of funding? (Interview 
10, 2007).
As a result of a lack of financial planning, large “landmark” projects turned into 
loss-making enterprises. For instance, the construction of the International Horse Racing 
Complex was funded by the Tatarstani government’s controlled distillery JSC 
‘Tatspirtprom’ and remained on its balance sheets as a daughter company. One of the 
senior managers at the local distillery JSC ‘Tataspirtprom” described the Horse Racing 
Track as a “very expensive toy” not generating any profit (Interview 30, 2006).
The construction of the Ice Rink was funded by the Bank Zenith which belonged 
to the holding company OAO ‘Tatneft” controlled by the Tatarstani government. During 
the Millennium celebrations of 2005 the Rink was one of the main venues but later it 
failed to generate cash flow sufficient to cover even the operational cost. A management
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company JSC ‘LDS-1000’, also a part of the “Tatneft” holding, was established to 
operate the Ice Rink. The official annual reports of the JSC “LDS-1000” (the 
management company of the Ice Rink) repeatedly posted substantial annual losses made 
by the enterprise (JSC “LDS-1000” 2009; 2008; 2007; 2006). The financial results of the 
first year of operation revealed dead loss of 35.38 million Russian roubles (approx. 1.24 
million USD) (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006). According to the annual report (2006), the JSC 
“LDS-1000” collected most of the revenues (up to 75%) from Bank Zenith and the 
Hockey club “Ak Bars” both of which were subsidiary companies of the holding 
company “Tatneft” that owns JSC “LDS-1000” as well. That means that most of costs 
were covered by the folding company “Tatneft” although paid through its subsidiaries. 
The revenues from advertising, ticket sales and commercial leases could only partially 
cover the annual operational cost of the Ice Rink that was as high as 138.66 million 
Russian roubles (approx 5.14 million USD). According to the Annual report, poor 
economic performance was due to low ticket sales which led to the cancellation of all 
events:
At the moment Kazan was oversaturated with entertainment events. Other 
venues with 1,000-1,500 seat capacity only managed to fill on average 40- 
50% of the seats. Under these circumstances it was unfeasible to hold any 
events in the Ice Rink (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006, p. 4).
As a result, the second year (2006) turned out to be vorse with a loss of 76 million 
Russian roubles (approx. 2.81 million USD) (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006, p. 2). In 2007 the 
financial results improved with 48.28 million Roubles (approx. 1.86 million UDS) in loss 
(JSC “LDS-1000” 2008, p. 12). While the ticket sales continued to be weak, the 
operational costs went up, especially the cost of energy, water, telecommunication 
services, the staff payroll and land taxes (JSC “LDS-1000” 2008, p. 12). The results for 
2008 worsened again with 53.72 million Russian roubles (approx. 2.26 million USD) in 
losses (JSC “LDS-1000” 2009, p. 9). The situation with expenditures and revenues 
persisted. According to the annual report (2008) the cost of municipal services (heat 
supply, sewage disposal) and well as the cost of energy went up and monopolies did not 
negotiate the growth of tariffs. As the Ice Rink continued to physically expand, all 
running costs increased as well as did fiscal obligations and the payroll (JSC “LDS-1000” 
2009, p. 9). In order to cover short-term cash shortage flow the JSC “LDS-1000” had to
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borrow 30 million Russian roubles from the parent company the holding Tatneft at a soft 
rate of 0.01% and 15 million Russian roubles from the government agency “Tatgossnab” 
at 0.00%. The JSC “LDS-1000” also had financial liabilities up to 15 million Russian 
roubles to various contractors, including cleaning and building companies (ibid, p. 10).
The strong role of the government in planning and implementing urban 
development projects facilitated the formation of the urban governance model that had 
very limited interest in economic feasibility of projects. The authorities prioritised the 
material aspects of urban development: the attraction of funding, implementation and the 
celebration of achievements (expressed in visual form), but ignored other important 
aspects, such as long-term economic sustainability, environmental impact, the impact on 
other services and transport systems.
The implementation of the Programme was also affected by fraud and corruption. 
The local TV news channel reported that out of 10,000 fraud crimes recorded in the 
republic during the past 11 months the majority was related to the preparations for the 
Millennium. According to the channel “more than 2 billion roubles were misspent. The 
management of “Kazmetrostroy” (the government contractor for the construction of 
Kazan Metro -  N.K.) and Central Stadium as well as some members of staff of district 
administrations were caught red-handed... Generally the wrongdoings were linked to 
theft, procurement fraud and unlawful transfer of funds to private accounts” (TK “Efir” 
2005). As much as 400 million roubles2 received from the federal budget as a part of the 
preparation for Millennium funding simply disappeared after a group of private 
contractors had received advance payments and run away (Mel’nik 2007). The Head of 
the Capital Construction and Reconstruction Department of Kazan Administration was 
the only city official who actually faced criminal prosecution. On one count the defendant 
was accused of authorising the artificially inflated procurement bill. On another count he 
allegedly accepted half a million rouble “kickback” for authorising the procurement of 
lifts for the Central Stadium VIP suit that the president Putin would use while in Kazan 
(Mel'nik, 2006). Despite numerous allegations, only a few episodes were investigated by 
the Prosecutor’s office. During an interview, one local expert revealed that:
2 Approximately 8 million British pounds.
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The authorities would adopt dozens and hundreds of plans... but the 
reasons why they fail would not be properly scrutinised, because that 
would require naming people in charge, investigating where the funds 
were spent and this could spoil life of certain people (Interview 3, January
2007).
This illustrates a typical situation when authorities in Russia often enjoy immunity from 
investigation and prosecution and only rarely civil servants become prosecuted.
6.6.2 Rationale behind the projects
During interviews it appeared more than once, that the cost of publicly funded projects 
would be justified by their social significance and the need to make an initial investment 
into the image of the city which would bring fruits later in form of foreign investment. 
During interviews both arguments were discussed and challenged by the experts. For 
instance, the Executive Director of the association of foreign businesses which is based in 
Moscow gave the following evaluation of “landmark” projects:
They are not important to business people. They look good but to a great 
extent “landmark” projects are supporting the ego of those putting them 
up. If you are a foreign businessman you will not necessarily see a 
“flagship” project as something that will attract the market that you need 
or give a sign of stability that you want or the revival of the area that you 
want. These projects are state- led, not business- led. If they are business- 
led they might be a sign of something, if they are state led, they are signs 
of nothing (Interview 12, 2007).
A professor of economics and an advisor to the Tatarstani Government acknowledged the 
significance of a positive city image for strengthening regional competitiveness, but at 
the same time drew a clear division between commercial projects and projects described 
as “public goods”:
The imagery side can not be ignored. When we visit a region, vs can 
immediately see the capital and the architectural component of the 
capital... Every businessman first notices the image, then the 
infrastructure, communications, the regulatory framework, the intellectual 
capital and the level of social development...
How can you evaluate the Horse Racing Track?
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Is another matter. One thing is good conditions of public buildings or 
organisations of hospitals; another thing - individual projects that are built 
for political reasons, the projects that should generate commercial returns 
but do not do so... Projects such as the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink 
must be commercial... The state should not enter into projects with a 
potential of commercial return. The state can promote development of 
commercial projects by providing land and the private sector to kick off; 
but when the state replaces the private sector and invests unsuccessfully, 
then the private sector can also see that the project can not pay off... this 
is the miscalculation of the state itself... Horse Racing Track is a 
gambling project and should be regarded as a purely commercial project. 
And the fact that the state stepped in and chose a wrong site and 
miscalculated the returns and now it a pain for everybody -  this is clearly 
wrong (Interview 24, 2007).
During interview, the Deputy Head of the Kazan Executive Committee accepted that 
some large urban development projects were not economically viable, but at the same 
time argued that that was the price of promoting the image of Kazan internationally:
There two ways to look at them: from economic and from social 
rationality point of view. Proper investments can give good results... The 
Horse Racing Track most likely has no profitability at all, because it 
occupies such a huge area and we do not have a huge number of people 
ready to use it... At the same time we had races and people brought the 
horses to Kazan even from America.
Question: What was the economic benefit of that?
The most important thing is that people have started visiting Kazan. The 
money will follow and will bring economic results. There is no alternative 
(Interview 7, 2007).
The pursuit of a competitive image of the city dramatically shifted the main focus 
of the Programme. Initially the Programme was designed as a set of policies specifically 
aimed on preservation and development of Kazan’s historic centre. The analysis has 
demonstrated that over the course of the Programme implementation the focus almost 
entirely shifted towards new construction. With a few exceptions, projects in heritage 
protection and modernisation of the city centre which were initially listed in the 
Programme were removed from the list and works continued predominantly on the sites 
of new prominent buildings and transport infrastructure projects.
2 1 0
Chapter 6 Case study 2
During interviews the shift in the Programme’s priorities received several 
explanations. The visual impression of the “old” as compared to the “new” would not
satisfy the expectations of the city and republic authorities. According to the Chief
Architect of a state-owned design institute, efforts in heritage protection would have been 
appreciated by experts in the field only, but the task was to articulate the economic 
strength of modem Kazan and Tatarstan:
History was not the most important element here... The Programme... 
emphasised not history but the future... The most important thing was to 
show the strength and the beauty of the city and the region. But how to 
show? By building projects such as the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink, 
the Metro... These prestigious projects immediately elevated the prestige 
of the city. It takes only seconds to visually perceive new projects. When 
we see the city and notice new projects within seconds we can form the 
opinion that the city is beautiful, the city is higher, better and is ahead of 
other cities... Funding could have been spent on the preservation of 
monuments which would have been appreciated by a narrow circle of 
specialists, but people... first need “bread and circus”. These “circuses”
were the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink, the Metro... they all showed to
the guests and the whole world that we were doing alright. Unfortunately, 
many transport projects... were not accomplished because they were not 
so visible... (Interview 3, 2007).
The visual impact made by historic monuments would have been less impressive as 
compared to that made by modem structures. Historical buildings even restored would 
have not provided such a visual impact compared to that of a large modern design. For 
instance, a senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute stated that:
Restored buildings could have been presented to the authorities as well.
But they are not so visible... How to present the relocation of old 
warehouses and the sidings around Kazan Central Station? (the project 
that was listed originally but later dropped -  N.K.) How Putin would have 
known that they had been there in the first place? Would Putin be shown 
old the photographs of the place? How would you show your 
achievements? (Interview 29, 2007).
This seems to be a naive comment, but it reflects precisely the role of government-led 
urban development projects in Kazan -  to make a strong visual impression of progress, 
development and growth; to demonstrate to the federal authorities the effectiveness of the
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regional leadership and the ability of decision-makers to mobilise resources to 
successfully achieve tasks -  in expectation of further development funding from the 
centre. The Director of a Kazan government-owned company pointed out:
Everything was tailored for Putin. It was a presentation of the place where 
the Mayor materialised his ambitions. The glamorous City Hall where he 
would bring visitors, a stunning Opera and Ballet theatre... These were all 
attributes of power. Why did they build it? Because the Opera Theatre was 
one of the venues for the CIS summit. They built projects that would be 
presented to the guests. They were all important: the Metro, the City Hall 
and the Theatre where they could all meet for banquettes (Interview 11,
2008).
Identifying the Russian authorities and specifically the President of Russia as 
main “consumers” of a new image of Kazan has to be placed in the context of centre- 
periphery relations in modem Russia. During the 1990s many Russia’s regions and ethnic 
republics first of all, created regional identities, often based on the ideas of ethnic and 
religious uniqueness. In the early 1990s Tatarstan was on of the champions of Russia’s 
regionalisation. After 2000 the Putin administration initiated policies aimed at 
strengthening the role of the federal centre and reinforcing the “vertical of power”, 
effectively eliminating all attempts to pursue regional sovereignty. As a result, the 
Tatarstani authorities could not rely on nationalism as political doctrine and the core 
component of the regional identity project. Tatarstan’s national identity now had to adjust 
to the new format of centre-periphery relationships established by the Putin 
administration.
Kazan’s Millennium celebrations ideally fit the purpose: on the one hand, it used 
the politically neutral language of socio-economic development, competitiveness and 
heritage preservation which satisfied Moscow. On the other hand, it did not abandon 
completely the references to Tatar history, heritage and uniqueness which satisfied the 
Tatar nationalists. During an interview one informant pointed out that the theme of the 
Millennium was well received, but if there had been any reference to the history of 
hostilities between the Russians and the Tatars, the Programme would have not worked 
out (Interview 11, 2008).
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Local leaders strived to demonstrate the image of a modern and economically 
viable region as their personal achievement. Their ability to attract federal funds and 
successfully prove the success by visual evidence materialised in large urban 
development projects, was perceived as a guarantee of obtaining more development funds 
from Moscow. According to several experts there was a strong personal dimension to the 
construction of new Kazan. A senior lecturer in Kazan School of Architecture revealed 
during interview that
power quite naturally expresses itself through monumental buildings. 
Politicians such as Mussolini always asserted themselves through 
architecture. In Russia any mayor uses architecture for self-assertion 
purpose... This is why no one attempts to assert himself though 
reconstruction of water-supply or sewage system (Interview 31, 2008).
Within the region, the decisions to choose some projects over others were often 
connected to the personal preferences of the leadership. As noted by Yakupov (2006) 
Shaimiev’s Tatar background formed his passion to horses that are important in the 
Islamic culture and contributed to the fact that many hippodromes were built in Tatarstan 
(p. 25). As power in Russia is strongly associated with those in power, politicians used 
urban development to implement their “personal” projects. Those projects reflect the 
preferences of the politicians and reinforce their position in the hierarch of power. A local 
expert pointed out during interview that
the projects that were implemented were image projects of the two leaders 
(the President of Tatarstan and the Mayor of Kazan -  N.K.). The Horse 
Racing Track was the project of President Shaimiev who loved horses; the 
Ice Rink was built because both Shaimiev and Iskhakov wanted to 
promote ice hockey... The same story with the Central Football Stadium -  
Iskhakov wanted to show off on the Russian or even the international 
arena. These were purely personal ambitions which had nothing to do with 
the city community (Interview 28, 2008)
The Kazan Mayor Iskhakov so much impressed President Putin with his managerial skills 
that became appointed to the position of the president’s personal envoy in Russia’s Far 
East federal district. Later Iskhakov was redeployment to the Middle East as Russia’s 
representative to the Organisation of Islamic Conference.
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At the practical level, the reason for pushing aside the projects associated with 
historical preservation was the cost of research, survey and restoration work itself As the 
owner of a Kazan-based private design practice explained:
Restoration and reconstruction are very expensive. That is why they 
tended to clear sites for new construction, demolishing the slums and all 
historical building along with the slums... Under budget constraints it was 
easier to knock down a building and build something new (Interview 22,
2008).
From the practical point of view old buildings also posed many hidden problems that can 
only be revealed after time-consuming and costly survey of the structure. Any heritage 
preservation project would pose more challenges than a new construction because of the 
extra costs, the need to comply with heritage protection requirements, the uncertainty of 
legal status, the need to relocate existing users and compensate the owners.
6.6.3 Spatial dimension
The city authorities could use the Programme to get access to large sources of funding 
that the city desperately needed to solve the accumulated over decades of neglect and 
under-finance problems. The analysis of the Programme design and implementation 
showed that during the initial stage of programme design and negotiation the city 
authorities actively used the rhetoric of heritage protection, improvement of living 
standards of the residents, economic development and job creation. Once the funding was 
secured and implementation began, the actual focus of the Programme shifted to visually 
significant, large urban development projects aimed at creating a new image of Kazan as 
the regional capital.
The empirical study has demonstrated that although the image of the city was 
seen as a high priority, practical steps did not match the rhetoric of developing business 
links and stimulating economic development. Similarly, as much as the preparations for 
the Millennium focused on symbolically important sites, as little they did to improve the 
actual living and working environment. According to a comprehensive study of Kazan
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environment completed in 2005 by a team of Kazan State University experts, Kazan 
Central Park “has been significantly damaged by the construction of the new bridge as 
the approach road has crossed a large section of the Park (Mingazova, et al, 2005, p. 
379). Many other environmental issues such as poor air quality, the discharge of 
untreated sewage waters into the river, the overloaded land fill sites remained unresolved 
{ibid, pp. 440-441).
While the contribution of the new projects to the strengthening of the city’s 
competitive positions did not make much practical impact, the main efforts were given to 
creating a positive visual impression among the city guests. This is described by the 
Russian word pokazukha -  displays meant only for show (Baker and Glasser 2005, p. 5)3. 
As the following sections will demonstrate this pokazukha was not a meaningless 
exercise but was aimed on achieving specific outcomes. The real role of the landmark 
development projects might be found in different areas, not related to pure economic 
rationality.
According to the local news agency, city authorities designated 63 streets as top- 
priority projects. Those streets would form routes the important guests would be driven 
along from the airport to hotels and venues. The improvements included pavement 
replacement, installing new streetlights, planting new trees and shrubs and the erection of 
new passenger pavilions (Tatinfo.ru 2004). At the same time, in other places solid fences 
were built in a great hurry in order to hide “dilapidated houses and ruins left after the 
Slums liquidation programme” (Serova 2005). According to the former press-secretary to 
the President of Tatarstan, the approach to urban planning adopted in Kazan is focused on 
creating highly visible projects aimed to form a positive impression among the city’s 
important visitors:
3 In M oscow urban developm ent projects also were used to make a good impression o f  federal government 
officials, most importantly the president. A s Baker and Glasser (2005) report, the M oscow  mayor 
Luzhkov decided that the era o f  kiosk capitalism  over in M oscow , to be replaced by real stores like those 
in other world capitals. This w as progress w ith an exclam ation point, and where could be a better place to 
start than Kutuzovsky Prospekt, so Putin each day could see for h im self evidence o f  the c ity ’s 
beautification? One boulevard over, o f  course, the ramshackle kiosks remained, but Putin never travelled 
there (Baker and G la sser  2005, p. 142).
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“Guest streets” -  are streets “which they drove important guests along 
during the Millennial celebrations trying to impress them with magnificent 
new buildings, splendour of decoration and the quality of the road surface 
on the route. But there are ... streets where guests would have nothing to 
do, as there is nothing to be shown or nothing to be proud of. Precisely 
those are streets where the majority of Kazan townsfolk live ... The City 
Hall, the Tatnefit-Arena, the Basket-Hall, the Horseracing complex, the 
Metro are all elements of the smart front facade of Kazan... but in the 
city’s “sleeping compartments” there are grim high-rise blocks of flats, 
dusty streets, wrecked sidewalks and roads, playing grounds converted 
into parking lots, schools and hospitals with cracked ceilings always in 
lack of money fir repair (Mourtazin 2006b).
The programme has created a significant transformation in Kazan’s urban space. 
A Moscow architectura critic who visited Kazan in 2006 reported that while the elements 
of old Kazan were being ruined, the emerging architecture was a “Disneyland” or even 
“an architectural freak-show” The remains of the Old Tatar District would soon be finally 
cleared up. What remained - burned down houses, warped gates, all in all - live 
decorations for a film about occupation atrocities” (Zmeul 2006). In October 2005 the 
Evening Kazan reported that three popular sites, including the Kazan State University 
main campus, the former Governor’s Palace (now the President’s Palace) and the former 
Nobel Assembly (now the City Hall) that used to be visited by many people, after the 
renovation became policed spaces with restricted access, security control and CCTV 
surveillance. The people of Kazan “have been deprived of the history” as a result of 
preparations for the Millennium (Yudkevich 2005b).
Right from the beginning vague goals were linked with a number of projects, most 
of which where irrelevant for the title of the programme. For instance, a local journalist 
asks the following rhetorical questions:
What have the projects like hotels, restaurants, entertainment centres, the 
Ice Rink and the Basket-Hall to do with the “Euro-Asian cultural and 
historical heritage”? What have shopping malls like IKEA to do with 
Kazan historical centre? (Mourtazin 2006a).
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While the official rhetoric emphasised the values of religious tolerance and social 
harmony, the way the Programme was designed and implemented revealed interesting 
facts about the existing and emerging patterns of social power which contradict the 
official rhetoric. During interview a Lecturer in the Kazan school of architecture stated 
that:
Among the population of Kazan there were people who knew the city.
As a result of the recent transformations the built environment [of the 
centre] was destroyed and those groups were scattered over the 
peripheral urban areas, blended with people who had come to Kazan 
during the last decades. Effectively not only the traditional built 
environment was destroyed, but the community of intelligentsia of 
Kazan was broken too. This community was coherent, had a lifestyle 
and loved the city... Now these people do not live where they were bom 
as those places disappeared along with the Kazan they grew up in. Here 
one could see the desire of the authorities to get rid of those city 
residents who could oppose the planned transformations of the city in
order to have a free hand to act. The public that could have risen in
opposition, found themselves dispersed... (Interview 19, 2007).
Not only the intelligentsia of Kazan who lived in the city centre was affected by 
the urban redevelopment programmes, the most vulnerable groups were affected too but 
in a much more negative way. A local newspaper reports that few days before the
celebration about 200 homeless people were “evacuated” from Kazan to one of the
abandoned Young Pioneers camping site. The homeless were washed, dressed in some 
odd second-hand clothes and medically examined. Some were sent straight to the 
psychiatric and tuberculosis hospitals. The site had been long abandoned and missed 
basic infrastructure so that the “guests” were forced to take an open-air baths while were 
kept warm by a big open fire. When several “guests” got suddenly stricken by drinking 
related psychoses, the police personnel on site was totally unprepared to cope with the 
situation and did not find a better solution as to handcuff the sick and tide them up to the 
trees. Residents of nearby villages later complained about inhuman yelling heard in the 
environs of the camp (Vyatkina 2005).
According to the local newspaper while the Ice Rink was being completed, the 
Kazan Oncologic Hospital where 10 patients were squeezed in each of its small wards did
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not receive any funding for a new building (Machneva 2005). A similar episode was 
debated at the parliament session. One of the Communist deputies criticised the decision 
to fund prestige objects at the expense of socially important ones. She pointed out that 
horses at the new Horseracing Complex might enjoy better facilities than the patients in 
Kazan hospitals. The speaker of the Parliament responded that the Racing complex was a 
commercial project4 and it was not correct to contrast people and horses (Yudkevich, 
2005a). As a result what was conceived and promoted as a heritage protection policy 
paradoxically led to massive losses in Kazan heritage. According to a senior member of 
staff at the Tatarstani Academy of Science,
Unfortunately as we all can now see, the city suffers irreplaceable losses.
In front of our eyes whole blocks of historic urban fabric degrade and 
sometimes simply disappear. Buildings forming our priceless cultural 
heritage are being dismantled and are vanishing irrevocably. Instead of 
real history, in the streets of Kazan emerge structures imitating history, 
that are constructed to meet the taste of bureaucrats and the “new Russians 
and Tatars”. We may be acquiring some European gloss but we are losing 
irreversibly our ancient history and originality (Hayboullin 2003, p. 5).
Along the same lines the Tatarstani Deputy Minister of Culture commented on the 
implementation of two programmes5: “the analysis of the situation shows that the 
implementation of those programmes often is being performed with violations of heritage 
laws, which ultimately can lead to the loss of historical and architectural uniqueness of 
the city centre that formed over centuries” (Valeyev 2003, p. 10). The local newspaper 
suggests that “Tatarstani authorities, having architected the 1000-year anniversary of 
Kazan, as a whole completed the task of raising the image of Kazan up to the level of 
Russia’s third capital and, accordingly demonstrated what Tatarstan was capable of 
achieving” (Alaev 2005b).
4 Not quite so. The distillery that built the com plex belongs to the governm ent, so even i f  the project was 
built with a hope to make profit the funds were public.
5 The programme for slum s dem olition and reconstruction o f  dilapidated housing blocks (1995-2005) and 
the Programme o f  preservation and develop m en t o f  Kazan city centre (2000-2005):
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6.7 Conclusions
The analysis of the Programme has focused on its genesis, design and implementation. 
The Programme was a product o f many factors including the ability of the republican 
authorities to successfully bargain with the federal authorities and organise cooperation 
across several levels of governance.
The federal authorities used the Programme to negotiate the compliance of 
Tatarstan with federal laws and demonstrate to other more rebellious regions that loyalty 
could be handsomely rewarded. The Tatarstani authorities used the Programme to 
mobilise financial resources, elevate the image of Tatarstan and Kazan on the 
international arena and demonstrate to the electorate the benefits of the “Tatarstan 
model”. Within this new format of centre-periphery relations joint development 
initiatives had to be packaged into politically neutral rhetoric. That is why instead of 
deploying the language of Tatarstani sovereignty, the Programme emphasised the much 
more neutral language of historic preservation, economic development and 
competitiveness.
The Programme goals did not represent a coherent list of urban development and 
heritage protection policies, which the name would suggest. The list of projects continued 
changing over the course of the implementation depending on the availability of funding 
and the politicians’ preferences. The vague language of heritage protection, economic 
development, competitiveness and the need to improve the quality of life was used to 
mobilise funding and political support across administrative levels. In fact, the 
preservationist language was used to secure access to funding, but many of the 
construction projects actually implemented had little or no relevance to the preservation 
of Kazan’s unique heritage or to the modernisation of the city centre.
As the analysis has clearly demonstrated, the use of neutral language did not 
remove the inherently political nature of large urban development projects and their role 
in working out new governing mechanisms. Under conditions of weak democracy the 
authorities had unchallenged power to change the list of projects to be funded. As a 
result, most of the projects that have been actually completed for the Millennium 
celebration were large urban development projects that had little to do either with the
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centre or heritage protection. Many socially important projects such as the new water 
treatment plant or several hospitals were excluded from the final stages of the 
programme. The authorities attempted to conceal the drawbacks in some projects by 
reporting progress spectacular progress in organising events and festivals. For that 
purpose inserting one programme within another and running ‘parallel’ programmes 
could to be a useful technique to confuse the public about the real progress. The smoke­
screen of programmes and policies associated with celebrations effectively overtook the 
projects originally aimed at the preservation and development of Kazan’s historic centre.
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CHAPTER 7 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
During the decade between 1995 and 2005 the city of Kazan witnessed the 
implementation of two large urban development projects that attracted large development 
funds and significantly influenced the image of the city. These projects were developed 
as a result of deliberate action by city and regional authorities and as such, the process of 
policymaking and governance has been the main focus of the current research. The 
chapter is organised as follows. The first part will report on the empirical data and the 
second part will discuss and interpret the findings in connection with the theoretical 
discussion in the previous chapters.
7.1 Results of the empirical study
The study of large urban development projects implemented in Kazan between 1995 and 
2005 has put them in the wider context of social, political and economic change that the 
city and the region experienced during the post-socialist period. There have been several 
urban development projects implemented in Kazan during that period, but the two 
projects selected for this study have involved the collaboration of federal, regional and 
local authorities as well as some involvement of the private sector and have had the most 
profound impact on the image o f the city.
7.1.1 The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005)
The analysis of the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin has shown 
the complexity and ambiguity of the project and the role it has played in transforming the 
image of Kazan, crafting a new urban governance model, and reinforcing the position of 
Kazan as the capital of Russia’s largest ethnic republic. Within the limits of the current 
research which has been focused mainly on the policymaking element of Kazan’s 
transformation, limited attention could be paid to an analysis of the actual design and
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planning solutions that the project was based upon. While there was no reliable evidence 
that would allow identifying either the location or the appearance of the old mosque 
where Seid Kul-Sharif used to preach, the planners and architects, in fact designed a new 
building. The research showed that neither the architects nor the authorities had a clear 
idea of the Mosque’s appearance, functional programme or size. The discussion of design 
options organised in a form of several design competitions inevitably led to more 
fundamental questions of Tatarstani statehood and identity that the Mosque was expected 
to reflect in its architecture, including the attitude towards the Russian heritage, the 
relations with the federal centre, other regions, a wider Islamic world, the Tatar Diaspora 
and the international community.
The empirical part of the research has revealed that initially the project was 
promoted by the public, but later gained support from the authorities of the Tatarstan 
Republic. With the sovereignty movement gaining strength, the Tatarstani leadership 
became increasingly supportive of the project and eventually secured the support of 
Russian President Yeltsin who endorsed the project by a presidential decree. 
Subsequently, the resurrection of the Mosque became institutionalised and started 
receiving government support including the allocation of a construction site at the most 
prominent city location - the Kazan Kremlin - and financial support from state-controlled 
industries.
The organisational structure and funding arrangements
The authorities took a full control of organising the design and implementation of the 
project and making funding arrangements. The Tatarstani President Shaimiev topped the 
organisation and established two special bodies responsible for the day-to-day operation 
of the project: 1) the State History, Architecture and Arts Museum-Preserve ‘Kazan 
Kremlin ’ that commissioned the architectural project and related studies and controlled 
the construction process; and 2) the special Kul-Sharif Mosque Fund that accumulated 
donations from enterprises and citizens and funded the construction works. The 
Tatarstani Government announced design competitions, the city Planning Department ran
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the competitions and a government-controlled design institute carried out the preparation 
of technical drawings. As the research has demonstrated, the public, the Muslim clergy or 
even the architects themselves had a very limited influence on the preparation of the 
project as all significant decisions were made by the republican leadership and personally 
by the President of Tatarstan. When the design team that had initially won the 
competition failed to meet the expectations o f the President, it was replaced by another 
team that produced an alternative design.
Only fragmented information has become available about the funding 
arrangements behind the resurrection of the Mosque. The citizens of Tatarstan and the 
Tatars from other Russia’s regions and abroad contributed money to the special Kul- 
Sharif Mosque Fund. The Mayor of Kazan issued a decree encouraging the collection of 
funds in each city district. Some foreign countries made small contributions which were 
not seen as very desirable as the resurrection o f the Mosque was perceived primarily as a 
common cause of the Tatarstani fellow-citizens. The main financial responsibility for the 
construction was carried out by the Tatarstani industries including the republic’s largest 
oil production company OAO ‘Tatneft’ and its numerous agricultural enterprises. The 
authorities used the old soviet mechanisms of collecting money from industries to fund 
socially significant projects. When contributions are made in-kind such as this and hence 
not taxed (e.g. donations of grain to the Fund), they helped to ‘keep’ capital inside the 
region as opposed to ‘losing’ it by paying taxes to the federal government. As a special 
advisor to the President of Tatarstan explained during interview, the ‘donations’ made by 
regional industries to various special funds should be seen as regional taxes, that the 
regional government can use for regional needs (Interview 32, 2007).
Equally important to the organisational arrangements of the project is the reason 
why the project was conceived in the first place. The interviews with decision-makers, 
planners and architects have revealed different opinions about the role of the Mosque in 
shaping a new image for the city. The resurrection of the Mosque is often placed in the 
context of historical rivalry between the Tatars and the Russians that has lasted for 
centuries. Finally the Tatars managed to achieve some sovereignty and commemorated 
the achievement by constructing a mosque in the heart of the former symbol of Russian
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domination and oppression -  the Kazan Kremlin. Several respondents have thus 
described the resurrection of the Mosque as an act of ‘historic justice’ for the Tatars who 
were subjected to forced Russification and Christianisation for centuries. It was important 
to locate the new Mosque in the Kremlin which was both the symbol of old Tatar 
statehood and the symbol o f Russian oppression. In the view of the Tatar leadership, the 
new Mosque standing next to the Russian Orthodox Cathedral and churches symbolised 
not only the resurrection of the Mosques, but the revival of Tatarstani statehood as equal 
to that of Russia.
The rationale behind the project
Quite indicatively, most of the respondents have attempted to avoid discussing the 
political and economic aspects o f the Mosque resurrection and emphasised the cultural 
side of the project, trying to explain the decision of the Tatarstani leadership to 
reconstruct the Mosque by referring to the history and spiritual needs and cultural 
peculiarities of the region. According to the majority of respondents, the authorities have 
simply “responded” to the spiritual needs of the electorate by offering a new place of 
worship to a large previously suppressed religious group. Those interpretations could be 
understood as an attempt to ‘de-contextualise’ the resurrection of the Mosque from 
political struggles with the federal centre’s and politics at the regional level. Although it 
appeared common that respondents downplayed the political significance of the project, 
its role in the regional identity and culture cannot be seen in isolation from the post­
socialist economic and political restructuring.
The Mosque project also has to be understood in the context of wider political and 
economic processes. Once the Communist regime collapsed, the ‘ideological vacuum’ 
created has been replaced by more traditional forms o f identity formed around the 
‘essentialist’ ideas such as religious and ethnic belonging. Other respondents have argued 
that the process of identity transformation was a ‘natural’ replacement of communism 
with nationalism. The question o f how ‘natural’ the collapse of a monolith communist 
ideology was and how effectively or neatly it has been replaced with the inherently
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diverse regionally constructed identities remains debatable. In post-socialist Tatarstan the 
old communist elites found their legitimacy increasingly in question and resorted to use 
of Tatar nationalist rhetoric and Muslim religious symbols to retain power. Some 
respondents have indicated clearly that the use of religious rhetoric by the post-socialist 
politicians had nothing to do with their own religiousness. Instead it revealed a rather 
manipulative use o f a seemingly apolitical but appealing rhetoric of religion, nationhood 
and ethnicity.
The analysis has demonstrated that the project can only partly be conceptualised 
as an attempt to strengthen the competitive positions of the city and region. The ability of 
the regional authorities to implement such an ambitious and costly project, which 
required the relocation o f the Russian garrison from its Kremlin barracks, the 
mobilisation of significant financial resources and which, at the same time, faced no 
opposition from the Russian authorities or ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, has clearly 
demonstrated the economic and political strength of the Tatarstani authorities but has not 
necessarily created any advantages in terms of creating opportunities to invest or do 
business in Tatarstan. The Mosque has become a factor of political mobilisation 
necessary to support the struggle for more sovereignty which helped to devote more 
economic powers to the regional level. In this respect sovereignty helped to boost the 
economic development o f Kazan and Tatarstan in a rather indirect manner, through 
keeping more taxes in the region, protecting regional industries from external competition 
and attracting more federal government subsidies than an average region could attract.
The spatial dimension
The choice to locate the Mosque inside the Kazan Kremlin was not accidental. Kazan 
Kremlin, the centre of the Kazan Khanate was conquered by the Russians, rebuilt in 
Russian architectural tradition and became a symbol of Russian colonisation. It was an 
ideal place to restore the Mosque as a symbol of the revival of the Tatarstani statehood. 
At the same time, the location of the Mosque inside the State History, Architecture and 
Arts Museum-Preserve ‘Kazan Kremlin ’ allowed the authorities to declare the building a
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part of the protected architectural ensemble that had to remain under control of the 
government and not the Muslim clergy. The control over the Mosque was also justified 
by the proximity of the government offices and the Presidential Palace that required 
security, constant policing and control of access to the site. As the result, the Mosque was 
very visible from outside the Kremlin but the use of the building was controlled by the 
government and access to it was closely watched by the Kremlin security. This made it a 
site for tourism but not religious gatherings.
The location of the Mosque in the Russian-built Kremlin and next to its churches 
and the Blagoveschensky Cathedral (1556), gave an opportunity to the authorities to 
promote ethnic and religious tolerance as a fundamental part o f Tatarstani national 
identity. The resurrection of the Mosque in connection with the reconstruction of the 
Cathedral in the Kremlin was used as ‘material evidence’ o f the harmonious coexistence 
of different peoples in Tatarstan. In order to strengthen their positions and rule out any 
possible accusations in Tatar nationalism, separatism or Islamic extremism the Tatarstani 
authorities praised the peaceful coexistence o f different ethnic groups and religious 
confessions including by the means of architecture.
As the analysis has demonstrated the project, because of its complexity and 
significance cannot be fully explained using one theoretical framework such as 
nationalism, place identity, city marketing or competitiveness discussed in the literature 
review chapter. As many large urban development projects in other parts of the world, the 
design and implementation of the Mosque project combines different discourses and 
motivations. The research has shown that the very process of designing the Mosque 
became a laboratory whereby a trial and error method was used to shape the building and 
discuss some important characteristics of the Tatarstani sovereignty project and the 
relationship between Tatarstan, Russia and other countries. The project contributed to the 
debates on the destiny of the Kazan Kremlin as the main heritage site, help to formulate 
the regional identity in relation to other Muslim countries and to clarify the relationship 
between the state and the Muslim clergy. The project has help to reinforce the dominant 
position of Tatarstani authorities in relation to large industries that agreed to fund the 
construction. Therefore the project has showed the dominant position of the regional
226
Chapter 7 Findings and analysis
authorities towards the religious leaders and the chiefs of large industries within the 
republic and the position of equality towards the Russian authorities. Hence, the main 
motivation behind the project was to clarify the issue of power relations within the 
republic and beyond. This has little to do with economic motivations such as city 
marketing or place promotion, except for an indirect influence of the Mosque on the 
image of the city as economic prosperous.
7.1.2 The preservation and development of the Kazan historic centre
The analysis of the Programme has been aimed at understanding the connection between 
a large development project and the wider political and economic processes in post­
socialist Russia. The analysis of the Special Federal Programme of the Preservation and 
Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005) has led to the following findings. 
The Programme was a product of successful bargaining between the leadership of 
Republic of Tatarstan and Russia over the position o f Tatarstan in Russia’s federal state. 
The analysis of the political statements and the interview with the political advisor to the 
Tatarstani President has revealed that funding for the Programme was secured as a result 
of a political bargaining between the Presidents o f Tatarstan and Russia, which involved 
‘trading’ some elements of the Tatarstan sovereignty for a large development grant from 
the federal government.
The organisational structure and funding arrangements
The analysis of the organisational arrangements of the Programme has demonstrated that 
from the inception stage to the implementation, the Programme was a government-led 
initiative, heavily reliant on government funding and the use of political power to secure 
cash contributions from government-controlled industries. Although the Programme was 
adopted and partly funded by the Russian Government, it would be an oversimplification 
to interpret it as a federal policy being filtered through the administrative tiers and 
implemented by bureaucrats in Kazan. The Programme was embedded into the centre- 
periphery relationship, was a result o f interaction and bargaining between different tiers
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of government and involved different actors. Political discourses and rhetoric used during 
the design and implementation of the Programme reflected the positions and interests of 
different political groups who used the policymaking process as a platform for gaining 
publicity, securing access to resources and achieving other goals.
Under this governance model, the federal government and the regional 
government appeared to be the main negotiators with the city administration responsible 
for the practical policy making and policy implementation role. That role was not of 
small importance as the actual selection of projects, development priorities and allocation 
of resources was made largely at the city level. The regional leadership secured support 
from large Tatarstani industries which were ‘allocated’ projects to sponsor. Under this 
scheme the Tatarstani state distillery JSC “Tatspirtprom” became responsible for the 
construction of the International Horse Racing Complex, the Bank Zenith became the 
sole investor for the Ice Rink, the Kazan Helicopter Plant was the main sponsor of the 
restoration of the Blagoveschensky Cathedral in the Kazan Kremlin.
Over the course of the implementation the original Programme for the 
Preservation and Development o f the Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005) gradually 
became discursively ‘dissolved’ in the policies aimed at the preparation for the Millennial 
celebrations. This shift of the policy focus and the public discourse from the originally 
stated goals of Kazan’s preservation and development to a vaguer collection of 
programmes and projects has allowed the authorities to detract public attention from the 
restoration of the Kazan city centre and effectively hide the backlogs and failures o f the 
original Programme. As a deliberate tactic this worked to the extent that neither the 
public nor the City Soviet challenged the course of action taken by the City 
Administration.
Regular reports on the success in the preparation for the Jubilee made it possible 
to abandon many originally identified projects and implement those which were not 
directly relevant for the preservation and development of Kazan historic centre. The 
rhetoric around the ‘preparation for the Jubilee’ helped to legitimise important political 
choices as to what projects would receive priority funding under the budget and time 
constraints. The actual implementation process has shifted the focus from the restoration
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of Kazan’s heritage and the delivery of new socially significant elements of urban 
infrastructure, to grand performance events aimed at making a positive impression among 
the city’s important guests including the political leaders of Russia and other countries. 
As a result larger symbolic projects received support while many other projects, arguably 
more beneficial for local residents, were removed from the list.
Not only did the authorities fail to introduce transparency into the policymaking 
process, but deliberate efforts were undertaken to complicate the organisational structure. 
Indeed some 17 simultaneous development programmes all connected with the Millennial 
celebrations were introduced in order to systematically confuse the public about the real 
state of affairs by slipping from a consistent evaluation of programme delivery to making 
references to other programmes and policies often irrelevant to context; by 
misrepresenting routing economic processes such as housing construction by wrapping 
them up as steps to the Millennial celebrations; by deliberate attempts to confuse the 
public about the scale of “voluntary” civic initiatives and so called “labour gifts”. One of 
the main problems that an investigation of urban transformation may face is that real 
political interests and motivations are likely to be hidden in carefully constructed 
rhetoric. The language used to present projects are legitimise policy making is often 
selected to conceal the real actor involved and their interests.
The rationale behind the project
While the design of the Programme has been strongly informed by the thinking on urban 
competitiveness, the actual investment arrangements have demonstrated that the 
construction of the image of an economically prosperous and competitive city has in fact 
sprinted ahead of market-generated investment as almost all investment was generated 
from the sources associated with government (budget and government-controlled 
businesses). Instead of targeting commercial return of investments, the projects were 
aimed at creating the image of prosperity and economic opportunity. Indeed, the research 
indicates that instead of generating profit, supported projects actually succeeded in taking 
value from the regional economy.
229
Chapter 7 Findings a n d  analysis
Although the Programme emphasised the need to develop international trade and 
cultural links and position the region and the city on the ‘global map’, the real 
competition seemed to happen between regional politicians trying to achieve tw o  major 
goals: 1) to influence the federal centre and receive funding for development projects; 2) 
to demonstrate the managerial skills and capabilities needed for successful 
implementation of development projects. The political power structure, the system of 
economic and political incentives and the conditions of getting access to government 
funding influenced the design and the implementation of the Programme. In exchange for 
the funding received from the centre, the regional and city leaders had to dem onstrate a 
visible material result as well as the capabilities as effective managers to secure  more 
funding in the future. It was also a good opportunity for the city level politicians to 
leapfrog the regional level and interact directly with the federal government.
The spatial dimension
As all projects were designed within a very rigid timeframe with clear deadlines for 
separate projects and the entire Programme, there was no incentive to think beyond  these 
limits both in terms of time and space. The government-controlled businesses and 
government agencies did not have to connect the projects with the surrounding areas or 
integrate them into any wider masterplan or investment scheme as it was clear th a t the 30 
August 2005 would be the end of the Programme. That is why the opportunity to use 
state investment as a trigger of commercial urban development did not work ou t, projects 
remained discrete sites poorly connected with each other. At individual level projects 
became money-losing enterprises. If the negative profitability of such projects as the 
Metro can be well expected and justified (especially in the initial stage), o ther types of 
projects should have been commercially viable. However, as the research has 
demonstrated, they have been experience a gross mismatch between their revenues and 
expenditures. The gain is not monetary profit, but political power that can b e  used to 
achieve economic gains. The system o f incentives is different too: economic feasibility or 
profitability may not play any role in the project justification. The approval o f  the  upper 
tier of government becomes the main motivation.
230
Chapter 7 Findings and analysis
7.1.3 The links between two cases
The two case studies used in the current research are also connected in the context of 
centre-periphery relationship. The project of the Kul-Sharif Mosque resurrection emerged 
during the turbulent roll-out stage o f the Tatarstani sovereignty and represented ideas of 
nationalism, religious identity and revival of the Tatarstani state. The Programme 
emerged in the beginning of Russia’s recentralisation project initiated by the new 
Kremlin administration. It became a result of negotiation between the Russian and 
Tatarstani leaders over the terms of Tatarstan rejoining Russia’s common political and 
fiscal framework. Hence the Programme used politically more neural discourse of 
heritage projection, city marketing, local economic development, cultural and business 
links and the image of the city.
Urban competitiveness is conceptualised and materialised as a set of policies 
developed and implemented in order to compete successfully for the federal grants and 
private capital. To some extent, the city became a ‘prisoner’ of the competitiveness 
thinking during the stage of implementation when important decisions upon the final 
selection of the projects had to be made. While the priority was given to the most visible 
sites located along the city’s main transport arteries and central locations, less noticeable 
but still crucial projects were left behind. Unfortunately, socially important projects 
became excluded from the process as their contribution to regional competitiveness is far 
beyond a short time horizon of regional and city politicians whose main motivation was 
to impress the visitors from Moscow and other places during a short period of time 
associated with the Millennial celebrations.
The use of ‘competitiveness’ seems to embrace a number of rather disjointed 
policies all connected with the constructing the image of the city and strengthening the 
positions of Kazan and Tatarstan in the informal hierarchy of Russia’s regions. This can 
partly be explained by the vagueness o f the competitiveness concept that allows many 
policies to be described as associated with ‘competitiveness building’. Again, the western 
literature on city marketing and place promotion fails to explain the design and the 
implementation of the Programme as the development project did not trigger private 
investment of create profitable enterprises. The Programme contributed to the city
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competitiveness but in rather indirect way: by creating the image of prosperity (which 
does not necessarily correspond with viable local economy), and by reassuring the central 
authorities that development projects in Kazan can be quite successfully implemented, 
which UDPs became a tangible and visible evidence of.
7.2 Analysis
The empirical chapters have demonstrated that the emergence of large UDPs in Kazan 
has been informed by different ideas and discourses including heritage protection, 
competitiveness, city marketing, local economic development and other. The analysis has 
demonstrated that the political rhetoric changed quite quickly reflecting the conjunctures 
of relationship with the federal government in Moscow and economic opportunities 
available to the region and the city. Once ideas outlived their usefulness on the dynamic 
political arena, new ideas had to be invented in order to retain political control and secure 
access to new streams of funding. The continuity of ideas and coherence of policies was 
not the main concern of the authorities as they adjusted quite comfortably to the emerging 
opportunities. The preferred discourses always reflected the nature of the political 
moment and the opportunities to maximise the access to valuable recourses including 
political power and investment. For example, in the 1990s political rhetoric was saturated 
with the language of nationalism, self-rule and secession, but after Putin administration 
clamped down on separatism the language of nationalism and sovereignty disappeared 
from regional political discourses and was replaced by that of economic development and 
strong federal state.
7.2.1 Reflection on post-socialist transition debates
The ambition of the research has been to address the questions lie beyond the political 
discourses and planning practices in Kazan and find out how the findings relate to the 
theoretical discussion developed in previous chapters. The research had to address some 
limitations of the existing theory in order to fulfil the goal. The post-socialist transition 
theory represents social change and institutional development as a series of pre-defined
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steps from a state-controlled economy to a market system and democracy (Huntigton 
1991; Sacks 1992; 1995). This has proven to be a too simplistic concept to produce a 
plausible analysis of the messy and often contradictory processes of urban transformation 
in post-socialist cities. The dominant post-socialist transition literature tends to explain 
the institutional ambiguity as a temporary state caused by transition from one system of 
social organisation to another when institutions have not yet fully adjusted to a new order 
(Lowenhardt 1995). When transition is not complete some ‘legacies’ of the past remain 
and continue influencing the performance of institutions. One of the main problems with 
this explanation is that transition is never complete and old institutions and practices may 
successfully adapt to new conditions and continue functioning forming a ‘hybrid’ form 
with new institutions (McFaul 2001). Another problem is that not only the actual 
transition is far from being a coherent move towards a homogeneous institutional 
environment but even its direction is sometimes unclear, as the case of Russia has 
demonstrated over the last decade (McFaul 2002; Robinson 2003). The mainstream 
literature on post-socialist transition while condemning the institutions and practices 
inherited from the socialist past as obstacles on the way to a market economy and 
democracy fails to acknowledge the role of pre-existing institutions as the ‘building 
blocks’ of new governing regimes. This limits the analytical power of post-socialist 
transition theories to explain the actual path of transition and diversion from the path 
prescribed by the theory.
7.2.2 Reflection on governance debates
The concept of urban governance can help to deal with complexity and ambiguity of 
urban transformation in the post-socialist context. The concept has been used to analyse 
the governing of socialist cities, focusing on political actors, institutions and their 
interaction in a complex multi-level environment. The research has referred to historical 
studies of socialist cities, including the key texts by Hough (1969), Ruble (1990) and 
Taubman (1973), which analyse the political and institutional arrangements through 
which the socialist city was governed. As governing mechanisms in the post-socialist 
period have become even more complex and multi-levelled the concept of governance
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did not lose it relevance in modem conditions. The research has shown that governing 
practices that worked in the socialist economy were adapted to the new post-socialist 
economic conditions. In order to analyse Kazan’s urban transformation and the interplay 
between different actors and tiers of government involved in the process, the research has 
focused on large urban development projects implemented in the city treating them as 
‘laboratories’ of change, and has analysed the broader political and economic conditions 
of the city and the region (see Swyngedouw 2003a; 2003c).
Urban and regional competitiveness in the context of post-socialist Russia has 
proven to be different from the ‘model form’ described in the literature (Begg 2002; 
Duffy 1995; Loftman and Nevin 1995; Porter 1995; Smyth 1994; Turok et al 2004). The 
nature of both the ‘competitiveness challenge’ and the city and region ‘response’ appear 
to be different from what theory would prescribe. The current prosperity of Tatarstan and 
Kazan has very little to do with the ability of the city and the region to innovate, attract 
foreign investment or sell advanced products on the global markets. To the contrary, 
Tatarstan has continued to benefit from the profit created in traditional economic sectors. 
All major industrial exports including first o f all oil, chemical and petrochemical 
products and heavy manufacturing goods, are produced using the facilities and 
technologies created during the Soviet Union period many decades ago. The limitations 
of the model of growth based on traditional exports have been realised by the leadership 
but as long as the traditional sectors can generate sufficient profit, there has been no 
pressing need for restructuring. In that respect Tatarstan is not different from any other 
industrially developed region of Russia where prosperity depends on traditional sectors, 
mineral endowment and the access to international transport networks.
What makes Tatarstan different is the history of successful political bargaining 
with the federal centre shown during the struggle for independence in 1990 and the 
Programme for the preservation and development of Kazan in 2000-2005. The analysis 
has shown that the Tatarstani authorities have successfully used the skills of bureaucratic 
bargaining developed during socialist times to negotiate various concessions and 
development funding with central government. In the bargaining with Moscow, Tatarstan 
has been better positioned than many ‘non-ethnic’ Russia’s regions because of the level
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of political mobilisation around the sovereignty project and the strong economic and 
institutional capacity comparable to that of some former socialist republic (e.g. Baltic 
states). This allowed the regional elites to form a ‘united front’ against the central 
authorities and successfully claim political and economic concessions from the central 
government. Regional competitiveness of Tatarstan has proved to be its ability to attract 
funding from the central government. Local identity, constructed among other things by 
means of architecture has been used to make political claims based on national and 
religious peculiarity of the region as compared to other Russian regions.
Although the very concept of urban and regional competitiveness remains highly 
debatable (see, Bristow 2005), the fundamental aspect of the competition in post-socialist 
Russia is that it does not always occur on the ‘open’ market and in economic terms. 
Kazan has been engaged in competition that cannot be described as global, but rather 
restricted to the size of the Russian state. Inter-region and interurban competition has a 
strong political component and occurs along the bureaucratic lines of command between 
the federal centre and the periphery (McCann 2004). These policies required considerable 
institutional strength, negotiation skills and the ability to mobilise and deploy resources, 
which are characteristics of entrepreneurialism. At the same time Tatarstani 
entrepreneurialism can work best under particular conditions of bureaucratic competition. 
These conditions are different from ‘ideal’ market competition that post-socialist 
transition was meant to create. Instead of maximising the entrepreneurial freedom, the 
regional authorities effectively controlled it; instead of opening markets and promoting 
competition the authorities did everything to protect regional manufactures, the banking 
and the service sector from unwanted external competition.
Although the authorities in Kazan have used the language of entrepreneurialism 
and competitiveness and in fact, have done many of the things that entrepreneurial cities 
are expected to do, e.g. put systematic efforts into strengthening the city’s positive image, 
attracting international events, presenting the city investment opportunities globally and 
erecting landmark buildings (Wu 2000a), all these practices have occurred on the 
backdrop of post-socialist political restructuring, legacies of governing arrangements, 
institutional settings, the system of political power and loyalty, the heritage of territorial
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and ethnic disputes, all of which contradicted the model of transparent and rational 
economic competition. The new emerging form of urban governance has inherited many 
generic features of the old socialist model but at the same time, has adopted elements of 
entrepreneurial and competitive urban governance. This apparent discrepancy between 
the competitiveness theory and Kazan practices may lead to some important conclusions.
The studied case of Kazan does not support the claims of competitiveness theory, 
including the significance of international investment and innovative industries, but those 
claims are far from being universally supported by studies of cities in the West either. 
For example, as a recent study of Cardiff competitiveness strategies has demonstrated, 
while the city strategies actively use the language of competitiveness and 
entrepreneurialism, the actual economic performance is driven mostly by the public 
sector spending (Bristow and Lovering 2006). In that respect the orthodox vision of city 
and regional competitiveness is far from being universally applicable. The analysis 
suggests that the universal claims of the competitiveness theory may have serious 
limitations. Modernisation and entrepreneurialism may not be ‘inevitable’ responses to 
the global challenges and modem ‘imperatives’. The ‘actually existing’ competition is 
influence by a wider range of factors, including those on the regional and city level. 
Depending on the local conditions and opportunities the actual policy may have a 
stronger ‘global’ or ‘local’ component. That makes competitiveness to a large extent a 
“hollow” concept -  which is being filled up or materialised on an ad hoc basis in each 
locality. Competitiveness is a “floating signifier” that bears whatever meaning that is 
being attributed to it by the local political elites who use it in rhetorical purposes (i.e. to 
legitimise certain political decisions).
The popularity of competitiveness thinking is explained by its role in promoting 
the neo-liberal project both in the West and in the post-socialist countries. As suggested 
by Harvey (2006) the fundamental difference between neoliberalisation in the West and 
post-socialist countries is that in the former case neo-liberalism is aimed at restoring the 
class power of the capital, while in the latter case it is aimed at constructing an 
overwhelming class power (p. 157). As the initial conditions in the West and in Russia 
were very different, the ‘actually existing’ form of competitiveness and urban governance
236
Chapter 7 Findings and analysis
appeared to be different too. Kazan has learned how to use the visual element of 
competitiveness including the promotion of a positive image of the city, but due to 
structural reasons and contingencies of political process and geographical location has 
never managed to get engaged into real global economic competition. Despite the actual 
level of performance, the use of competitiveness rhetoric has helped to facilitate the 
transition from a socialist to a post-socialist city. The question how neo-liberal the city 
has become as a result of the change remains open as the ‘hybrid’ from of governance 
demonstrated elements of urban entrepreneurialism (not to be confused with ability to 
innovate) and an authoritarian state carefully controlling competition and patronising 
local economy.
The research has discovered that no ‘grand narrative’ such as post-socialist 
transition or neo-liberalism or a ‘ready-made’ theory such as urban regime or 
competitiveness can fully explain the transformation. Neither the transitional literature, 
nor the neoliberal urban governance literature can adequately conceptualise the actual 
configuration of urban governance emerging in Kazan. The actually exiting neo­
liberalism debate (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002) perhaps comes 
closer to explaining the transformation of urban governance in Kazan but does not seem 
to acknowledge the whole complexity of the post-socialist dynamics. The question of the 
comparative significance of global versus local factors in shaping urban governance in 
the post-socialist city remains open. The concept of ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’ 
offers a valuable explanation of local governing regimes as a product of pre-existing 
institutional conditions and the global economic order. The research has demonstrated the 
significance of pre-existing institutions but serious doubts have emerged whether urban 
governance in Russian cities can be described as neo-liberal or not.
The research has revealed a trial and error process that eventually shaped a 
‘hybrid’ model of urban governance that included elements inherited from the socialist 
and in fact pre-socialist past, as well as the newly acquired language of urban 
entrepreneurialism and competitive thinking. In this new urban governance model, 
political, economic and symbolic elements are closely intertwined. The elements of urban 
entrepreneurialism included the search for external funding and the use of funding to
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produce buildings and spaces that create the image of a modem and economically viable 
place capable of attracting more external investment. This has started a self-perpetuating 
cycle of the reproduction of imagery and buildings aimed at attracting more funds into 
the process. The ‘traditional’ component of the model has been the role of the state as the 
main actor. The city and regional authorities have designed the development plans, 
implemented them, secured the participation of large state-controlled industries using 
traditional and well-proven during the socialist period methods based on administrative 
coercion and political leverage.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
The dramatic social, political and economic changes have led to the transformation of the 
city landscape and the emergence of new types of buildings and public spaces as well as 
new planning and governing mechanisms. Nevertheless, cities have not just been ‘passive 
receivers’ of the action of social and economic forces, as the dominant post-socialist 
transition theory often suggests (see, Nedovic-Budic et al 2006), instead they have been 
places where these new forces are shaped and social relations are actively constructed 
(Lefebvre 2003; Moulaert et al 2003; MacLeod 2002). The analysis o f  urban 
transformation in Kazan has helped to understand the underlying political, economic and 
social processes that the post-socialist countries have experienced since the late 1980s 
and critically evaluate the theories o f post-socialist transition, neo-liberalism and 
governance.
The analysis of the transformation of the post-socialist city has faced several 
theoretical problems. Many studies of post-socialist cities put the analysis o f  urban 
change within the dominant framework of ‘post-socialist transition’ that conceptualises 
urban change as a passage from one fixed condition (i.e. state socialism) to another 
(market system). The dominant theory o f post-socialist transition focuses mainly on 
institutional transformations and the introduction of new regulatory frameworks 
necessary for a market economy to function. This approach can hardly address the whole 
complexity and political dynamism of post-socialist transformation where the old and the 
new institutions and practices always coexist, forming ‘hybrid’ institutional arrangements 
which do not always represent a consistent progress towards a democratic and market 
society.
In order to deal with the complex and intrinsically political nature o f  urban 
transformation, the research has reviewed other theoretical frameworks and current 
debates. This has revealed another problem, namely that western theories o f  urban
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governance, globalisation, entrepreneurialism, competitiveness with few exceptions have 
not been systematically applied to study urban transformation in post-socialist Russia. 
The West and non-West theoretical debates are still poorly connected. This has been 
caused by several factors, including the historical division between West and non-West 
(Flynn and Oldfield 2006), the dominance o f the post-soviet transition paradigm, a 
certain intellectual isolation of Russian scholars from the mainstream western debates 
and little involvement of western scholars in the study of urban governance in the 
Russian context as compared to other post-socialist regions such, as Central and Eastern 
Europe and China. Many studies remain descriptive in nature, the question of politics and 
governance of urban development in the post-socialist city has been poorly explored 
(Feldman 2000; Gel’man 2002b).
Although the post-socialist city are converging with the western city in some 
ways, many important aspects remain different which makes direct theoretical transfer 
difficult. Some cities in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate the emergence of 
‘entrepreneurial’ or neo-liberal urban governance regim es which converge more with 
western examples, while the cities in Russia and C hina are characterised by the state 
retaining greater control o f urban development and still playing the role of a direct 
provider of urban development while behaving as an ‘entrepreneurial state’. During the 
transition period, the state has continued to play a leading role in initiating urban 
transformation trying to promote cities and regions in the new conditions of inter-regional 
and international competition.
While city governments in Russia make deliberate efforts to create the image of a 
modem and economically successful place attractive fo r potential visitors and investors, 
their real engagement with international flows of capital, goods and people remains weak. 
The “world-city-entrepreneurialism” in the Russian governing practice remains more of a 
discourse than a reality (Golubchikov 2010, p. 640). W hile there is a proliferation of 
urban entrepreneurialism, competitive strategies and use o f the image of the city for city 
marketing purposes in both western and eastern countries, the politics and governing 
arrangements behind these processes in post-socialist countries are quite different from 
those in western countries. The version of capitalism that Tatarstani authorities have built
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is more about “ ’ideological globalisation’, the phraseology of neoliberalism and the 
glossy surface imagery of Western brands and logos” than about “material globalisation” 
(McCann 2005, p. 10).
The research has demonstrated that there is no ‘grand narrative’ or ‘ready-made’ 
theoretical framework that could be used to produce a plausible explanation of urban 
transformation in the context of Russia. The research has addressed the gap in knowledge 
by analysis the governance of large urban development projects (UDPs) and answering 
the question whether projects in Kazan have been aimed at creating the image for the 
international audience or for domestic actors. Recent UDPs in Kazan have been used as 
instruments of creating a new city image, attracting investment and stimulating economic 
development. The projects have become laboratories of urban change where new 
configurations of power and mechanisms of urban governance are being worked out.
The research has used the methodological approach based on a critical realist 
philosophy. The analysis has focused on actors, institutional constellations, policy 
making process and aimed at revealing necessary relationship of power and influence 
between the actors involved in the policy-making process. From a realist perspective, the 
image of the city, planning and architecture are the expressions of the dominant political 
and economic structures. The use of competitiveness and nationalism discourses in urban 
planning and governance help to legitimise political power by referring to exterritorial 
(global competitiveness) and historicist (nation) values. The research has adopted the 
“instrumentalist” approach to national identity and has interpreted the construction of 
national identity as an instrument of social mobilisation for centre-periphery relations. 
The study has used two case studies to produce an in-depth analysis of the governing 
mechanisms behind the design and implementation of two large urban development 
projects that had a profound impact on the image o f the city. The empirical study has 
focused on the analysis of policy-making process that has led to transformation of Kazan. 
The data was collected from in-depth semi-structured interviews with policy-makers and 
experts, government documents, policy reports, statistical sources and press.
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Tatarstan and Kazan have been good examples to analyse the emerging model of 
urban governance and the interplay of the global and local at the city level because recent 
policies implemented in, the city show how the authorities of Tatarstan and Kazan tried 
energetically to break free from the localism and obscurity of the geographical and 
economic position by using political, economic and cultural means expressed among 
other means through a new image o f the city and its projection to the international 
community. The transformation of its image was aimed at reflecting the modernity and 
the wealth of Tatarstan as a sovereign state (Graney 2007). One of the key differences 
between Kazan and many other Russia’s regional capitals is that Kazan is the capital city 
of an ethnic region that in 1990 declared its ‘sovereignty’ from Russia. This gave 
Tatarstan powerful leverage in bargaining games with the federal centre and added an 
additional dimension to the study. Local identity played an important role in making 
claims for more autonomy and funding based on national peculiarity of Tatarstan as 
compared to a “pure” Russian region which does not have such an advantage.
Two case studies have been used to analyse the transformation of the image of 
Kazan and its urban governance. The selection o f case studies was informed by their 
significance (political, symbolic and economic) for the city and involvement of different 
tiers of government (federal, regional and local) as well as the private sector in the 
implementation. The Kul-Sharif Mosque has been the first mosque to be built in Kazan 
Kremlin since 1552. The Mosque has created a symbol o f the regained statehood and 
cultural revival. The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development 
of Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) was a result o f successful bargaining with the 
federal centre over the region’s political status. The Programme was the largest 
investment in the city in terms of construction cost implemented in the post-socialist era. 
The Programme has helped to promote the city and the region in the informal hierarchy 
of Russia’s regions. Both projects have dramatically changed the image of Kazan and in 
many ways have actually transformed the city from ‘socialist’ to ‘post-socialist’.
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8.2 The main findings
The research has discovered that despite the use of competitiveness rhetoric, the actual 
competition that Kazan is engaged in is aimed not at internationally footloose capital but 
at getting access to the specific resources available from the federal state, such as 
political power and development funding. The terms of such competition are 
fundamentally different from what the thinking around globalisation and competitiveness 
typically suggest. The research has put the claims of globalisation and competitiveness 
theories under scrutiny by questioning the necessity and universality of global 
competition between cities and regions.
UDPs implemented in Kazan between 1995-2005 were driven mainly by political 
rather than economic rationality. The ruling elite of Tatarstan used grand projects to 
strengthen their political legitimacy and power. Large UDPs became one of the ways 
political power is exercised, expanded, shaped and presented in a visual form to the 
political actors. In order to secure the support o f the projects, the elites used powerful 
political rhetoric. The competitiveness rhetoric was used to legitimise their policy 
choices, to de-politicise and ex-territorise the decision-making process and eventually to 
disempower the local community and strengthen the positions in power of the elites. The 
ideas of competitiveness were especially seductive because they referred to external 
forces and the need to react to them in particular ways which were though to be 
‘inevitable’, politically neutral and seemingly acceptable for everybody. While serving 
the interests of the elites, those projects may have led to the misallocation of resources 
that could have been used elsewhere.
The authorities also sought to strengthen the legitimacy of power by ‘responding’ 
to social needs (e.g. religion and identity) and modem economic ‘imperatives’ (e.g. 
globalisation and competitiveness). The authorities designed their political mission 
around the need to find adequate responses to modem challenges such as the threat of 
ethnic violence and the loss of competitive position, and used development projects to 
prove their ability to tackle these threats effectively. For example, the Mosque was 
created to respond to the modem challenges of globalisation and loss of local traditional 
identities by creating a house of worship and a cultural centre for all the Tatars which was
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supposed to preserve their ethnic, religions and religious identity but also help to position 
Kazan on the ‘global map’. The Programme used similar rhetoric of heritage 
preservation, cultural revival, but also that of modernisation and competitiveness.
More importantly, large UDPs have been used as evidence of political power, 
control and managerial capabilities o f the city and regional elites which had to be shown 
to their counterparts and the higher tiers o f government. When the central government 
was weak, the image of the city communicated a message o f aggressive nationalism and 
threat of succession (via the Mosque). When the central government became stronger the 
message contained in development projects was that o f loyalty and effective management 
of federal development funds (via the Programme). This required specific governing 
practices, planning and urban design approaches. Governing practices and their spatial 
implications have been intertwined and have become mutually reinforcing: as much as 
forms of governance instigate specific design solutions, the latter require certain 
institutional arrangements for their successful implementation. That is why the policies 
have led to the emergence of certain type of buildings and urban spaces: large 
monumental projects, closely monitored and policed and not always accessible for the 
public, and large infrastructural projects both oriented on specific external audiences and 
having a strong imagery component.
The research has addressed the question of the emerging form of urban 
governance in Kazan. The research has discovered that in Kazan the state controls the 
allocation of resources for urban development. This is not to gain market land value or to 
act as a ‘trigger’ effect for private investment, but rather the govemment-led UDPs are 
aiming to strengthen the position o f political elites within the existing structure of power. 
The construction of a new city image started a self-perpetuating cycle of attracting 
funding into the reproduction of urban imagery aimed at attracting more funding. 
Although the emerging model of governance has borrowed some elements and techniques 
of entrepreneurial governance, it has not become innovative or business orientated. Under 
the surface and rhetoric of entrepreneurialism, competitiveness and internationalisation 
lie developed during the socialist period mechanisms of bureaucratic negotiation, political 
bargaining and coercion to implement the planned policies. The authorities in Kazan and
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Tatarstan have not simply ‘responded’ to economic and political challenges by trying to 
reproduce ‘best practice’ or adjust their institutional organisation according to the neo­
liberal reforms ‘cook-books’, they constructed a somewhat unique model that allowed to 
pursue the following goals:
1) To mobilise political and financial resources;
2) To work in collaboration with the federal government;
3) To invent new ways o f attracting funding from external sources;
4) To position the city and the region nationally and internationally;
Therefore, the authorities actively participated in the construction of the new governing 
regime. The governing practices were aimed not only (and possibly not as much) at luring 
elusive international investments or national capital but more at legitimating the rule of 
the local elites who (under conditions o f procedural or ‘controlled’ democracy) use 
ambitious urban development projects to convince both the federal centre (as the source 
of power) and the local electorate (source o f passive approval) in the ‘rightness’ of their 
political course.
8.3 The main results
This research has led to the following main results. There are limits to which the existing 
theory can explain urban transformation in Russian cities. The research has made an 
attempt to overcome the limitations of the existing theory by applying the theory of urban 
governance to the post-socialist city and placing it into a wider theoretical context 
including politics, multi-level governance and the spatiality of urban transformation. The 
analysis of urban development projects in Kazan has helped to understand current 
transformation of urban environment in the post-socialist city and the political and 
economic context of urban governance. In theoretical development the research has 
helped to challenge the dominant position of the post-socialist transition theory and link 
the debates of post-socialist cities with western literature which so far have not been well
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connected. The application o f western theories to a study o f post-socialist cities has also 
helped to test their validity beyond the traditional geographical region.
The research has established that urban transformation do not fit in a consistent 
pattern of “transition” from one ideal state to another. Urban transformation, although 
influenced, are not pre-defined by powerful forces which are external to cities, would 
they be identified as forces of post-socialist transition, globalisation or competitiveness. 
Neither do they represent a uniformed response to global “imperatives” as claimed by 
some experts on globalisation and urban competitiveness (Turok 2004, p. 1070). The 
urban process is far from being consistent more likely it can be described as a trial and 
error influenced by socially and historically contingent circumstances. Urban 
development projects are the testing sites at which urban regimes and governing models 
are being worked out.
The western concepts of urban competitiveness and entrepreneurialism (Begg 
2002; Duffy 1995; Loftman and Nevin 1995; Porter 1995; Smyth 1994; Turok et al 2004) 
have limited usefulness in the post-socialist city because the whole politico-economic 
structure creates different incentives. The modem examples of urban development 
implemented in post-socialist cities may look like a ‘standard response’ to the ‘challenges 
of globalisation’ but this can be a very superficial answer to the question on how large 
urban development projects emerge and what forces are responsible for their 
implementation (for deeper analysis see, Pagonis and Thomley 2000). Political rhetoric 
can be used to legitimise choices and strengthen positions in power. Kazan case has 
demonstrated that development policies lack consistency or focus and are very contingent 
on the political and economic opportunities. The identity constmction projects remain 
very opportunistic, contingent on political influences and the availability of funding. As 
soon as the recourse base for one theme has been exhausted, a new theme would be 
invented, which does not correspond very well with the previous one. During the 
sovereignty heydays Kazan was positioned as the capital of an independent state, then as 
a cultural centre of Russia (with the support o f the federal funding) and then as a 
competitive city, Russia’s third capital and global destination. The research has looked at
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the ‘marginal’ manifestation of competitiveness representing competition under largely 
‘non-competitive’ conditions structured by the political conditions.
The relations between ‘global’ and ‘local’ at urban level are more complex than 
some simple models predict. The perception of ‘global’ has a lot to do with local political 
struggles, governing institutions and organisational structures. The case of Kazan case 
can be treated as a particular variation of neo-liberal urbanisation that ‘mutated’ under 
specific conditions of a post-socialist city, the capital of an ethnic republic in Russia. 
Inevitably this particular variation was influenced by the actual conditions, the most 
important of which are as follows: 1) the bargaining federalism; 2) nationalism; 3) 
undemocratic, unaccountable nature o f the local government.
8.4 The novelty of the research
This research has contributed to the understanding of urban governance in the post­
socialist city in several ways. First, the research has bridged the gap between the western 
urban debates and the debates on post-socialist urban transition. Second, the research has 
widened the theoretical boundaries of ‘post-socialist’ urban studies by using multi­
disciplinary approach and integrating different debates and has tested the western theories 
beyond their traditional geographical region. Third, the research has examined how large 
urban development projects (UDPs) contribute to the construction of the image of the 
city, which serves various political and social ends.
8.5 Further research
Over the course of the research, many intriguing and potentially fruitful areas of 
investigation have been identified but difficult decisions had to be made to keep the 
research within the limits and as focused as possible. This thesis provides a good base for 
further research on urban governance in post-socialist cities. Since urban governance in 
Russia has been poorly explored in contemporary literature, further research would focus 
on a range of topics and questions that have been identified here.
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Firstly, western critical debates on socio-spatial transformation of state power and 
state rescaling in late capitalism (Brenner 2004; 2009; Moulaert et al 2003; Swyngedouw 
2000) have been based exclusively on the examples from Western Europe and North 
America. In a recent article Brenner (2009) has urged that more systematic comparative 
studies could help to advance the research on state rescaling by looking at its trajectories 
and patterns in diverse global regions (p. 133). Applying these debates to analyse the new 
regional development strategies of the Russian federal government (discussed in Section 
4.3.3) could offer a new interpretation o f the role of the post-socialist state in 
development and offer a new analytical approach to post-socialism that so far has been 
almost exclusively focused on the institutional development issues, macro level formal 
indicators and have largely overlooked the spatial dimension of transition except for a 
mere acknowledgment of the fact that transition has reinforced spatial disparities between 
regions and cities. This could also help to tackle the problem of the intellectual separation 
between scholars in the West and the East and could test the validity of western theories 
in a new geographical context.
Secondly, there are signs that as the result o f the pursuit of the competitiveness 
Kazan has become a ‘dual city’, one part o f which forms a smart fa9ade constructed 
according to the competitiveness rules; while the rest represents the less glossy side 
which is the living environment of the majority of people. There is little research on 
urban space and issues of political power and social control (see Hall and Hubbard 1998; 
MacLeod 2002) in relation to Russian cities. An empirical study of the transforming 
geography of Kazan (and possibly other cities) could shed some light on the socio­
economic processes in the post-socialist city and help to develop further the concept of 
the ‘dual city’.
During the course of the research, new development programmes have been 
adopted in Kazan which creates new source of data and opportunity to extend the 
longitudinal study. The most significant achievement has been hosting the International 
Student Games in 2013. Once again the Tatarstan and Kazan authorities used their skills 
to receive federal funding for a number of large urban development projects for the 
Games infrastructure. This raises many questions about the development strategy adopted
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by the city authorities that is based on competing for external investment and its 
limitations and possible dangers. The phenomenon of competing on occasional and 
unpredictable markets is worth further studying.
Overall, extending research to other Russia’s cities could help to test theoretical 
claims in other regions with no ethnic and religions differences from the Russian 
heartland. Using more case studies would help to generalise on the emerging model o f 
urban governance in post-socialist Russia and identify the necessary elements of such a 
model.
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APPENDIX 1 
Semi-structured interviews will be based on the following questions.
Case Study 1:
1. Why was the mosque reconstructed?
2. If restoration of the religious consciousness was the major motivation behind 
the mosque reconstruction, why the funds were not spent on a number of 
mosques built within closer proximity to potential users?
3. What does the project represent or symbolise?
4. How could possibly the federal leadership perceive the project? Could they 
possibly see it as a threat for national unity?
5. Did it help Tatarstan to justify claims for sovereignty?
6. Did it give Tatarstan competitive advantage over other regions which did not 
have distinct ethnic or religious background?
7. Does the project and more generally the favourable attitude towards Islam in 
Tatarstan help the republic to establish closer economic links with the Islamic 
world countries?
Case Study 2:
1. What was the rationale behind the selection of sites and specific projects for 
the Programme?
2. Why do you think towards the end of the Programme projects which 
entertainment and representative functions survived; whereas socially oriented 
projects were sequestered?
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3. Would you agree that while the Programme was being implemented the major 
concern shifted to creating an attractive image of the city rather than solving 
any significant problems?
4. How to explain the fact that a number the flagship projects implemented under 
the programme have had very little relevance to either city centre or historic 
preservation?
5. Do you think that the Programme gives an example of effective spending of 
public money?
6. What do the projects which received funding from the Programme represent 
or symbolise?
7. Did the Programme help Tatarstan and Kazan to enhance its competitiveness?
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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APPENDIX 2 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Role
Chair of a committee in the Kazan executive committee
Chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy 
of Science
Chief architect o f a state-owned design institute
Deputy chair o f Russian cultural society
Deputy director o f a Kazan-based tour operator
Deputy director o f a research centre in the Tatarstan 
Republic Academy o f Science.
Deputy head o f the Kazan Executive committee
Director of a transnational computer manufacturer 
represented in Kazan
Director of a museum in Kazan
Director of a department in the Ministry o f Finance of 
the Russian Federation
Director of a Kazan government-owned company
Executive director of a business association based in 
Moscow
Former chief o f a department in the Kazan Planning 
Department
Journalist, former press-secretary to the president of 
Tatarstan Republic
Head of a department in the Ministry for Architecture, 
Construction and Communal Services
Head of a Tatar noble society
Head of a department in the in the Tatarstan Republic 
Academy of Science
Head o f a department in the Kazan executive committee
Date
January 2007 
January 2007
January 2008 
May 2008 
January 2007 
May 2007
June 2007 
May 2007
January 2008 
May 2007
January 2008 
May 2007
June 2008
June 2008
May 2007
June 2008 
June 2207
June 2007
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19 Lecturer in Kazan school of architecture
20 Lecturer in Kazan school of architecture, architect o f the 
Mosque
21 Lecturer in Kazan school of architecture, architect of the 
Mosque
22 Owner of a Kazan-based private design practice
23 Professor in Kazan school of architecture
24 Professor of economics, advisor to the Tatarstani 
Government
25 Professor of History KSU
26 Regional director of a large western retailer operating in 
Kazan
27 Senior member of staff in the administration o f the 
president of Tatarstan Republic
28 Senior economist in a Kazan government-owned 
company
29 Senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute
30 Senior manager o f a large industry
31 Senior lecturer in Kazan School of Architecture and lead 
architect in a private design company
32 Special advisor to the president o f Tatarstan Republic
33 Special advisor to the president o f Tatarstan Republic
34 Independent journalist and publisher
June 2007
January 2007
January 2008 
June 2007 
June 2007
January 2007 
May 2007
January 2007
January 2008
January 2007 
May 2007 
January 2008
June 2007 
June 2007 
June 2008
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APPENDIX 3 THE USE OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS
The PhD has discussed the western theories of globalisation, neo-liberalism, governance 
and competitiveness in relation to urban transformation of the post-socialist city. In that 
sense the findings not only shed light on urban governance in the post-socialist city, but 
critically evaluate western debates by expanding the geographical horizons to the region 
that has not been sufficiently studied yet. The broadening of geographical horizons helps 
to test the applicability of western theories in a new research context and evaluate the 
scope of generalisation these theories can provide.
The research can benefit the following professional communities and groups. First 
of all, the academic community involved in research on policy, transition and urban and 
regional governance will benefit from theory transfer and critical evaluation of some 
western debates. Governance and public policy are becoming ever more complex multi­
layered in which national and supra-national bodies set the macro framework for 
international security, trade, sustainable development and human rights, whereas sub­
national actors like cities and regions are assuming more and more discretion in 
economic development, environmental and social policies. Cities and regions in both 
west and post-socialist countries are becoming laboratories of economic restructuring and 
new forms of governance. This creates opportunities for theoretical transfer and testing 
western theories and debates in a new geographical context. Therefore studying urban 
governance in the post-socialist city can advance western theories too.
The UK-based firms conducting business in Russia will benefit from a better 
understand of the policies of the central, regional and local government in the recourse 
allocation in development projects. This would help firms to adjust their business 
development strategies in the way that their operation on the Russian market is more 
competitive and secure.
Government agencies (e.g. DfID), intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the 
World Bank and EBRD) that offer funding for development projects in Russia will 
benefit from better understanding of the mechanisms of investment. International non­
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governmental organisation involved in environmental protection and social development 
activities in Russia will benefit from better understanding of project governance which 
will help to evaluate the environmental and social impact, to design possible mitigation 
measures and design the communication strategies.
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